Going in?

BEIRUTIn my pre­vi­ous post, I men­tioned that Maj. Gen Ashraf Rifi, the head of the Inter­nal Secu­rity Forces told me, he “thinks the army will have to go in” to Nahr el-​Bared to uproot the mil­i­tants of Fatah al-​Islam.
“They are very dan­ger­ous,” he told me in his plush office. “We have no choice, we have to com­bat them.“
Per­haps I under­played his com­ments, because if he’s right, “going in” would be a huge devel­op­ment. The Pales­tini­ans have run their own secu­rity in the 12 camps under a 1969 agree­ment bro­kered by the Arab League. Now, that agree­ment was allegedly revoked in 1987 by the Lebanese Par­lia­ment, but there’s still at least a tacit agree­ment that the Pales­tini­ans mind their own store.
That’s not really a viable secu­rity option any­more, as we can see just north of Tripoli.
Now, what was Rifi try­ing to say? Was he merely repeat­ing the phrase of my ques­tion — “Will the army have to go in?” — because his eng­lish isn’t so good, as he protested a cou­ple of times? (He spoke well enough to con­duct an inter­view, mind you.) Was he try­ing to empha­size the point that there are ele­ments in the gov­ern­ment that are rarin’ to go get those Fatah al-​Islam guys while oth­ers, per­haps Prime Min­is­ter Fuad Sin­iora, are will­ing to take a slower approach?
Or was he try­ing, in his own locu­tion, to empha­size the impor­tance for Lebanon of win­ning this bat­tle? Because this is make or break time for Lebanon as a sov­er­eign state.
If the army fails at this task of defeat­ing Fatah al-​Islam — and I’m not talk­ing about some mealy-​mouthed “arrange­ment” where a few of the mil­i­tants are hauled in — it will under­mine the legit­i­macy of the army as a state insti­tu­tion. And that will very much play right into Hezbollah’s hands.
See, Hezbol­lah has often said it is needed as an armed resis­tance because the army is too weak to stand up to Israel. (True.) But the Shi’ite group won’t put itself under the com­mand of the army because to do so would mean that any attack it launched on Israel such as, say, cap­tur­ing and killing Israeli troops, would mean _​Lebanon_​was the aggres­sor and as such would bring down the wrath of the Israeli mil­i­tary on _Lebanon._
Of course, this is exactly what hap­pened last sum­mer, but let’s not quib­ble. In Lebanese pol­i­tics, there are appar­ently no lim­its on hypocrisy.
If the army fails and is seen as weak or ille­git­i­mate, Hezbol­lah has a strong argu­ment for say­ing it must keep its arms for the defense of Lebanon. Now, one of the def­i­n­i­tions of sov­er­eignty is the “monop­oly on the legit­i­mate use of phys­i­cal force”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monopoly_on_the_legitimate_use_of_physical_force, or vio­lence. Since Lebanon’s gov­ern­ment and weak army would be unable to claim that fol­low­ing a loss at the hands of Fatah al-​Islam, there would be no real sov­er­eignty here. Hezbol­lah 1, Lebanon 0.
One can argue whether a sov­er­eign Lebanon is a good or bad thing in the grand scheme of things, an argu­ment I can’t address on this hum­ble blog, although I favor the for­mer. But it’s vitally impor­tant to the Lebanese gov­ern­ment.
It’s so impor­tant that some ele­ments of the gov­ern­ment, includ­ing Rifi’s for­mer boss, cab­i­net mem­ber Ahmad Fat­fat, “are call­ing for storm­ing the gates of Nahr el-Bared.”:http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20070526.LEBANON26/TPStory/International
There is some buzz that this will be resolved in 48 hours. That may be true, or it might not be. A lot can hap­pen in this small coun­try in that time.
By the way, the dona­tions are work­ing again, and cov­er­ing this place ain’t cheap. Fix­ers, rented cars, hotel rooms, etc. all cost money and free­lanc­ing for news­pa­pers only cov­ers part of it. If you’d like me to keep blog­ging the devel­op­ments in Lebanon’s lat­est cri­sis, please con­sider drop­ping some coin in the donate link below and to the right. Thanks.

