Death of a Scientist

Some bad news of a per­sonal nature out of Iraq today. A sci­en­tist friend of my for­mer fixer in Iraq was shot and killed in traf­fic Mon­day:

BAGHDAD — A lead­ing Iraqi aca­d­e­mic and promi­nent hard­line Sunni polit­i­cal activist was fatally shot by three gun­men Mon­day as he was leav­ing his Bagh­dad home, police said.
The killers escaped in a car after gun­ning down Essam al-Rawi, head of the Uni­ver­sity Professor’s Union and a senior mem­ber of the influ­en­tial Asso­ci­a­tion of Mus­lim Schol­ars, accord­ing to police Lt. Maitham Abdul-Razaq.
The asso­ci­a­tion is a Sunni orga­ni­za­tion believed to have links to the insur­gency rag­ing against U.S. forces and their Iraqi allies. The group has boy­cotted elec­tions and stood aside from the polit­i­cal process.
An asso­ci­a­tion offi­cial con­firmed the killing of al-Rawi, a geol­o­gist, say­ing he was behind the wheel of his car and had just left his home for the drive to work at Bagh­dad Uni­ver­sity accom­pa­nied by two body­guards.
The gun­men drove in front of al-Rawi’s car, forced it to stop, then sprayed it with auto­matic weapons fire, said the offi­cial, who spoke on con­di­tion of anonymity because he feared reprisal. One of al-Rawi’s body­guards was killed and the other was wounded, the offi­cial said.

I wrote about Dr. Al-Rawi in June 2004 for Seed Mag­a­zine, shortly after I got back to Iraq. I don’t remem­ber if the story ever ran or not as there was a pay­ment dis­pute, but here’s the story I wrote:

