The Birthplace of Civil War

AIN EL-RUMMANE, Lebanon — It’s an odd place to start a war.

Ain el-Rummane, a Chris­t­ian neigh­bor­hood in the hills above Beirut occu­pies an omi­nous place in Lebanese his­tory. It was here, in 1975, near a statue of the Vir­gin, that a bus full of Pales­tin­ian refugees was ambushed by Chris­t­ian mili­ti­a­men. It was a mas­sacre in response to an assas­si­na­tion attempt, and the reprisals it gen­er­ated in turn quickly grew into the Lebanese civil war.

And now this res­i­den­tial neigh­bor­hood may pro­vide some of the sol­diers to fight in a new one. Mem­bers of the Lebanese Forces, the same mili­tia that killed the Pales­tini­ans in 1975, still claim Ain el-Rummane as home and they sim­mered Wednes­day, the day after the grand­son of the founder of their polit­i­cal party was killed by assas­sins on a busy Beirut street in mid-afternoon.

One more mis­take and we will take the streets with our hands,” said Arz Wehbe, 27, a mem­ber of the mili­tia. “There are no weapons out now, but when it becomes seri­ous, we will take weapons from under the ground.”

The assas­si­na­tion of the 34-year-old Pierre Gemayel, Lebanon’s min­is­ter of indus­try, on Tues­day was the lat­est, most omi­nous devel­op­ment in Lebanon’s lat­est, most omi­nous polit­i­cal cri­sis that began in Feb­ru­ary 2005 with the mur­der of for­mer prime min­is­ter Rafik Hariri. Since then, Lebanon has seen five assas­si­na­tions, 15 bomb­ings, a vicious war between Hezbol­lah and Israel and an attempt by the Shi’ite group to top­ple the elected government.

But Gemayel’s death is more than just another assas­si­na­tion, because he was the first sit­ting mem­ber of gov­ern­ment to be killed and his death brings the spec­tre of a gov­ern­ment col­lapse closer than ever. Two weeks ago, five Shi’ite min­is­ters and a pro-Syrian Chris­t­ian min­is­ter resigned from Fuad Siniora’s U.S.-backed cab­i­net over the issue of the approval of an inter­na­tional tri­bunal on Hariri’s killing — which many think would impli­cate senior Syr­ian offi­cials. Other politi­cians gave omi­nous warn­ings that Syria would try to assas­si­nate some of the remain­ing cab­i­net min­is­ters in order to reduce it below its quo­rum level of 16 mem­bers. With Gemayel’s death, only two min­is­ters stand against its dis­so­lu­tion, and with it the inter­na­tional tribunal.

In Lebanon, his­tory casts a long shadow. It was an attempt on the life of his grand­fa­ther, the Pha­langist Party founder who was also named Pierre Gemayel, that sparked the mas­sacre in Ain el-Rummane 31 years ago.

We will not shut up, we will not be silent,” said Wehbe. “Even if the coun­try is destroyed, we will stay.”

Another Lebanese Forces loy­al­ist, Simon Ghanime, 39, said that every­one was ready to take to the streets. They were just wait­ing for word from their lead­ers, Samir Geagea, the leader of the Lebanese Forces, and Amin Gemayel, the slain man’s father and a for­mer president.

At the end of the day, you have to defend your­self,” Ghanime said. “I lis­ten always to my leader.“
And if, at the end of the day, Geagea or Amin Gemayel says fight?

Then we have to fight,” he said with a shrug. “They are hunt­ing us (Chris­tians) like birds.”

For now Amin Gemayel has coun­seled patience and prayer in Bik­faya where his son would be buried on Thurs­day. But in Beirut and its sub­urbs like Ain el-Rummane, angry men prowled the streets.

I won’t leave Lebanon to the Shi’ites or the Syr­i­ans,” said Char­bel Nas­ral­lah, 24, from a mas­sive con­voy that was pass­ing the Pha­langist Party Head­quar­ters in East Beirut. “We don’t want Syr­i­ans or Ira­ni­ans to decide our fates. We will.”

But even within the ranks of Lebanon’s right-wing Chris­tians, there are those with less appetite for confrontation.

