Risking Everything in Baghdad

BAGHDAD — Bas­sam Talal, a wisp of a man with large ears and dole­ful eyes, is in his ele­ment on the floor of the “Iraq Stock Market”:http://www.isx-iq.net/. Every Mon­day and Wednes­day morn­ing, he pirou­ettes between the other 50 or so bro­kers, nip­ping up to the white boards that line the wall of the trad­ing pit. He marks 10,000 shares of Bagh­dad Car­bon­ated Drinks bought for 2 dinars a share (a $13 trade), 5,000 shares of al-Hillal Water Com­pany sold for 2.05 dinar a share (less than $7). He waves col­ored order slips above his head and darts between the white boards and the investors, sep­a­rated from the pit by a waist-high bar­rier. About 200 indi­vid­ual investors eye the Ara­bic scrib­bles of the orders on the wall. Some bring opera glasses. They’re mostly older, heavy­set men in suits, with a few tra­di­tion­ally dressed Bedouin guys hang­ing around. When the see a price they like, they ges­ture to Talal or another bro­ker and point.

All invest­ment comes with risk, but Iraq’s investors face spe­cial — and dead­lier — risks. Bagh­dad is the prize in a civil war that rages even as the Iraq Stock Mar­ket attempts to rebuild itself and Iraq’s shat­tered econ­omy. The fight­ing that often rages out­side the old hotel which houses the bourse is marked by vio­lence that is indis­crim­i­nate and sav­age. In Bagh­dad, car bombs, eth­nic cleans­ing and mas­sacres are the hall­marks of this fight. Located in Hayy al-Awaya, a Chris­t­ian neigh­bor­hood, mas­sive con­crete bar­ri­ers sur­round the entrance to deter car bombs, and grim gun­men care­fully search any­one who gets close.

Dur­ing the ses­sion, I have about 15 min­utes of watch­ing the prices,” says Taha Ahmed Abdul Salam, the pres­i­dent of the Exchange. “The rest of the time I will be in the street watch­ing my guards who are watch­ing the build­ings. And I have some infor­ma­tion from the police. When I hear some­thing bad, believe me, I will go and search around the build­ing myself.”

He’s con­stantly engaged in a jug­gle of secu­rity and busi­ness. His refusal to halt trad­ing for any­thing is a point of pride for him, a show of defi­ance. On Feb. 22, the day the “Askariya shrine in Samarra was destroyed”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/2006/02/game_on.php, touch­ing off Iraq’s lat­est round of vio­lence that has yet to sub­side, “I didn’t stop the trad­ing,” he says. “I let the trad­ing go on, and I didn’t men­tion any­thing to anybody.”

The story of the Iraq Stock Exchange has as many ups and downs as a penny stock. It opened in 1992, but Saddam’s gov­ern­ment heav­ily reg­u­lated and manip­u­lated it, and often used it for money laun­der­ing. Prices were only allowed to move 5 per­cent in either direc­tion. By the time U.S. troops bore down on Bagh­dad in April 2003, about 140 com­pa­nies were trad­ing on it and its clien­tele was com­posed of busi­ness­men and wealthy Ba’athists who had socked some cash away. The Amer­i­cans closed the old mar­ket but re-opened it in June 2004 under Coali­tion Pro­vi­sional Author­ity Order No. 74. The new mar­ket has just 15 com­pa­nies, many of the old bro­kers and traded about 500 mil­lion Iraqi dinars a day back then — about $333,000.

Today — from a busi­ness point of view — things aren’t much bet­ter. Though there are 94 com­pa­nies listed, the mar­ket sees only about $1 mil­lion in busi­ness each ses­sion, Salam says. Bank­ing is the largest and most active sec­tor, because they have hold­ings of hard cur­rency and have formed part­ner­ships with for­eign banks like HSBC.

The high-point of the mar­ket, accord­ing to data pro­vided by the eco­nomic sec­tion of the embassy, was around the end of Octo­ber, when the per­ma­nent con­sti­tu­tion was approved. Total mar­ket cap­i­tal­iza­tion surged to almost $2.5 bil­lion, but it’s since plum­meted to $1.25 bil­lion as the polit­i­cal process drags on with no end in sight. (Iraq’s mar­ket is the small­est in the region, with even the Pales­tin­ian stock mar­ket dwarf­ing it at $25 bil­lion — and they don’t even have a real state yet.)