About that showdown…

BEIRUT — Lebanon is truly a strange — yet tasty — place. Two hours ago, I had Lebanese sol­diers point­ing guns at me over a traf­fic snafu (my dri­ving or theirs, I’m not sure which and I’ll bet nei­ther do they) and now I’m at Julia’s enjoy­ing a right­eous grilled chicken salad with a sub­tle basil vinai­grette.
But I won­der if “my pre­dic­tions of a loom­ing showdown”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/2007/05/showdown_looming.php were pre­ma­ture. It’s true that hun­dreds of Lebanese troops are ring­ing the Pales­tin­ian camp of Nahr el-​Bared, where “hun­dreds” of Fatah al-​Islam fight­ers are holed up — along with about 18,000 Pales­tin­ian civil­ians. And also it’s true that the U.S. and other Arab coun­tries have sped up the deliv­ery of mil­i­tary aid to Lebanon: more ammo, night vision gog­gles and the like. And it’s true that Defense Min­is­ter Elias Murr has said that death or sur­ren­der are the only options for the fight­ers. Fur­ther­more, the chief of the Inter­nal Secu­rity Forces, Maj. Gen. Ashraf Rifi told me not 30 min­utes ago that he thought the army would have to go in.
But that ras­cally sheikh Has­san Nas­ral­lah has thrown a span­ner in the works, it seems. Yes­ter­day was Lib­er­a­tion Day, a national hol­i­day com­mem­o­rat­ing the retreat of the Israelis from south­ern Lebanon in 2000. Nas­ral­lah took the oppor­tu­nity to warn against going into the camps, say­ing an assault by the army was “a red line” and that the oppo­si­tion wanted no part of it.
“The Nahr al-​Bared camp and Pales­tin­ian civil­ians are a red line,” Nas­ral­lah said, accord­ing to Al-​Nahar. “We will not accept or pro­vide cover or be part­ners in this.“
“Does it con­cern us that we start a con­flict with Al Qaeda in Lebanon and con­se­quently attract mem­bers and fight­ers of Al Qaeda from all over the world to Lebanon to con­duct their bat­tle with the Lebanese army and the rest of the Lebanese?” he added.
Fair enough, I guess. But more to the point, his address and his oppo­si­tion to a mil­i­tary solu­tion will rever­ber­ate through­out the army, about half of which is Shi’a. A sharp pro­ducer I know up north painted an alter­nate sce­nario than the _al-Götterdämmerung_ sce­nario presently being awaited.
Nasrallah’s address stopped the state in its tracks, said the pro­ducer, because of his influ­ence among Shi’a. Going into the camp now, with half the army Shi’a, risks split­ting the army while at the same time risk­ing a gen­eral upris­ing among the 350,000 to 400,000 Pales­tini­ans in Lebanon. With­out a uni­fied army, there can be no uni­fied Lebanon. The rem­nants of the mil­i­tary would col­lapse into mili­tias. And that’s the end of the ball game. Civil War 2.0. Talk about an ‘80s revival! (Only with­out the music, hair or Molly Ring­wald.)
What’s more likely, he said, is that in the com­ing days or, more likely, weeks, a num­ber of Fatah al-​Islam mem­bers will be “caught” try­ing to “escape” the camp. The Army will announce it has caught the “crim­i­nals” who started this whole thing with their attack on army posi­tions last week­end. Shaker al-​Abssi, the leader of Fatah al-​Islam, will evade cap­ture.
And the rest? Well, it will turn out that Fatah al-​Islam wasn’t quite as big an orga­ni­za­tion as peo­ple thought it was.
The army would look like it accom­plished some­thing, mas­sive blood­shed would be avoided (a good thing) and, like most issues in Lebanon, this whole ugly episode would be sus­pended but not resolved.
Does it solve the prob­lem? No, but look­ing the other way and see­ing what they want to is a Lebanese tra­di­tion.
Time will tell if the pro­ducer or the doom­say­ers are right.
By the way, the dona­tions are work­ing again, and cov­er­ing this place ain’t cheap. Fix­ers, rented cars, hotel rooms, etc. all cost money and free­lanc­ing for news­pa­pers only cov­ers part of it. If you’d like me to keep blog­ging the devel­op­ments in Lebanon’s lat­est cri­sis, please con­sider drop­ping some coin in the donate link below and to the right. Thanks.