The aim of March 8″ — the name of the pro-Syrian coali­tion — “is to get us to fight,” said a for­mer Lebanese Forces fighter who gave his name only as Car­los. “We can’t slip into this trap. It’s in their inter­est to get us to fight, but we don’t want that.”

Another man who was tap­ing pic­tures of the slain Gemayel to his car and who gave his name only as Eli echoed the idea that Lebanon’s Chris­tians must unite and not fall into the trap of vio­lence set by Syria and other for­eign pow­ers. But he said that even he would fight if his lead­ers told him to.

To ensure the Chris­tians stay in this part of the world?” he asked. “Of course I would fight.”

Orig­i­nally pub­lished in the Newark Star-Ledger.

Pierre Gemayel has been assassinated

BEIRUT — Pierre Gemayel, indus­try min­is­ter in the Sin­iora cab­i­net, a major Chris­t­ian leader and an anti-Syrian politi­cian has been shot to death in the street. This comes at an extremely tense time in which the anti-Syrian and pro-Syrian camps are close to com­ing to blows.

I don’t know much right now, but this could be the spark in the can of gaso­line that Lebanon has become.

UPDATE: Here’s the story I filed for the San Fran­cisco Chron­i­cle:

BEIRUT — With the killing of Pierre Gemayel, Lebanon’s indus­try min­is­ter and the scion of one its most influ­en­tial Chris­t­ian fam­i­lies, Lebanese pol­i­tics took a dan­ger­ous turn with the Chris­t­ian com­mu­nity deeply split and the U.S.-backed gov­ern­ment more under siege than ever.

Gemayel, 34, a mem­ber of Lebanon’s polit­i­cal elite, was killed at approx­i­mately 3:30 p.m. gang­land style Tues­day when his car was rammed by two other cars and gun­men leaped out and sprayed his vehi­cle with assault rife fire.

His body was taken to St. Joseph Hos­pi­tal in a Chris­t­ian neigh­bor­hood on the out­skirts of Beirut. As the news broke, sev­eral hun­dred sup­port­ers of the Pha­langist party, gath­ered as a show of sol­i­dar­ity and an out­let for their rage against their Chris­t­ian rivals, the Free Patri­otic Move­ment, and Shi’ites.

Fuck Nas­ral­lah!” many chanted, refer­ring to the leader of the Shi’ite mili­tia Hezbol­lah. “Fuck Michel Aoun!”

Aoun is the head of the FPM, and there has been bad blood between the Gemayel fam­ily, Aoun and the Shi’ites in Lebanon for years. Dur­ing the lat­ter days of the Lebanese civil war, forces loyal to Aoun bat­tled Chris­t­ian mem­bers of the Pha­langist and Lebanese Forces mili­tias in some of the blood­i­est bat­tles of that 15-year-long con­flict. Pierre Gemayel him­self infa­mously said last year that Shi’ites may have the num­bers, but the Chris­tians had the “qual­ity” to run the country.

The crowd at the hos­pi­tal veered dan­ger­ously in its moods. One moment, it was a mass of somber griev­ers and the next it came dan­ger­ously close to being a lynch mob for any­one they thought might be friendly to Hezbol­lah or Aoun.

The ene­mies of Lebanon are known: Aoun, Nas­ral­lah,” said Joseph Ger­manos, a party loy­al­ist. “They want to cre­ate a new war.”

The assas­si­na­tion was roundly denounced, includ­ing by Hezbol­lah, but Aoun gave a press state­ment that was remark­able in its brevity and lack of emo­tion. “This crime is against the unity of the Lebanese and is an attempt to sow dis­cord among the Chris­t­ian ranks,” he said in a flat tone. “I invite all Lebanese to remain calm, and I offer my deep­est sym­pa­thies to Sheikh Amin Gemayel, and to his wife and fam­ily, the Pha­langists and to all Lebanese.”

Today is the 70th anniver­sary of the found­ing if the Pha­lange Party by Gemayel’s grand­fa­ther, also named Pierre Gemayel.

Last week, Samir Geagea, the leader of the Lebanese Forces, warned that a cam­paign of assas­si­na­tions was in the works and would be aimed at the remain­ing mem­bers of the cab­i­net in a bid to force its collapse.

They are killing our Chris­t­ian lead­ers so the truth won’t show,” Ger­manos said.