Although it’s legal for for­eign investors to own up to 49 per­cent of an Iraqi com­pany, it’s not yet been imple­mented because of tech­ni­cal hur­dles, which means the flood of for­eign invest­ment pre­dicted when the mar­ket reopened hasn’t hap­pened yet. What local invest­ment there is also side­lined because of a steady exo­dus of wealthy Iraqis and their money to neigh­bor­ing coun­tries dri­ves a vicious cycle of vio­lence, inse­cu­rity and poor eco­nomic per­for­mance that might lessen the violence.

Peo­ple are wor­ried about their money,” says Talal in a break from trad­ing. “The price drops con­tinue, so peo­ple are try­ing to sell as fast as they can so they don’t lose a lot.”

There is a notional reg­u­la­tory regime with the Iraqi Secu­ri­ties Com­mis­sion, but there Salam and the bro­kers, who own the mar­ket, do the real reg­u­la­tion. They all know one another from the old Saddam-era exchange, which helps pre­vent insur­gents or crim­i­nals from gam­ing the mar­ket. Such famil­iar­ity feels good to Iraqis, but it seems sketchy to west­ern­ers used to more trans­par­ent, rules-based trad­ing rather than a sys­tem run by a bunch of buddies.

But if you talk to June Reed, a senior con­sul­tant for pri­vate sec­tor devel­op­ment at the embassy, things are going pretty well. “This mar­ket has func­tioned very well through sev­eral interim gov­ern­ments,” she said. “Make no mis­take: There is invest­ment in Iraq.”

Reed, a for­mer invest­ment banker from New York for Mer­rill Lynch and Credit Suisse, refused to budged off her cau­tious opti­mism about the mar­ket, stress­ing that great things were in store for the Iraq Stock Mar­ket when a per­ma­nent gov­ern­ment is in place and a planned automa­tion pro­gram is estab­lished. “Here it is truly the poten­tial that is the most impor­tant thing,” she says. But given the archaic, anar­chic and opaque nature of the mar­ket (“It was unusual to see grease boards, hand­writ­ing, etc.,” Reed says) any for­eign investors are rightly wor­ried that they could lose their shirts before they ever know what happened.

In the com­ing weeks, she says, that’s going to change, thanks to a pro­posed auto­mated sys­tem for trad­ing secu­ri­ties that will cre­ate a cen­tral, net­worked elec­tronic depos­i­tory, due to be com­pleted by the end of the year. There will be auto­mated sales, clear­ing and depos­i­tory func­tions like the NASDAQ, she says. “It’s very high tech.” Bro­kers like Talal will be able to respond to orders from his desk at his firm, the Nin­eveh Bro­ker­age, rather than nav­i­gate the IED-peppered streets of Bagh­dad. There are even plans for trad­ing over the Internet.

But as the Amer­i­can mil­i­tary has learned, whiz-bang tech­nol­ogy alone won’t make peo­ple feel safe enough to invest big money into a place like Iraq. The lack of polit­i­cal sta­bil­ity leads to a secu­rity vac­uum, which leads to car bombs, which leads to fur­ther cap­i­tal flight. “The sit­u­a­tion right now in Iraq is not sta­ble. There are many chal­lenges for the stock exchange,” says Salam gloomily. “The investors are all wait­ing for things to hap­pen to the econ­omy, the ser­vices. I believe every­one here is wait­ing for good things to happen.”

[Ed. note: I wrote this for “Fast Company”:http://fastcompany.com/homepage/index.html after I left Bagh­dad, but it was killed because I had the bad luck of fil­ing it the day before the NYT story ran. Such is the jour­nal­ism biz. But bet­ter to blog than to never been seen at all!]