The sci­en­tists among the shell cas­ings
BAGHDAD — Dr. Isam al-Rawi, a geol­o­gist at Bagh­dad Uni­ver­sity, sweeps his hand over a set of dog-eared jour­nals. The arc of his ges­ture con­tin­ues on to include a bare lab­o­ra­tory with a few slices of rock sam­ples, a sag­ging chair and a drip­ping sink. The room is mean, long and nar­row, with barely enough room for a col­league to squeeze past al-Rawi car­ry­ing a tray of glasses filled to their chipped rims with Sprite. Finally his hand returns to the jour­nals and books, and he points an accus­ing fin­ger at them.
“I am a uni­ver­sity pro­fes­sor,” he says. “I need books!“
Indeed, he needs a lot more than that, but few things sum up the cur­rent state of Iraq’s sci­en­tific cri­sis more than its lack of books and jour­nals. Al-Rawi’s most recent acqui­si­tion is a pho­to­copied ver­sion of the 1998 edi­tion of the Atlas of Rock Form­ing Min­er­als, which he bought in Libya on his last trip out­side Iraq. His most recent jour­nal, a copy of the Geo­log­i­cal Soci­ety of Amer­ica Bul­letin, dates to August 1985. To a one, his books and jour­nals are old, out of date and falling apart, much like the country’s sci­en­tific com­mu­nity itself.
Before the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq’s sci­en­tists were some of the most respected in the region and they made a good liv­ing. The country’s uni­ver­si­ties churned out engi­neers, tech­ni­cians and Ph.D.s. They often did post-graduate work in the West and had access to the world’s sci­en­tific lit­er­a­ture. They trav­eled to sci­en­tific con­fer­ences all over the world.
But things started to get bad in the mid-1980s when the Iran-Iraq war was rag­ing; Sad­dam Hus­sein began restrict­ing access to sci­en­tific jour­nals. After the dis­as­trous 1991 war and the impo­si­tions of sanc­tions, things took an even graver turn. Salaries plum­meted. Al-Rawi’s monthly income went from about $2,000 a month before the 1991 war to about $400 a month. New sci­en­tists and pro­fes­sors earned about $100 a month. They could not travel; they could not sub­scribe to peri­od­i­cals, as they were for­bid­den by the sanc­tions regime. New books were too expen­sive. Much needed equip­ment, which was often marked as “dual use,” was pre­vented from enter­ing the coun­try. The Mid­dle East’s most advanced sci­en­tific com­mu­nity was effec­tively sealed up in a time cap­sule.
But now, even with most of the restric­tions gone, things are still hard 15 months after Sad­dam Hus­sein was removed from power. While sci­en­tists are no longer pre­vented from order­ing new books and jour­nals and are allowed to leave the coun­try, they often can’t for the sim­ple rea­son that they have no money to do so. And a sin­is­ter series of killings has ter­ri­fied and dec­i­mated the sci­en­tific com­mu­nity. In mid-June, Sabri Al-Bayati, pro­fes­sor of telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions at the col­lege of Sci­ence and Edu­ca­tion at Bagh­dad Uni­ver­sity was shot dead near his home in the Bab Al-Athamiya area in cen­tral Bagh­dad.‏ A few days pre­vi­ously, a physi­cian, Dr. Mohammed Abdul­lah Faleh al-Rawi (no rela­tion), was killed while sit­ting in traf­fic. Their deaths are just two of about 250 uni­ver­sity pro­fes­sors, med­ical doc­tors and engi­neers who have been killed since May 1, 2003.
“No one knows why, no one knows who,” al-Rawi says, and flicked his prayer beads back and forth.
In such an envi­ron­ment, there is no work on new research, says Dr. Nuhad Ali, a mechan­i­cal engi­neer at the uni­ver­sity. The only money being spent is to keep up the salaries of the pro­fes­sors, and the only new equip­ment are some com­put­ers paid for with the now-defunct oil-for-food pro­gram. The uni­ver­si­ties aren’t even accept­ing new grad­u­ate stu­dents, Ali says. All cur­rent grad­u­ate stu­dents, who used to receive a monthly stipend, were enrolled before the war.
But not all is hope­less, two solid state physi­cists, Dr. Izzat al-Essa and Dr. Raed al-Haddend, says they had been able to attend the Saudi Solid State Physics con­fer­ence in Riyadh in March. The praised the lift­ing of travel restric­tions, but says it was still very expen­sive.
Bagh­dad Uni­ver­sity was also lucky. Almost every other uni­ver­sity in the coun­try was looted in the civil unrest fol­low­ing the fall of Bagh­dad. But Amer­i­can troops decided to bivouac on the cam­puses of Bagh­dad Uni­ver­sity and the nearby Al-Nahrain Uni­ver­sity neé Sad­dam Hus­sein Uni­ver­sity. Their pres­ence pre­vented the whole­sale loot­ing of every­thing down to elec­tri­cal fix­tures that was going on just across town at al-Mustansiriya Uni­ver­sity.
So now the sci­en­tific com­mu­nity must rebuild with lim­ited finan­cial resources in a secu­rity vac­uum. It’s no won­der there’s an abid­ing sense of hope­less­ness among the pro­fes­sors. Al-Essa and al-Haddend dream of X-ray machines, elec­tron micro­scopes and FT-IR spec­trom­e­ters. Al-Rawi wants to replace his 1974 X-ray flu­o­res­cence machine so he can ana­lyze some rock sec­tions he recently took near Perispike in the Kur­dish area of north­ern Iraq. Dr. Emad T. Bakir, an indus­trial chemist with a spe­cialty in poly­mers, hopes for research assis­tants, cat­a­lysts and sol­vents.
But the money is sim­ply not there. The for­mer admin­is­tra­tor for the now-dissolved Coali­tion Pro­vi­sional Author­ity L. Paul Bre­mer III was found of say­ing, “Iraq is a rich coun­try that is tem­porar­ily poor.” The new gov­ern­ment is inher­it­ing many of Iraq’s old debts, includ­ing $29.8 bil­lion for war repa­ra­tions to Saudi Ara­bia and Kuwait, but the Tran­si­tional Admin­is­tra­tive Law, which is the work­ing con­sti­tu­tion for the interim gov­ern­ment, for­bids deficit spend­ing. All min­istries, includ­ing the Min­istry of Higher Edu­ca­tion, headed by Dr. Taher Kha­laf Jabur al-Bakaa, are feel­ing the vice grip of national poverty. The min­is­ter doesn’t even have a bullet-proof vest; he can’t afford one.
But if Iraqis are good at any­thing, it’s hop­ing. The sci­en­tific com­mu­nity is no excep­tion. Fuel­ing this hope is a promise promise from Bre­mer. Before he left June 28, he said he would attempt to increase com­mu­ni­ca­tions between Amer­i­can sci­en­tists at uni­ver­si­ties and their Iraqi coun­ter­parts. An Iraqi del­e­ga­tion recently returned from the Uni­ver­sity of Okla­homa whose pres­i­dent Bre­mer went to school with.
“We hope our friends in Amer­ica and Eng­land will come to see what has hap­pened to us,” says al-Rawi.

It should be noted that almost all of the mur­ders of uni­ver­sity pro­fes­sors have gone unsolved. Al-Rawi was work­ing to change that when he became a vic­tim himself.