There is a wide­spread sen­ti­ment among many Lebanese that Syria is behind a string of 15 car bomb­ings, includ­ing five assas­si­na­tions, that started Feb. 14, 2005 with a mas­sive truck bomb that killed for­mer prime min­is­ter Rafik Hariri and 22 oth­ers. The U.S.-backed gov­ern­ment of Fuad Sin­iora, which is sup­ported by an anti-Syrian bloc in par­lia­ment, recently voted to approve an inter­na­tional tri­bunal that would try sus­pects in the killings. Many in Lebanon expect the court’s find­ings to impli­cate high-level Syr­i­ans in the ter­ror cam­paign against Lebanon.

But the five Shi’ite min­is­ters in the cab­i­net rep­re­sent­ing Hezbol­lah and its allies, along with a pro-Syrian Chris­t­ian min­is­ter, resigned ahead of the vote in protest and said Siniora’s gov­ern­ment was uncon­sti­tu­tional because of the lack of Shi’ite rep­re­sen­ta­tion. Hezbol­lah then ratch­eted up ten­sions in the coun­try with promises of mas­sive protests, expected on Thurs­day, it says are designed to bring about the col­lapse of the Sin­iora gov­ern­ment. Under Lebanon’s polit­i­cal rules, if nine of the Cabinet’s 24 min­is­ters resign or are absent, the gov­ern­ment must resign. With the death of Gemayel, only two min­is­ters stand in the way of this outcome.

Iron­i­cally, how­ever, the mur­der of Gemayel could put Hezbol­lah on the defen­sive because of its close ties to Syria and force the mili­tia into a compromise.

It puts Hezbol­lah in the embar­rass­ing posi­tion in the sense that they have been so bla­tantly defend­ing Syria’s inter­ests,” said Reinoud Leen­ders, an assis­tant pro­fes­sor of inter­na­tional rela­tions at the Uni­ver­sity of Ams­ter­dam and a for­mer ana­lyst for the Inter­na­tional Cri­sis Group in Beirut. “They have been put in the Syr­ian camp much more than in the past. I just have a sense that peo­ple are skep­ti­cal of Hezbollah’s recent moves.”

With the likely Secu­rity Coun­cil approval of the inter­na­tional tri­bunal on Thurs­day, Syria may be play­ing a dou­ble game, spec­u­lates Leen­ders. Wash­ing­ton has been reach­ing out to Dam­as­cus recently for help in Iraq, and the regime there may be try­ing to make a point to the United States.

I wouldn’t rule out them being a pain in the neck and at the same time reach­ing out to Wash­ing­ton,” he said. “They might be try­ing to con­vey a mes­sage: ‘You have to talk to us, because oth­er­wise we can be a pain in the neck.’ I wouldn’t rule out them being behind it.”

Already, youths sur­round­ing the Pha­langist head­quar­ters in East Beirut say they plan to stay in the streets as a counter to any demon­stra­tions Hezbol­lah might plan. These demon­stra­tions by the anti-Syrian camp could “pre-empt” the Hezbol­lah one and weaken their effec­tive­ness, said Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, a vis­it­ing scholar at the Carnegie Cen­ter for Inter­na­tional Peace and an expert on Hezbollah.

March 8 will have a hard time with the demon­stra­tions now,” she said “March 8″ is what Hezbol­lah and its other pro-Syrian allies calls its coali­tion. Chris­t­ian sym­pa­thy for Aoun also may leech away, she said.

But the threat of mas­sive street protests by Hezbol­lah and the Aounists still looms, and the pos­si­bil­ity of renewed civil con­flict between the two camps is very real.

All the ele­ments are there for clashes, and pretty seri­ous ones,” said Leen­ders. “The polit­i­cal process is bogged down, the talk of war, the creepy signs before the storm atmos­phere. I’m pretty worried.”

When asked if they were pre­pared to fight their ene­mies in the street, one young man in the crowd at the hos­pi­tal, who declined to give his name other than Kataeb — Ara­bic for “Phalangist” — said, “We lost every­thing. We don’t have any­thing to lose again.”

Another young man said he was just wait­ing for the sig­nal from Pierre’s father, Amin Gemayel, a for­mer pres­i­dent of Lebanon.