New Zarqawi video online

Zarqawi holding weapon
Photo Cour­tesy of “IntelCenter”:http://www.intelcenter.com

Al Qaeda in Iraq has released a video of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi on a jihadi web site, which is the first time he’s been seen in video since the Nick Berg behead­ing video.
“Your mujahideen sons were able to con­front the most fero­cious of cru­sader cam­paigns on a Mus­lim state. They have stood in the face of this onslaught for three years,” Zar­qawi said on the video.
I’m work­ing on get­ting a copy of the video, but so far, this is the first time AMZ (as he’s called in U.S. mil­i­tary par­lance) has appeared in a video with­out a mask. (He was con­cealed in the Berg video.) It’s a well-produced video, with slick graph­ics and pro­fes­sional titling, of a kind with many videos from insur­gent and jihadi groups. I’ve seen pic­tures of AMZ and this video appears authen­tic.
So the ques­tion now is why the video and why now? There are a num­ber of fac­tors. There have been per­sis­tent rumors that AMZ was replaced as the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) on Jan. 20 by an Iraqi, Abdul­lah Rashid al-Baghdadi, on the orders of the Muja­hadeen Shura Coun­cil, the umbrella orga­ni­za­tion for the jihadi groups in Iraq. I’ve never quite believed that, and instead thought it was a ploy by AQI to make itself more palat­able to nation­al­ist Iraqis who don’t fol­low the extreme Islamism of Al Qaeda. AMZ has been catch­ing a lot of flack for the last year or so because of his sui­cide bombers and bru­tal tac­tics. This is why you no longer see the grue­some behead­ing videos. There are still a lot of sui­cide bomb­ings, but there are likely less than there were, and they seem aimed more specif­i­cally at Amer­i­can and Iraqi secu­rity forces with more care taken to reduce civil­ian casu­al­ties. So, by releas­ing this video, he’s show­ing the world — and Iraqis, insur­gents and civil­ians alike — that he’s still around, still the man and still com­mands the loy­alty of AQI.
Sec­ondly, by lit­er­ally putting a face on him­self, AMZ is human­iz­ing him­self and attempt­ing to quell the dis­cord with the Ba’athist groups that has been split­ting the Sunni insur­gency — a split that has been exploited with lim­ited suc­cess by the Amer­i­cans. By putting him­self for­ward less as a spec­tral bogey­man and more of a heroic leader — as the images in the video do — the think­ing may be that when the civil war finally breaks out, as many in Iraq antic­i­pate, AMZ will be seen as a leader among the Sun­nis, and not as an out­sider among Iraqis. While the Ba’athists and jihadis gen­er­ally despise one another, they despise the Iraqi Shi’ites who hold power more. The Ba’athists see them as Iran­ian stooges (not entirely inac­cu­rate, frankly) and the jihadis have adopted a toxic anti-Shi’ite ide­ol­ogy that holds the sect as unbe­liev­ers (_kafirs_.)
But this video’s audi­ence is not pri­mar­ily the West. Many peo­ple think the insur­gents pro­duce videos and stage attacks in sight of west­ern media to influ­ence the pop­u­la­tions back home. This is only par­tially true. By cre­at­ing the impres­sion — and the real­ity — of chaos, they can under­mine sup­port for the U.S. pres­ence in Iraq among Amer­i­cans. But the real pur­pose of these videos is recruit­ment. Instead of scared west­ern­ers, the real audi­ence is the dis­af­fected and angry young men of the Mus­lim world. They will down­load this video, like they do all the oth­ers, and pass it among their friends and watch it at Inter­net cafés in Jakarta and Riyadh over and over again.
In the 1970s and ‘80s, you couldn’t claim to have any juice as a ter­ror­ist group unless you had a decent media arm. This is why Hezbol­lah pio­neered the film­ing of its attacks against the Israelis and started al-Manar, its broad­cast arm. The need for an effec­tive media cam­paign is still true, but there is no longer really a need for West­ern media to pub­lish a screed or air a tape. It can be dis­trib­uted online for less money, with more reach and hit a more tar­geted audi­ence than before.
It’s likely not a coin­ci­dence that the video was released now, just a cou­ple of days after the dead­lock over PM Ibrahim al-Jaafari was bro­ken with the selec­tion of Jawad al-Malaki, the brains of Jaafari’s Dawa Party. While the Iraqi gov­ern­ment remained in limbo, the polit­i­cal chaos allowed the Sunni groups room to move. But with the dead­lock bro­ken, the for­ma­tion of the new gov­ern­ment will prob­a­bly pro­ceed apace, with the fur­ther strength­en­ing of the Shi’ite-dominated secu­rity forces. The Sun­nis have to pre-position them­selves if they’re to stand a chance in the com­ing civil war, and AMZ’s video is part of his effort to posi­tion him­self with the Sun­nis.
*UPDATE 4÷26÷06 8:58:50 AM +0200 GMT:* Inter­est­ing. Accord­ing to “IntelCenter”:http://www.intelcenter.com, in the video, AMZ is briefed on two new rock­ets allegedly devel­oped by the insur­gents in Anbar province. The two rock­ets are the “Qaeda 1″ and the “Quds 1.” The first allegedly has a range of 40km and is capa­ble of car­ry­ing a 50kg explo­sive, while the sec­ond is designed to be fired hor­i­zon­tally and is designed to pierce armor. “God will­ing, these rock­ets will be used in the next phase,” the briefer tells Zarqawi.