Haggling over Amnesty

Muham­mad over at Iraq the Model blogs on the seven (or six) insur­gent groups com­ing in from the desert and propos­ing a truce.
He doesn’t really add much to my pre­vi­ous post, but he does have an inter­est­ing comment:

So far, every­body in Iraq feels good about Maliki’s plan and expressed their hopes for it to meet suc­cess and ease the suf­fer­ing of the Iraqi peo­ple; every­body except for the Sadrists and the asso­ci­a­tion of Mus­lim schol­ars who both crit­i­cized the plan and said it wasn’t accept­able and expected it to fail.

I’m not in Bagh­dad any­more so I have no idea if “every­body feels good” about the plan. I doubt that’s true, but I’m sure most peo­ple _want_ to feel good about it. That’s not my point. What’s inter­est­ing is the point he makes about the Asso­ci­a­tion of Mus­lim Schol­ars, which is also the Mus­lim Cler­ics Asso­ci­a­tion “I men­tioned previously”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/2006/06/coming_in_from_the_desert.php. The MCA, headed by Harith al-Dhari has alleged con­nec­tions to the 1920 Rev­o­lu­tion Brigades through al-Dhari’s son, Muthanna, and which is allegedly one of the groups seek­ing a truce. What gives?
I’m not sure at this point, but I sus­pect al-Dhari’s play­ing both sides of the field at this point, with­hold­ing his group’s sup­port for more con­ces­sions from the gov­ern­ment, while dan­gling the 1920 Rev­o­lu­tion Brigades as a tease. Pol­i­tics in Iraq are like hag­gling in a bazaar: out­ra­geous demands, emo­tional appeals, walk­ing away… all just before agree­ing on a final deal. Mid­dle East­ern­ers _love_ this stuff.
Moq­tada al-Sadr, who com­mands the loy­alty the Mahdi Army, is cer­tainly doing the same thing. If any­one wants to be declared a legit­i­mate, national resis­tance who should get amnesty for killing U.S. troops, it’s those guys. Not only are they guilty of “killing Amer­i­can Marines in Najaf”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/2004/08/inside_the_imam_ali_shrine.php, they’re also heav­ily enmeshed in the Shi’a-on-Shi’a vio­lence in Basra as they “jockey for posi­tion against their rivals”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/2005/08/clashes_between_badr_and_sadr.php, the Badr Orga­ni­za­tion and the Fadul­lah Party. Have they killed Iraqis? Yes. Will they get their amnesty? Answer hazy; ask again later.

Coming in from the Desert?

Inter­est­ing. The day after PM Nouri al-Maliki intro­duced his “plan for national reconciliation”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/2006/06/english_version_of_reconciliat.php, seven insur­gent groups from the Ba’athist/Nationalist side of the insur­gency have report­edly con­tacted the Iraqi gov­ern­ment in order to offer a truce.
The groups include the 1920 Rev­o­lu­tion Brigades, the Muham­mad Army (jaysh al-Muhammad), Abtal al-Iraq (Heroes of Iraq), the 9th of April Group, al-Fatah Brigades, and the Brigades of the Gen­eral Com­mand of the Armed Forces. The sev­enth group was not named by the Shi’ite leg­is­la­tor who says these groups are seek­ing the cease-fire.
The 1920 Rev­o­lu­tion Brigades is allegedly led by Muthanna al-Dhari, son of Sheikh Harith al-Dhari, who is head of the Mus­lim Cler­ics Asso­ci­a­tion, a hard-line Sunni group. Harith al-Dhari’s grand­fa­ther was a lead­ing fig­ure in the 1920 rev­o­lu­tion and allegedly shot the Eng­lish Col. Ger­ard Leach­man, spark­ing the upris­ing against the British in the west. “I’ve writ­ten about _jaysh al-Muhammad_ before”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/2005/10/a_note_on_jaysh_almuhammad.php, and you can read about its place in the greater insur­gency.
And here’s a chart from Intel­Cen­ter “show­ing the link­ages between the var­i­ous groups”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/Files/Iraqi-InsurgentsLinks13Feb2006.jpg (283KB .jpg).
As for the four other groups, I con­fess I don’t have a lot of data on them.