What­ever Pres­i­dent Gemayel says,” said David Jaara, 25. “We are pre­pared for 10,000 mar­tyrs, 20,000. We are prepared.”

Misimpressions about Lebanon

BEIRUT — Well, the oafs at Lit­tle Green Foot­balls are at it again. Of course, they never stopped. But it gives me a chance to point out the sheer wrong­ness of their world­view and clear up some wrong ideas about Lebanon. At the end of the day, we all learn some­thing, right?

Any­way, LGF is warn­ing that Lebanon is hang­ing in the bal­ance with Hezbollah’s com­ing putsch against the American-friendly Sin­iora gov­ern­ment. Now, like a bro­ken clock, even blovi­at­ing idiots can be right now and then assum­ing they talk enough, but the LGF’s com­menters of course blow it:

There should be some way to get Lebanese Chris­tians out of there before it’s too late.

I have a cou­ple of frends, Lebanese Chris­tians, that still have fam­ily there. I hope they get out before it’s too late.

The Chris­t­ian city dwellers will rue the day they let these sav­ages immi­grate. (not sure what this means… — CA)

The Chris­tians in Beirut have been whistling past the graveyard.

Chris­tians are being heav­ily per­se­cuted in most of the mus­lim coun­tries, with the worst in the ME. Per​se​cu​tion​.com has lots of infor­ma­tion about it.

Lebanon

In 1968 70% Christian.

In 2006 45% Christian.

The gain was almost all for the mus­lims; the pales­tin­ian tsunami.

Such com­ments always inspire in me a Lou Reed-size world-weary sigh. Yes, it’s all so sim­ple: evil Mus­lims, per­se­cuted Christians.

Except, it’s com­pletely wrong.

Hezbollah’s strongest ally in its push to top­ple the gov­ern­ment is … Chris­t­ian. It’s the Free Patri­otic Move­ment headed by Maronite politi­cian Michel Aoun, a man who’s so obsessed with being Pres­i­dent that he will ally with the peo­ple who work for his old enemy: Syria.

And the Free Patri­otic Move­ment is sup­ported by — by some esti­mates — up to 70 per­cent of Lebanon’s Chris­tians. The rest fall mainly into Samir Geagea’s camp, the Lebanese Forces, a party/militia that owes traces it its pede­gree to the Hitler Youth of the 1930s. (No won­der the LGF ogres like it.)

This cur­rent polit­i­cal fight here has very lit­tle to do with Chris­t­ian vs. Mus­lims. Instead, it’s a fight between a pro-Syrian bloc (Hezbol­lah, Amal, FPM and a few smaller par­ties) and an anti-Syrian bloc (Future Move­ment, Lebanese Forces and Pro­gres­sive Social­ist Party). And this split in the Lebanese polit­i­cal soci­ety mir­rors the greater strug­gle for the Mid­dle East: the con­test for influ­ence between the United States and the Islamic Repub­lic of Iran.

There’s lot more to say about this — I’ve writ­ten about it before “here”:http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/07/02/INGIJJM87B1.DTL&hw=allbritton&sn=001&sc=1000 and “here”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/2006/11/lebanon_hurtles_toward_crisis.php — but I’m on dead­line. More later, if possible.

Oh, and com­ments are still fubar’ed. Still try­ing to fix that.

Another massacre?

BEIRUT — Oh, man. The BBC is report­ing another pos­si­ble mas­sacre of Iraqi civil­ians, this time in Ishaqi, 60 miles north of Bagh­dad. Up to 11 peo­ple may have been “delib­er­ately shot” by U.S. troops.

The video appears to chal­lenge the US military’s account of events that took place in the town of Ishaqi in March.
The US said at the time four peo­ple died dur­ing a mil­i­tary oper­a­tion, but Iraqi police claimed that US troops had delib­er­ately shot the 11 peo­ple.
A spokesman for US forces in Iraq told the BBC an inquiry was under way.