The Qaeda 1 rocket
Photo Cour­tesy of “IntelCenter”:http://www.intelcenter.com

Jill Carroll is Free

jillcarrollreleased.jpgBEIRUT — Jill Car­roll has been released in Bagh­dad. After nearly three months, dur­ing which she was in the thoughts of every reporter in Bagh­dad, Jill is now in the hands of the Amer­i­cans and will soon be on her way home to her fam­ily. This is the best news I’ve heard in a long time.
I’ve heard she was first released to the the Iraqi Islamic Party before she was taken to safety in the Green Zone.
UPDATE 3:29:57 PM +0300: It was the Iraqi Islamic Party who received her. The Wash­ing­ton Post seems to have the most details so far. And U.S. Sec­re­tary of State Con­doleezza Rice just gave Jill’s release a shoutout at the sum­mit over Iran’s nuclear pro­gram.
*UPDATE 3÷31÷06 2:27:57 AM +0300:* “The story I did for TIME​.com on Jill’s release is up”:http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1178564,00.html. And the pre­vi­ous story I did when she was first kid­napped “is here”:http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1147652,00.html.
The right-wing nuts already are say­ing she “should have been killed”:http://littlegreenfootballs.com/weblog/?entry=19858&only, was “treasonous”:http://www.debbieschlussel.com/archives/2006/03/so_anti-america.html, “should be banned from com­ing home”:http://bareknucklepolitics.com/?p=1111 and, in gen­eral, spout­ing their usual mish­mash of unin­formed — but pas­sion­ately cer­tain — lies, prej­u­dices and “speculation”:http://www.brothersjudd.com/blog/archives/2006/03/did_she_have_a.html. It’s sick­en­ing. (A favorite trope is that because she said her cap­tors treated her well, she must have been in on the kid­nap­ping.)
They base this on a “video her cap­tors made”:http://bareknucklepolitics.com/forum/viewthread.php?tid=171 in which she says the _mujahdeen_ will win because they’re smarter and that the war is wrong, etc. What’s weird­est is their carp­ing on the fact that she was still wear­ing her hijab and Ara­bic dress when she was filmed in the Iraqi Islamic Party head­quar­ters. Peo­ple: She didn’t have any other clothes. And the IIP is a con­ser­v­a­tive Sunni party. It would have been very dis­re­spect­ful to the peo­ple who were try­ing to get her home to whip off her hijab in their offices. Notably, in the pics on the Wash­ing­ton Post and New York Times site, she’s pretty obvi­ously wear­ing a mil­i­tary T-shirt. Man, do these peo­ple even con­sider some of the issues they slam peo­ple for?

Blast from the Past

BAGHDAD (still) — So, check this blast from the past from my buddy Matt Stan­nard at the _SF Chronicle:_ Iraqi strag­glers still pose threat to allied troops patrolling cap­i­tal / Hit-and-run attacks likely to per­sist

Orga­nized mil­i­tary oppo­si­tion to U.S. and British forces in Iraq has evap­o­rated rapidly since the fall of Bagh­dad, U.S. mil­i­tary lead­ers say, but small groups of fight­ers — irreg­u­lars — are still defend­ing the fallen regime.
These “pock­ets of resistance” — the pre­ferred phrase used widely by pun­dits — have existed since the first days of the cam­paign, when Amer­i­can gen­er­als said such strag­glers would be “mopped up” once the main thrust was complete.