English version of Reconciliation Plan

BEIRUT — So, any­one have a link to the Eng­lish ver­sion of Maliki’s rec­on­cil­i­a­tion plan? I’d like to actu­ally, you know, read it before shoot­ing off from the hip.
But: An amnesty for peo­ple who haven’t done any killing of Iraqis or other “ter­ror­is­tic activ­i­ties” “ter­ror­ist acts” isn’t much of an amnesty at all.
*UPDATE:* Well, thanks to a friend at the Embassy in Bagh­dad, I found a BBC media mon­i­tor “translation/summary of the main points”:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5114932.stm of the plan. It’s exas­per­at­ingly vague:
# Amnesty for detainees not involved in ter­ror­ist acts, war crimes or crimes against human­ity, as long as they con­demn vio­lence and pledge to respect the law. [This seems to exclude quite a lot, but it’s so vague. This might not be so bad, though as it allows plenty of room for, ah, _practicality_ in decid­ing to whom to grant amnesty. — CA]
# Nego­ti­a­tions with the US-led coali­tion to pre­vent the vio­la­tion of human and civil rights in mil­i­tary oper­a­tions.
# Com­pen­sa­tion for those harmed by ter­ror­ism, mil­i­tary oper­a­tions and vio­lence.
# Pre­vent­ing human rights vio­la­tions, reform­ing pris­ons and pun­ish­ing those respon­si­ble for acts of tor­ture.
# Ensur­ing that Iraq’s jus­tice sys­tem is solely respon­si­ble for pun­ish­ing mem­bers of the Sad­dam regime, ter­ror­ists and gangs guilty of killings and kid­nap­pings.
# Ensur­ing that mil­i­tary oper­a­tions take place in accor­dance with judi­cial orders and do not breach human rights.
# Com­pen­sa­tion for civil­ian gov­ern­ment employ­ees who lost their jobs after the fall of the Sad­dam regime.
# Mea­sures to improve pub­lic ser­vices. [Pos­si­bly the most pop­u­lar aspect of the plan for Iraqis — CA]
# Mea­sures to strengthen Iraq’s armed forces so they are ready to take over respon­si­bil­ity for national secu­rity from the multi­na­tional forces.
# Review of the armed forces to ensure they run on “pro­fes­sional and patri­otic” prin­ci­ples. [Mili­tias, he’s lookin’ at you. — CA]
# Ensur­ing the polit­i­cal neu­tral­ity of Iraq’s armed forces and tack­ling Iraq’s mili­tia groups. [Ditto — CA]
# Insis­tence that Iraq’s elected bod­ies, includ­ing the gov­ern­ment and par­lia­ment, are solely respon­si­ble for deci­sions on Iraq’s sov­er­eignty and the pres­ence of multi­na­tional troops.
# Insis­tence that all polit­i­cal groups involved in gov­ern­ment must reject ter­ror­ism and the for­mer Sad­dam regime.
# Return of dis­placed peo­ple to their homes and com­pen­sa­tion for any losses they have suf­fered. [This one’s going to be tricky. The Kurds have been demand­ing a set­tle­ment on Kirkuk for _ages_ and the var­i­ous Shi’ite gov­ern­ments have been drag­ging their feet on this. At the same time, the Kurds have been eject­ing Arabs from Kirkuk and I’ve heard reports of Shi’ites eject­ing Kurds from some neigh­bor­hoods in Baghdad. — CA]
# Improved com­pen­sa­tion for vic­tims of the Sad­dam regime and deprived peo­ple through­out the coun­try.
# For­ma­tion of a National Coun­cil for the Rec­on­cil­i­a­tion and National Dia­logue Plan, includ­ing rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the gov­ern­ment and par­lia­ment as well as reli­gious author­i­ties and tribes. [Talk to Nicholas Haysom, former/current head of UNAMI’s con­sti­tu­tional advi­sory board in Bagh­dad. He was instru­men­tal in help­ing write South Africa’s con­sti­tu­tion and devel­op­ing the Truth and Rec­on­cil­i­a­tion Com­mis­sion that seemed to work well there. — CA]
# Cre­ation of National Coun­cil sub­com­mit­tees at regional level
# Cre­ation of “field com­mit­tees” to fol­low up on the progress of the rec­on­cil­i­a­tion process.
# A series of con­fer­ences of tribal lead­ers, reli­gious schol­ars, polit­i­cal groups and other mem­bers of civil soci­ety will be held to back the rec­on­cil­i­a­tion process. The con­fer­ence of reli­gious schol­ars is expected to issue _fatwas_ sup­port­ing the pol­icy. [Whoa. I know the cler­ics wanted a tight bond between the gov­ern­ment and the mosques, but I don’t think they expected the gov­ern­ment telling them what _fatwas_ to issue. — CA]
# Talks with other Arab and Islamic gov­ern­ments, espe­cially those that sup­port the ter­ror­ists, to inform them about what is hap­pen­ing in Iraq.
# Adop­tion of a “ratio­nal” dis­course by the gov­ern­ment and polit­i­cal par­ties to restore mutual trust and ensure the media are neu­tral. [But not independent? — CA]
# National dia­logue includ­ing all the opin­ions of those involved in the polit­i­cal process.
# Adop­tion of con­sti­tu­tional and legal legit­i­macy in resolv­ing the country’s prob­lems, includ­ing extra-judicial killings.
# Review of the de-Baathification com­mit­tee to ensure it respects the law. [This is long over­due. School­teach­ers who were forced to join the party should not still be pay­ing the price. — CA]
# Co-operation with the United Nations and the Arab League to pur­sue the work of the Cairo Con­fer­ence for National Rec­on­cil­i­a­tion.
# Mak­ing it eas­ier for Iraqi cit­i­zens or groups to work on rebuild­ing the coun­try, as long as they have not com­mit­ted any crimes or been banned from the polit­i­cal process.
# Tak­ing a united stand regard­ing the ter­ror­ists and other hos­tile ele­ments. [Well, duh. — CA]
# Start­ing work on a large-scale devel­op­ment cam­paign for the whole coun­try, which will also tackle the prob­lem of unem­ploy­ment.
Well, it cer­tainly doesn’t lack for ambi­tion. I would like to see a bet­ter trans­la­tion before mak­ing any (more) snap judg­ments, though.