Strange doings in Tripoli

TRIPOLI — What the heck is going on up here? That seems to be the big ques­tion at the moment. Last night around 9 p.m., fight­ing started up again between the Lebanese army and Fatah al-​Islam. This prompted spec­u­la­tion that the push against the jihadi group had come, and I raced back up to Tripoli from my spot of being stuck in a check­point just out­side Beirut. (The cap­i­tal is locked down after three bombs this week, so secu­rity is tight.)
Atop the build­ing where the tele­vi­sion crews have set up, the owner of the build­ing — a tightly wound guy in the best of times — car­ried around a Kalash­nikov and threat­ened to shoot any­one who turned on their tele­vi­sion lights.
In the dark­ness, you couldn’t see who was who, and a rumor — goosed, appar­ently by Lebanese mil­i­tary intel­li­gence — swept through the gang that Fatah al-​Islam had sent sui­cide bombers through­out the nearby area and one might be on the roof. A quick evac­u­a­tion ensued.
This morn­ing it’s quiet again. The fight­ing stopped around 6 a.m., and we’re back to wait­ing for some­thing to hap­pen.
My feel­ing is that Fuad Siniora’s gov­ern­ment is a bit con­fused, as the Pales­tin­ian issue is a tricky one. The sta­tus of Pales­tini­ans in Lebanon is not a purely inter­nal affair, but one belong­ing to the Arab League thanks to a 1969 agree­ment that keeps Lebanese author­ity out of the 12 camps scat­tered around the coun­try. Fur­ther com­pli­cat­ing mat­ters, the camp isn’t empty. There has been a more or less steady trickle of refugees get­ting out of the camps, either on foot or in cars, but there are still about 18,000 civil­ians in the camp, accord­ing to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.
The human­i­tar­ian sit­u­a­tion is grow­ing worse by the hour inside the camp, accord­ing to the Inter­na­tional Com­mit­tee of the Red Cross, and scat­tered demon­stra­tions in other camps have already occurred. More casu­al­ties among civil­ians is going to inflame the Pales­tini­ans in Lebanon — an already seething peo­ple who make up about 10 per­cent of Lebanon’s pop­u­la­tion. Sul­tan Abu Aynan, the head of Lebanon’s branch of Fatah — the main group in the PLO — has warned of a gen­eral upris­ing among the Pales­tini­ans could occur. Other Arab gov­ern­ments have also expressed con­cern over the casu­al­ties (even while they pledge a rush ship­ment of weapons to the Lebanese army.)
So a long siege is unten­able to the Pales­tini­ans and Arab gov­ern­ments around the region. But leav­ing Fatah al-​Islam alone is equally unten­able to the Lebanese gov­ern­ment. Going into the camp, no mater how care­fully, will result in hor­rific casu­al­ties among both the Pales­tini­ans and the Lebanese army, per­haps the only state insti­tu­tion almost widely admired by all of Lebanon’s quar­rel­ing con­fes­sional groups. Fur­ther com­pli­cat­ing mat­ters, mem­bers of the oppo­si­tion, led by the Syr­ian– and Iranian-​backed Hezbol­lah, camped out in down­town since Dec. 1, have started mak­ing polit­i­cal hay out of this sit­u­a­tion by accus­ing the U.S.-backed gov­ern­ment of incom­pe­tence and dither­ing — charges which aren’t entirely untrue.
I men­tion the var­i­ous back­ers because solv­ing the prob­lem of Fatah al-​Islam has impli­ca­tions far beyond the bor­ders of Lebanon. While mass casu­al­ties on the army’s side would be bad, in Lebanon, the fear of the “other” over­rides all. It’s highly unlikely Siniora’s polit­i­cal allies in the Chris­t­ian and Druze camps would desert him no mat­ter how bad a mil­i­tary assault might be.
(On a side note, Saad Hariri, the son of the slain for­mer Prime Min­is­ter Rafik Hariri, urged his sup­port­ers — of which there are many in this con­ser­v­a­tive Sunni area — to help the army. Allegedly, some have taken that to heart because I’ve heard sto­ries from Pales­tini­ans who say Future Move­ment fol­low­ers are shoot­ing into the camp at any­thing that moves. How do they know the bul­lets are from Future Move­ment sup­port­ers? Who knows, but the truth is almost irrel­e­vant in this case; the sus­pi­cions indi­cate the depth of dis­trust between Pales­tini­ans and local res­i­dents up here.)
So while army casu­al­ties would be bad, large num­bers of dead among the Pales­tini­ans would be worse. Arab gov­ern­ments in the region such as Egypt, Jor­dan, Saudi Ara­bia and the var­i­ous Gulf sheikhdoms would be seen by their own restive pop­u­la­tions as help­ing a gov­ern­ment mas­sacre Pales­tini­ans — and it would be an _​Arab_​gov­ern­ment doing it. Talk about betrayal! (Al Jazeera, by far the most pop­u­lar news chan­nel through­out the Mid­dle East, “is allegedly push­ing this narrative”:http://beirutspring.com/blog/2007/05/23/why-many-lebanese-are-shunning-aljazeera/, although I can’t ver­ify this just yet.) So Cairo, Amman and oth­ers are watch­ing this sit­u­a­tion very closely.
This would be bad for Sin­iora because he relies not only on sup­port from the West, but from friendly Arab gov­ern­ments who want to check the Iranian-​Syrian axis. Weak­en­ing Sin­iora means strength­en­ing Hezbol­lah in Lebanon’s zero-​sum pol­i­tics, which would fur­ther strength­en­ing Syria, right when it’s fac­ing a pos­si­ble United Nations Secu­rity Coun­cil res­o­lu­tion that would set up the Hariri tri­bunal under Chap­ter 7.
The com­mon thread in all of this is Syria. Fatah al-​Islam is sus­pected of being a Syr­ian mar­i­onette and Hezbol­lah is a Syr­ian ally. With threats from the north, south and east, the lit­tle prime-​minister-​that-​could is rapidly run­ning out of room to maneuver.