The story dates from April 11, 2003, two days after the U.S. “helped” pull down the Sad­dam statue in Fir­dos square near the Pales­tine Hotel. Ah, we were so young. No one really knew it at the time, but Stan­nard was eerily pre­scient in his descrip­tion of a “third type” of resistance:

A third type of resis­tance may prove even harder to han­dle, ana­lysts said: sui­cide bombers such as the one who report­edly killed him­self and injured four Marines at a Bagh­dad check­point Thurs­day.
Dressed in civil­ian cloth­ing and will­ing to die for rel­a­tively small mil­i­tary vic­to­ries, those indi­vid­ual Iraqis — or, in some cases, for­eign nation­als vis­it­ing Iraq specif­i­cally to attack Amer­i­cans — may prove the thorni­est chal­lenge for U.S. and British forces in com­ing days, ana­lysts said.

It was just after these early days — in June and July — that the Iraqi resistance/insurgency formed around these ves­ti­gial cells of Ba’athists and feday­een. Throw in some for­eign fight­ers, sprin­kle in a whole lotta Gulf money and bingo — you’ve got a quag­mire. It’s really a shame that no one pre­dicted this. Oh, wait! “Some­one did!”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/2003/01/the_burdens_of_empire.php

Instead of a nice, clean occu­pa­tion that results in the first Arab democ­racy — and a net­work of Army bases from which to project power through­out the region — I pre­dict the United States will have years of guerilla insur­gency from nation­al­is­tic Iraqis (some of the fiercest nation­al­ism in the Arab world), the dirty job of sup­press­ing Kur­dish and Shi’ite inde­pen­dence move­ments and Sunni power grabs, the prob­lem of al Qai’da slip­ping across the bor­ders (with the help of Iran and sym­pa­thetic Saudis) into the coun­try to stike at Amer­i­can troops and med­dling in Iraq’s inter­nal affairs by Turkey, Iran, Saudi Ara­bia and Rus­sia. And don’t for­get the resent­ment in the region that will occur when the United States begins exploit­ing the Iraqi oil fields for its own pur­poses. No one will like that, least of all the Iraqis.

OK. So I wasn’t 100 per­cent right on all of this. (Rus­sia? What the hell was I think­ing?) But I was pretty close. As were a lot of other peo­ple a whole lot smarter than me.
But crow­ing “I told you so!” — which is not even emo­tion­ally grat­i­fy­ing any­more — does lit­tle to solve the prob­lem. But I don’t know what the solu­tion is any­more. We’re a hair’s breadth away from civil war, Amer­i­can troops can nei­ther stay or go with­out an even higher body count and we have a polit­i­cal process that is awash with egos, sec­tar­ian ten­sions and lack­ing in lead­er­ship. And that’s just in Amer­ica. It’s even worse in Iraq.
I have to con­fess: I can’t see a way out of this briar patch with­out a whole lot more blood­shed. And at the risk of sound­ing defeatist — hell, I’ve been here a long time, I can say what I want — I see the likely end as defeat and ruin for Iraqis, the United States and the region. Feel free to use the com­ment sec­tion to sug­gest real­is­tic solu­tions ’cause I’m fresh out of ideas. (By the way, if you don’t post a com­ment, then the ter­ror­ists win.)

Operation Overblown

BAGHDAD — “Oper­a­tion Swarmer”:http://www.mnf-iraq.com/Daily/Mar/060317.htm is turn­ing out to be much less than meets the eye, or the tele­vi­sion cam­era, for that matter.