Zarqawi Killed in Airstrike

zarqawi_release_04.jpg

Photo cour­tesy of Intel­Cen­ter

In a cru­cial devel­op­ment, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/blog-mt/mt-search.cgi?IncludeBlogs=1&search=Zarqawi, has been killed in an airstrike north of Baqouba in Iraq, Iraqi prime min­is­ter Nuri al-Maliki is say­ing right now. Also, later today, Maliki says he will present his can­di­dates for Defense and Inte­rior min­is­ters. These two sto­ries are intri­cately related.
Details are very sketchy, obvi­ously, as this is break­ing now, but Maliki, U.S. ambas­sador Zal­may Khalilzad and Amer­i­can com­man­der Gen. George Casey said a reli­able tip on Zarqawi’s loca­tion came in and allowed the U.S. to call in the bombers. The attack occurred last night at about 6 p.m., BBC says, and he may have been betrayed by some­one in his inner cir­cle. Zarqawi’s body was iden­ti­fied by facial recog­ni­tion, Casey said.
[ADD 2:57:40 PM +0200 GMT: Intrigu­ing detail: Jor­dan­ian intel­li­gence was involved, appar­ently. No friend of AMZ they, see­ing as they had a num­ber of scores to set­tle with the guy. But con­sid­er­ing Jordan’s ties with the Ba’athist insur­gency, which mostly hated AMZ, this looks more and more like the Ba’athists saw the time had come to turn in AMZ to cement the polit­i­cal deal in Bagh­dad.]
If true, and this should be a very big con­di­tional, This is a big, _big_ suc­cess for the Iraqis and the Amer­i­cans. Zar­qawi wasn’t the sole force behind the insur­gency, but he was the dri­ving per­son­al­ity behind the _jihad_ aspect of the Sunni fight­ing, which has much larger influ­ence within the Iraqi insur­gency than the size of its ros­ter would sug­gest. It was his con­nec­tions that brought in a lot of money from the Gulf, and with that cash and influ­ence was able to bleed off some of the Ba’athists and Iraqi Islamists to his part of the insur­gency.
*Also, this indi­cates that bring­ing the Sun­nis into the gov­ern­ment seems to has worked.* One of the gam­bles of bring­ing the Sun­nis in was to see if they could start ramp­ing down the vio­lence through tips, turn-ins and gen­eral coop­er­a­tion. That has always been the cen­tral ques­tion: Do the Sun­nis in gov­ern­ment have con­trol over their fac­tions in the insur­gency? I’ve argued here that they don’t, but if today’s news is true, I may very well need to admit I was wrong on that. Gut feel­ing is that I was.
Casey said they got infor­ma­tion on the safe­house where Zar­qawi was hid­ing from local tips, so that indi­cates the Sun­nis have started coop­er­at­ing with Maliki’s gov­ern­ment, which means this gov­ern­ment may hold up after all. But it is impor­tant to real­ize that this will _not_ end the insur­gency. It has numer­ous fac­tions, not all who are loyal to Zar­qawi (obvi­ously, since some­one tipped the Amer­i­cans off.) And it won’t end the sec­tar­ian vio­lence, because Shi’ite death squads are still oper­at­ing out of the Inte­rior min­istry and other police forces and many Sunni insur­gents are not for­eign jihadis. They have their own fight with the mainly Shi’ite Maliki gov­ern­ment, which they see as a tool of Iran. Remem­ber how happy every­one was after Sad­dam was cap­tured? And remem­ber how it just kept get­ting worse and worse?
