BEIRUT — Any­one pay­ing any atten­tion to *al-wada* (the sit­u­a­tion) in Lebanon knows things ain’t good. The weather is affect­ing every­thing, from food deliv­er­ies to elec­tric­ity. Skiing’s good up in Faraya, I hear, though.
Last weekend’s unrest was extremely unset­tling. Seven peo­ple were killed and now Hezbol­lah and Amal are call­ing for revenge against the Army. March 8 — the Hezbollah-led oppo­si­tion — is look­ing more and more intran­si­gent, and unwill­ing to come to any solu­tion other than a com­plete cav­ing of the gov­ern­ment to their demands: veto power in the cab­i­net, pick­ing the pres­i­dent and a lock-in to the Syr­ian orbit.
Of course, the pro-Western gov­ern­ment of Fuad Sin­iora is unwill­ing to do that, cre­at­ing a sit­u­a­tion that is ripe for explo­sion. The atmos­phere is tense, and Lebanese are jumpy. Already there are [small daily clashes](http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2008/02/3_injured_as_he.php) and [assaults on Army positions](http://www.naharnet.com/domino/tn/NewsDesk.nsf/getstory?openform&C84DEA09904614D1C22573E300236CDE). Lebanese media are rife with reports that Syria now opposes Army Chief Michel Sleiman for pres­i­dent (not sure why, really; per­haps he’s not so in their camp as they thought he was?) and prefers for­mer For­eign Min­is­ter Fares Boueiz for the post.
Mrs. Back to Iraq, a bet­ter observer of Lebanese pol­i­tics than I am, doesn’t think last week’s protest-turned-street-battle was spon­ta­neous. The *dahiyeh*, she said, is like Syria. Not much hap­pens there with­out Hezbollah’s notice and approval. They’re try­ing to dis­credit the proto-presidency of Sleiman before it even hap­pens. I agree with her, but I won­der if the protests really did start spon­ta­neously and Hezbol­lah, rec­og­niz­ing an oppor­tu­nity, allowed them to bal­loon into a con­fronta­tion with the state. At any rate, “Black Sun­day” has led to a pre­dictable amount of [finger-pointing](http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=88635) and blame-shifting.
My friend, Mitch Prothero, [has a good piece in Slate](http://www.slate.com/id/2183285/) on last weekend’s vio­lence.
Most peo­ple I talk to think the *al-wada* will go on until 2009, when there are par­lia­men­tary elec­tions. Then Hezbol­lah and the rest of the March 8 folks will likely win these and that will be the end of the so-called Cedar Rev­o­lu­tion. Lebanon will return to the Syr­ian fold and politi­cians like Walid Jum­blatt and Saad Hariri will be spend­ing a lot of time in Paris and Riyadh.
That’s Hezbollah’s real goals, I think. Not to take over the coun­try and install an Islamic state. Hezbol­lah is at heart a rev­o­lu­tion­ary move­ment and they’re smart enough to know that their pop­u­lar­ity comes from that mys­tique as well as their social ser­vices that oper­ate sep­a­rately from the woe­fully inef­fi­cient Lebanese ser­vices.
If they “took over” and became the gov­ern­ment, they would lose the rev­o­lu­tion­ary aura. From Hezbollah’s point of view, It’s much bet­ter to be a net­work of guerilla com­man­ders in south­ern Lebanon fight­ing Zion­ist occu­piers than to be in charge of fix­ing pot­holes and mak­ing sure the elec­tric­ity is on. Because they don’t get blamed for the screw-ups then. (And Lebanon is noth­ing but one big screw-up when it comes to basic infra­struc­ture.)
It works like this: If Hezbol­lah gives up its weapons — as every other mili­tia in Lebanon did at the end of the 1975 – 1990 Civil War — they lose their value to Iran and Syria as a force on the north­ern flank of Israel. They would be just another polit­i­cal party in Lebanon. With­out that fire­power, what rea­son is there for Syria and Iran to con­tinue fun­nel­ing money and matériel to the group? And with­out the money, those much-admired social ser­vices will come to an end. Lebanese are eas­ily bought, frankly, and their loy­al­ties are not usu­ally so ide­o­log­i­cal. They fol­low lead­ers who deliver on patron­age, jobs and ser­vices. With­out the loy­alty of the Shi’ites, pri­mar­ily bought and paid for with those ser­vices — not, as is claimed, because of an inborn rev­o­lu­tion­ary mind­set — Hezbol­lah would quickly fall apart.
That’s what’s at stake here. That’s why Hezbol­lah must have veto power and con­trol the pres­i­dency — to pre­vent any deci­sion regard­ing its weapons; to remove UNIFIL as an irri­tant in the south; to pre­vent the Lebanese gov­ern­ment from extend­ing author­ity to south Beirut and other areas of Hezbol­lah­stan.
Samir Geagea, a March 14 leader, said the goal is to so par­a­lyze Lebanon that [Syria will be asked to inter­vene again](http://www.naharnet.com/domino/tn/NewsDesk.nsf/getstory?openform&CEC817027646A1F6C22573E2005610B2), as it did in 1975, but he inflates the issue, I think. I think Syria very much wants a return to pre­em­i­nence in its tiny neigh­bor, but troops are not in the cards. The plan is to return to the 2004 *sta­tus quo ante*, as Con­doleezza Rice intoned so often dur­ing the Israel-Hezbollah war. They want to get back to a pro­tected sta­tus in the south, being a free-range guerilla move­ment. They want to pre­serve their weapons, which is their real con­stituency.
Hezbollah’s plan, when it comes to Syria and its weapons, is to par­a­lyze and protect.