Iraqi and Coali­tion forces launched Oper­a­tion Iraqi Freedom’s largest air assault oper­a­tion in south­ern Salah Ad Din province March 16. Named Oper­a­tion Swarmer, the joint operation’s mis­sion was to clear a sus­pected insur­gent oper­at­ing area north­east of Samarra.
Oper­a­tion Swarmer included more than 1,500 troops from the Iraqi Army’s 4th Divi­sion, the U.S. 101st Air­borne Divi­sion and 101st Com­bat Avi­a­tion Brigade. The Sol­diers iso­lated the objec­tive area in a com­bined air and ground assault.
More than 50 Attack and assault air­craft and 200 tac­ti­cal vehi­cles par­tic­i­pated in the oper­a­tion. Troops from the Iraqi Army’s 4th Divi­sion, the “Rakkasans” from the 187th Infantry Reg­i­ment and the “Hunters” from the 9th Cav­alry Reg­i­ment assaulted mul­ti­ple objec­tives. Forces from the Iraqi 2nd Com­mando Brigade then com­pleted a ground infil­tra­tion to secure numer­ous struc­tures in the area.
Ini­tial reports indi­cate a num­ber of weapons caches were cap­tured, con­tain­ing artillery shells, IED-making mate­ri­als and mil­i­tary uni­forms. Iraqi and Coali­tion troops also detained 41 sus­pected insurgents.

That sounds excit­ing! But accord­ing to a col­league of mine from TIME who trav­eled up there today on a U.S. embassy-sponsored trip, there are no insur­gents, no fight­ing and 17 of the 41 pris­on­ers taken have already been released after just one day. The “num­ber of weapons caches” equals six, which isn’t unusual when you travel around Iraq. They’re lit­er­ally every­where.
(Digres­sion: Just to clear some things up, “air assault” does not equal air strikes. There are no JDAMs being dropped, and there are no fixed-wing air­craft involved at all, except maybe for sur­veil­lance. An air assault is the 101st Airborne’s way of insert­ing troops into a bat­tle­space. There is so far no evi­dence of bom­bard­ment of any kind. Also, it’s a telling exam­ple of how “well” things are going in Iraq that after three years, the U.S. is still lead­ing the fight and con­duct­ing sweeps in an area that has been swept/contained/pacfied/cleared five or six times since 2004. How long before the U.S. has to come back again?)
As noted, about 1,500 troops were involved, 700 Amer­i­can and 800 Iraqi. But get this: in the area they’re scour­ing there are only about 1,500 res­i­dents. Accord­ing to my col­league and other reporters who were there, not a sin­gle shot has been fired.
“Oper­a­tion Swarmer” is really a media show. It was designed to show off the new Iraqi Army — although there was no enemy for them to fight. Every Amer­i­can offi­cial I’ve heard has empha­sized the role of the Iraqi forces just days before the third anniver­sary of the start of the war. That said, one Iraqi role the mil­i­tary will start high­light­ing in the next few days, I imag­ine, is that of Iraqi intel­li­gence. It was intel from the Iraqi mil­i­tary intel­li­gence and inte­rior min­istry that the U.S. says prompted this Potemkin oper­a­tion. And it will be the Iraqi intel that pro­vides the cover for Amer­i­can mil­i­tary com­man­ders to throw up their hands and say, “well, we _thought_ bad guys were there.“
It’s hard to blame the mil­i­tary, how­ever. Sta­tions like Fox and CNN have really taken this and ran with it, with fancy graph­ics and theme music, thanks to a rel­a­tively slow news day. The gen­er­als here also are under tremen­dous pres­sure to show off some func­tion­ing Iraqi troops before the third anniver­sary, and I won’t fault them for going into a region loaded for bear. After all, the Iraqi intel­li­gence might have been right.
But Oper­a­tion Overblown should raise seri­ous ques­tions about how good Iraqi intel­li­gence is. I can’t tell you how many times I’ve been told by earnest lieu­tenants that the Iraqis are valiant and nec­es­sary part­ners, “because they know the area, the peo­ple and the cus­toms.” But when I spoke to grunts and NCOs, how­ever, they usu­ally gave me blunter — and more col­or­ful — rea­sons why the Iraqi intel­li­gence was often, shall we say, use­less. Tribal rival­ries and per­sonal feuds are still a major rea­son why Iraqis drop a dime on their neigh­bors.
So I guess it’s fit­ting that on the eve of the third anniver­sary of a war launched on  — oh, let’s be gen­er­ous — “faulty” intel­li­gence, a major oper­a­tion is hyped and then turns out to be less than what it appeared because of … faulty intel­li­gence.
*UPDATE 2400 GMT +0300:* Time​.com has posted the magazine’s “offi­cial version”:http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1174448,00.html by Brian Ben­nett, my col­league who was on the oper­a­tion today.