The mil­i­tary says it was a fire­fight with Iraqi insur­gents, and in the course of the bat­tle a house col­lapsed under heavy fire, killing a sus­pect, two women and a child. But Iraqi police said the Amer­i­cans rounded up 11 peo­ple and shot them in the house. They then blew up the build­ing.
The BBC says the tape, pro­vided by a hard­line Sunni group opposed to the occu­pa­tion, showed bod­ies with clear gun­shot wounds and appeared to be gen­uine.
Now, just because a Sunni group sup­plied this video doesn’t mean it should be dis­counted. Greeted with skep­ti­cism, yes, dis­counted, no. The group that brought the Haditha video to our atten­tion at TIME was a Sunni NGO opposed to the Amer­i­can pres­ence, and Haditha looks to be exactly as they described it: a mas­sacre. Also, it makes absolute sense that a Sunni group would be the mes­sen­ger. Thanks to the ram­pant sec­tar­i­an­ism, only Sunni groups can oper­ate in Sunni areas, and they’re bear­ing the brunt of the vio­lence from the U.S.
So why don’t they play up the hor­rors of the Shi’ite groups that are also mas­sacring Sunni fam­i­lies? Well, it wouldn’t do any good. Any­one think the Iraqi gov­ern­ment is going to be par­tic­u­larly respon­sive when the Shi’ite prime min­is­ter (Jaa­fari) appointed a Shi’ite Inte­rior Min­is­ter (Jabr) who “packed his min­istry with Shi’ite death squads”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/2006/03/neither_a_good_war_nor_a_badr.php while Amer­ica dithered and/or trained them? Of course not.
But, also, this is what hap­pens when democ­ra­cies go to war in a media age: The inno­cents — or aggrieved — take their case to the Amer­i­can peo­ple. If their own gov­ern­ment won’t pro­tect them, per­haps the peo­ple that elected the gov­ern­ment that put their gov­ern­ment in place will. It’s a vain hope, I know, but what else do they have left?
*UPDATE 6÷2÷06 8:16:40 PM +0200:* “U.S. mil­i­tary denies alle­ga­tions of Ishaqi massacre”:http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=2032795&page=1.

ABC News has learned that mil­i­tary offi­cials have com­pleted their inves­ti­ga­tion and con­cluded that U.S. forces fol­lowed the rules of engage­ment.
A senior Pen­ta­gon offi­cial told ABC News the inves­ti­ga­tion con­cluded that the alle­ga­tions of inten­tional killings of civil­ians by Amer­i­can forces are unfounded.

Neither a Good War, nor a Badr Peace

_NOTE: Here is “the story”:http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1175055,00.html I filed for TIME​.com over the week­end and which has been occu­py­ing much of my time here in Iraq these last few weeks. It will be my final Iraq story for a while, as I’m leav­ing in a mat­ter of days. After two months, it’s time to take a break._