Scene from the North

Here’s the story I filed for the San Fran­cisco Chron­i­cle last night,giv­ing you a sense of the scene up around the Nahr el-​Bared camp. It’s grim:

Across the street, black smog bil­lowed over the camp while half a dozen build­ings blazed. Sniper fire crack­led in the air as the army pounded the camp with 120mm mor­tar and tank shells. Fatah al-​Islam mil­i­tants responded with rocket pro­pelled grenade launch­ers and machine-​gun fire.
Dense orange groves sur­round­ing the camp were scorched from explo­sions while the army seemed to method­i­cally lob shells on a spe­cific sec­tor of the camp, set­ting a num­ber of build­ings on fire before mov­ing on.
Con­di­tions in the camp — a mis­er­able war­ren of alley­ways and cin­derblock homes hous­ing between 30,000 and 40,000 peo­ple – are grim. A source at the U.N. Relief and Works Agency in New York said it was impos­si­ble for camp med­ical work­ers to get to the dead and wounded. Water and elec­tricty have been cut off and about 50 for­eign­ers — many of the West­ern­ers — are hun­kered down as their embassies work to get a cease fire in place so they can be evacuated.

I’m head­ing up in a cou­ple of hours. Word is a UN con­voy is going to try to get into the camp.

More Violence and an update on Fatah al-​Islam

BEIRUT — Jesus. Another car bomb just went off a few min­utes ago in upscale Ver­dun, an upscale Mus­lim neigh­bor­hood full of tony shops. I can’t tell yet, but there appear to be much more dam­age and casu­al­ties than last night’s car bomb in Achrafiyeh. The cars are still burn­ing as I type. The neigh­bor­hood is in chaos as sol­diers and res­cue work­ers try to keep order and reach the wounded amid the flames. Updates as I can get them.
*UPDATE 1:* Future TV, affil­i­ated with the Hariri fam­ily, says four peo­ple have been injured in the bomb.
I’d also like to write a lit­tle his­tory on Fatah al-​Islam. As the Lebanese Army fights a pitched bat­tle with the Pales­tin­ian mil­i­tant group, the ques­tion for many in Beirut — espe­cially those who sup­port the cur­rent gov­ern­ment — is what role Syria may be play­ing in the cur­rent drama to the north.Â
The tim­ing, accord­ing to some polit­i­cal observers, is telling com­ing as it does on the heels of the intro­duc­tion of a draft res­o­lu­tion at the United Nations Secu­rity Coun­cil to set up an inter­na­tional tri­bunal that would try sus­pects in the mur­der of for­mer Prime Min­is­ter Rafik Hariri in 2005. Syria, which opposes the tri­bunal, could have pulled the strings on Fatah al-​Islam, a group that gov­ern­ment sup­port­ers say heeds its mas­ters in Dam­as­cus.
National police com­man­der Maj. Gen. Ashraf Rifi said yes­ter­day that Dam­as­cus was behind Fatah al-Islam’s recent surge, with only a bit of al Qaeda ide­ol­ogy thrown in.Â
“Per­haps there are some deluded peo­ple among them but they are not al Qaida,” Rifi said. “This is imi­ta­tion al Qaida, a ‘Made in Syria’ one.“
Muham­mad Shatah, a senior advi­sor to Prime Min­is­ter Fuad Sin­iora — whose gov­ern­ment is locked in a power strug­gle with oppo­si­tion groups that sup­port Syria — also said Syria was try­ing to derail the tri­bunal, which is widely expected in to impli­cate senior Syr­ian offi­cials in the Hariri killing, by sow­ing dis­cord in Lebanon. The widely held belief among gov­ern­ment mem­bers is that the leader of Fatah al-​Islam, Shaker al-​Abssi, is a mem­ber of the Syr­ian _​mukhabarrat_​and was sent here last year to stir up trou­ble after mak­ing a deal for an early release from a Syr­ian prison.Â