But it is also sig­nif­i­cant that Maliki says he will announce his new Defense, National Secu­rity and Inte­rior min­is­ter later today. (He declined to give their names at the press con­fer­ence on Zar­qawai, say­ing that would wait until the par­lia­men­tary meet­ing in the after­noon.) This indi­cates to me that the Defense and Inte­rior slots have been being held open as a car­rot for Sun­nis to start bring­ing their fight­ers to heel. Now that the Sun­nis have deliv­ered a big prize in Zarqawi’s alleged corpse, it’s time to reward them with a big post. Will they get both Inte­rior and Defense? No. In fact, Reuters is already report­ing that Inte­rior will go to Shi’ite Jawaad al-Bolani, for­merly of the Fad­hilla Party, and Defense will go to Sunni Gen. Abdel Qader Jas­sim.
Al-Bolani is an inter­est­ing choice, because he is report­edly a for­mer Army colonel under Sad­dam and has been affil­i­ated with numer­ous fac­tions in Shi’a pol­i­tics, includ­ing Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Con­gress and Sheikh Karim Al-Mohammadawi, the “Prince of the Marshes,” a local Shi’ite boss in the south opposed to Iran, Cha­l­abi and some­times — but unre­li­ably — allied with Moq­tada al-Sadr. Moham­madawi is reli­ably in favor of Moham­madawi. Jas­sim, a Sunni, is cur­rently the com­man­der of the Iraqi ground forces and has worked closely with the Amer­i­cans. He also was the gen­eral who advised Sad­dam to with­draw from Kuwait in 1991, fur­ther endear­ing him to Wash­ing­ton.
Both choices seem likely to be approved, or at least not opposed, will be sup­ported by the Sun­nis, as nei­ther is closely tied to Iran. (The for­mer Inte­rior Min­is­ter, Bayan Jabr, was tied with the Badr Orga­ni­za­tion _neé_ Corps, which is still closely con­nected with the Iran­ian Rev­o­lu­tion­ary Guards.)
[ADD 2:18:08 PM +0200 GMT: Going back through some old notes, I found a brief inter­view I did with al-Bolani in Jan­u­ary 2005, before the first elec­tions, when he was pres­i­dent of the Shi’a Polit­i­cal Coun­cil, a rival group to the United Iraqi Alliance. At the time, he said he didn’t think the con­sti­tu­tion will be based on Islamic _shari’a_, even though Islamic par­ties are call­ing for this. “Democ­racy is a strange idea in Iraq, but democ­racy is a demand of every­one,” he said. “I can assure you there are many Islamic polit­i­cal move­ments that don’t want gov­ern­ment like Iran’s. But this Islamic iden­tity and the Islamic tra­di­tions can­not be removed from this coun­try. … So I think the Iran­ian sys­tem will never hap­pen in Iraq, and most Islamic move­ments agree wth me on that.” That will please the Sun­nis and the Amer­i­cans.]
So now we’ll have to wait and see what hap­pens in the com­ing days and weeks. There will no doubt be a flare of vio­lence thaht could last up to a week or so, but after that, If the level of vio­lence starts to decrease, then that means the Sun­nis are play­ing ball. Now it is time for the Shi’ites to curb their mili­tias; that’s the deal. If that doesn’t hap­pen, expect the Sun­nis to let their fight­ers loose again.
[UPDATE 5:49:39 PM +0200 GMT: DefenseTech has “a good roundup”:http://www.defensetech.org/archives/002483.html of news on Zar­qawi, includ­ing links to the “video of the bomb­ing run”:http://www.mnf-iraq.com/zarqawi/video/Zaqarwi_Clip.wmv.]
[UPDATE 6:18:34 PM +0200 GMT: The story I did for TIME Mag­a­zine is “here”:http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1201993,00.html.]
[UPDATE 7:05:36 PM +0200 GMT: Right on sched­ule. Sev­eral sui­cide car bombs have gone off in Bagh­dad killing an unknown num­ber of civilians.]