The bod­ies began to show up early last week. On Mon­day, 34 corpses were found. In the dark­ness of Tues­day morn­ing, 15 more men, between the ages of 22 and 40 were found in the back of a pickup truck in the al-Khadra dis­trict of west­ern Bagh­dad. They had been hanged. By day­break, 40 more bod­ies were found around the city, most bear­ing signs of tor­ture before the men were killed execution-style. The most grue­some dis­cov­ery was an 18-by-24-foot mass grave in the Shi’ite slum of Kamaliyah in east Bagh­dad con­tain­ing the bod­ies of 29 men, clad only in their under­wear with their hands bound and their mouths cov­ered with tape. Local res­i­dents only found it because the ground was ooz­ing blood. In all, 87 bod­ies were found over two days in Bagh­dad.
The grisly dis­cov­ery was hor­ri­ble enough, the lat­est and per­haps most chill­ing sign that Iraq is descend­ing fur­ther into butch­ery — and quite pos­si­bly civil war. But almost as dis­turb­ing is the grow­ing evi­dence that the mas­sacres and oth­ers like it are being tol­er­ated and even abet­ted by Iraq’s Shi’ite-dominated police forces, over­seen by Iraq’s Inte­rior Min­is­ter, Bayan Jabr. On his watch, sec­tar­ian mili­tias have swelled the ranks of the police units and, Sun­nis charge, used their posi­tions to carry out revenge killings against Sun­nis. While allow­ing an Iranian-trained mili­tia to take over the min­istry, crit­ics say, Jabr has autho­rized the tar­geted assas­si­na­tion of Sunni men and stymied inves­ti­ga­tions into Interior-run death squads. Despite numer­ous attempts to con­tact them, nei­ther Jabr nor Inte­rior Min­istry spokes­men responded to requests for com­ment on this arti­cle.
Jabr’s and his forces’ grow­ing rep­u­ta­tion for bru­tal­ity comes at a par­tic­u­larly inop­por­tune moment for the Bush Admin­is­tra­tion, which would like to hand over secu­rity respon­si­bil­i­ties to those same police units as quickly as pos­si­ble. That has raised the dis­tinct and dis­turb­ing pos­si­bil­ity that the U.S. is in fact train­ing and arm­ing one side in a con­flict seem­ing to grow worse by the day. “Mili­tias are the infra­struc­ture of civil war,” U.S. ambas­sador Zal­may Khalilzad told TIME recently. Khalilzad has been pub­licly crit­i­cal of Jabr and warned that the new secu­rity min­istries under the next, per­ma­nent Iraqi gov­ern­ment should be run by com­pe­tent peo­ple who have no ties to mili­tias and who are “non-sectarian.” Fur­ther U.S. sup­port for train­ing the police and army, he said, depends on it.
But ever since Jabr was appointed Inte­rior Min­is­ter after the Jan­u­ary 2005 elec­tion brought a reli­gious Sh’ite coali­tion to power, Sun­nis allege, he began remak­ing the para­mil­i­tary National Police into Shi’ite shock troops. A mem­ber of the Iranian-backed Supreme Coun­cil for the Islamic Rev­o­lu­tion in Iraq (SCIRI), Jabr fled to Iran in the 1970s to avoid Saddam’s crack­down. Jerry Burke, a for­mer civil­ian senior police advi­sor to the Inte­rior Min­istry, said Jabr’s expe­ri­ence with Saddam’s gov­ern­ment has left him bit­ter and dis­trust­ful of any­one he sus­pects has ties to the pre­vi­ous regime. That would most cer­tainly include the for­mer mem­bers of Sad­dam Hussein’s Spe­cial Forces and Repub­li­can Guards which ini­tially made up the bulk of the National Police when Jabr took charge.
To help facil­i­tate his trans­for­ma­tion of the police forces, Jabr made sure to enlist the help of SCIRI’s armed wing, the Badr Orga­ni­za­tion. Mem­bers of the mili­tia have been a grow­ing pres­ence in the National Police, which now con­sists of nine brigades, with about 17,500 mem­bers divided between the Spe­cial Police Com­man­dos, the Pub­lic Order brigades and a mech­a­nized brigade, which will soon be trans­ferred to the Min­istry of Defense. “Lead­er­ship in the com­mando posi­tions has been turned over to Badr,” said Matt Sher­man, a for­mer CPA advi­sor to the Inte­rior Min­istry. “And new recruits are mostly Badr.“
Indeed, out­side the min­istry head­quar­ters, ban­ners pro­claim­ing sol­i­dar­ity with Imam Hus­sein, one of Shi’ites’ holi­est fig­ures, snap in the spring breeze along­side — and some­times instead of — Iraqi flags. Most of the guards’ beards are invari­ably cut in the close-cropped Iran­ian style, mak­ing them stand out in Bagh­dad, where beards are less com­mon.