But one long­time observer of the Pales­tin­ian camps and Islamist move­ments doesn’t see Syria’s direct involve­ment. Kassem Kas­sir, a jour­nal­ist for the pro-​government news­pa­per al Mus­taqbal who is an expert on these groups and has inter­viewed mem­bers of the group in Nahr el-​Bared, said Fatah al-​Islam, and its leader Shaker al-​Abssi are sup­ported by Salafist groups in the Gulf, Iraq and Jor­dan that share al Qaida’s ide­ol­ogy more than they are by Syria. Al-Abssi’s link to Syria comes from the long his­tory of attempts by Syria to use the Pales­tini­ans for its own pur­poses against Israel.Â
Al Abssi used to be a mem­ber of the main Pales­tin­ian fac­tion, Fatah, founded by for­mer PLO chair­man Yas­sir Arafat. He later joined Fatah al-​Intifada, a fake group set up by Syria in an attempt to turn Pales­tini­ans’ national yearn­ings to Syria’s advan­tage. But with lit­tle sup­port among the Pales­tin­ian pop­u­la­tion, which by and large stayed loyal to home­grown groups such as Fatah and Hamas, Fatah al-​Intifada lan­guished. Last year, in a bid to strike out on his own, Kas­sir said, Al Abssi split and formed Fatah al-Islam.Â
It was pos­si­bly a nat­ural split, he said, because Al Abssi is a Jor­dan­ian of Pales­tin­ian descent with ties to Abu Musab al-​Zarqawi, the for­mer leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, who was killed last year. Today he gets money and men from Salafist groups in the Gulf, Iraq and Jor­dan who share his jihadist view of an Islamic caliphate stretch­ing from Morocco to Indonesia.Â
Kas­sir acknowl­edged that Fatah al-​Islam appears to be very well armed and those weapons had to have come through Syria at some point, indi­cat­ing some degree of coöper­a­tion, but Syria often allows groups other than its main ally Hezbol­lah to arm up.Â
Hezbol­lah has con­straints on what it can do, given its image as a Lebanese resis­tance with mem­bers of par­lia­ment, said Reva Bhalla, direc­tor of geopo­lit­i­cal analy­sis at Strat­for, a Houston-​based secu­rity firm. It is reluc­tant to turn its guns on the gov­ern­ment, given that it’s part of it and it still hope to be seen as a legit­i­mate part of the Lebanese polit­i­cal process. Groups such as Fatah al-​Islam have more flexibility.Â
“Syria is fun­nel­ing weapons and men to them, keep­ing them there (in Lebanon) and they’re a bar­gain­ing tac­tic against the United States,” which is cur­rently talk­ing with Syria’s main ally, Iran, over a pos­si­ble détente in the Mid­dle East, she said. Sig­nif­i­cantly, she added, Iran has sig­naled that it doesn’t oppose the Hariri tri­bunal, which is mak­ing Syria very ner­vous that its main ally might be hang­ing it out to dry.Â
“Syria is watch­ing very closely that it doesn’t get screwed in any deal,” and any sup­port it may be giv­ing to groups such as Fatah al-​Islam is to remind the United States that it has chips it can still play.  Â
Regard­less of how the bat­tle with Fatah al-​Islam plays out, there are other groups that Syria has more direct ties with, Kas­sir said, such as Jund al-​Sham (Army of the Sham) and Osbat al-​Ansar (the League of Par­ti­sans), which are based in other Pales­tin­ian camps in Lebanon. They all share a sim­i­lar ide­ol­ogy and all ben­e­fit from Syria’s look­ing the other way as matériel crosses the bor­der com­ing from and head­ing to Iraq.Â
“This is just the tip of the ice­berg,” he said.Â