Like so many things in Iraq right now, it wasn’t sup­posed to be this way. As far back as Decem­ber 2003, David Gom­pert, the for­mer National Secu­rity Advi­sor for the Coali­tion Pro­vi­sional Author­ity, real­ized the dan­gers sec­tar­ian mili­tias posed to Iraq’s sta­bil­ity. And in the wan­ing days of the Coali­tion Pro­vi­sional Author­ity, Amer­i­can viceroy L. Paul “Jerry” Bre­mer issued Order 91, which was intended to demo­bi­lize or inte­grate nine mili­tias total­ing about 100,000 men into the Iraqi secu­rity forces. But the Kur­dish pesh merga and the armed wing of SCIRI, the Badr Orga­ni­za­tion, still exist today because the order was never com­pletely or com­pe­tently car­ried out.
For that, Gom­pert puts the blame squarely on the Iraqi gov­ern­ment, then under Iyad Allawi, as well as the Amer­i­can embassy. With the U.S. mil­i­tary engaged in sev­eral major oper­a­tions in 2004 and the gov­ern­ment tran­si­tion­ing from the CPA to a more tra­di­tional diplo­matic pres­ence with the arrival of U.S. ambas­sador John Negro­ponte at the end of June, Gom­pert says, nei­ther Allawi nor the U.S made the rein­te­gra­tion pro­gram a pri­or­ity. Job train­ing pro­grams run by Allawi’s Labor Min­istry were can­celled over per­sonal feuds and pen­sion pro­grams and other aspects of the pro­gram of DDR — “demil­i­ta­riza­tion, demo­bi­liza­tion and rein­te­gra­tion” — were bounced around from one com­mand to another.
Mak­ing mat­ters worse has been the fact that the police — unlike the Iraqi Army, which is still under U.S. com­mand and super­vi­sion — were prac­ti­cally ignored almost from the begin­ning of the occu­pa­tion, says Burke. And what super­vi­sion the National Police did get came from U.S. mil­i­tary intel­li­gence offi­cers, not civil­ian police advi­sors.
This grave over­sight, which stemmed from the military’s unfa­mil­iar­ity with civil­ian police meth­ods and its unwill­ing­ness to learn, has led to numer­ous abuses and lit­tle account­abil­ity. The U.S. State Depart­ment, “in a report released two weeks ago”:http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61689.htm, doc­u­mented numer­ous inci­dents in 2005, dat­ing back to early May when Jabr was first appointed Inte­rior Min­is­ter, where Sunni men were killed execution-style by Inte­rior Min­istry police or Shi’ite mili­tias. In each case, Jabr ordered an inves­ti­ga­tion, and in each case the inves­ti­ga­tion had yet to report any find­ings.
Thanks in part to the Inte­rior Minister’s “non­fea­sance,” said Burke, the for­mer Inte­rior Min­istry adviser, Jabr was at least indi­rectly respon­si­ble for the deaths of hun­dreds of military-age Sunni men whose bod­ies have turned up at the sewage plant in south­east Bagh­dad since late Decem­ber. Men in police uni­forms and vehi­cles rou­tinely travel through the city in day­light hours with bod­ies in the back of trucks for dis­posal at the sewage plant, he said. Pris­on­ers often dis­ap­pear, Burke said, because they’re picked up at night and no one has an accu­rate account of who is arrested and where they are taken. “The Spe­cial Police Com­man­dos,” he said, using their old name, “are most def­i­nitely out of con­trol.“
So black is the rep­u­ta­tion of the National Police, that after the Feb. 22 bomb­ing of the Askariya shrine in Samarra, many Sun­nis said the per­pe­tra­tors were Inte­rior Min­istry troops who were look­ing for a pre­text to start a civil war. Their fears were fur­ther fueled in the bloody two days after the attack, when Iraq became a sec­tar­ian slaugh­ter­house. Instead of pro­tect­ing cit­i­zens from each other, National Police units stood by as Shi’ite riot­ers — and rival mili­ti­a­men from Moq­tada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army — stormed Sunni mosques and swarmed over Sunni neigh­bor­hoods, accord­ing to numer­ous reports, includ­ing some con­firmed by U.S. Gen. George Casey, com­man­der of Amer­i­can forces in Iraq.
The Amer­i­can efforts to try and help stem the deadly sec­tar­i­an­ism will likely do lit­tle good — and in some respects may well exac­er­bate the prob­lem. Instead of increas­ing the num­ber of civil­ian advi­sors to Iraq’s local police forces, a spokes­woman for the Multi­na­tional Secu­rity Tran­si­tion Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) said more U.S. mil­i­tary police and mil­i­tary per­son­nel will be assigned to train them. The Spe­cial Police Tran­si­tion Teams (SPTTs) are the model that will be fol­lowed. “The SPTTs have been very suc­cess­ful in their efforts,” the spokes­woman said. No change is planned for the over­sight pro­gram on the National Police.
Gom­pert notes, “I remem­ber say­ing, ‘If there is going to be a civil war, it’s going to be fought between Sunni insur­gents and Shi’ite mili­tias.” And as long as Jabr is run­ning the Inte­rior Min­istry and its police forces, there is lit­tle doubt which of the two in such a con­flict will have the law — and Amer­i­can train­ing — on its side.