Preliminary Election numbers

BAGHDAD — Pre­lim­i­nary num­bers from the Inde­pen­dent Elec­toral Com­mis­sion in Iraq, based on an audit of 20 per­cent of bal­lot boxes from last Saturday’s con­sti­tu­tional ref­er­en­dum show mas­sive “yes” votes in most provinces. But the most closely watched one, Ninevah, is rapidly turn­ing into the Ohio of Iraq.

Province No Yes
Bagh­dad 21.83% 78.17%
Dhouk 0.89% 99.11%
Diyala 48.24% 51.76%
Kar­bala 3.46% 96.54%
Kirkuk 38% 62%
Misan 2.16% 97.84%
Muthana 1.34% 98.66%
Najaf 3.97% 96.03%
Qadis­siya 3.24% 96.76%
Sala­hadeen 81.15% 18.85%
Sulay­ma­nia 1.05% 98.95%
The­qar 2.94% 97.06%
Wasit 4.20% 95.80%

*Still to come:*
_Ninevah_, Anbar, Babil, Basra and Erbil.
In a state­ment, the IECI said, “These results are not a demo­graph­i­cally sig­nif­i­cant sam­ple of all polling sta­tions so they can­not be used to pre­dict the final out­come of the Ref­er­en­dum.” Babil, Basra, Erbil and Ninevah are cur­rently under­go­ing field audits, while Anbar votes are still being input into the sys­tem, the state­ment said. No one expects Anbar to vote for the ref­er­en­dum, and Babil, Basra and Erbil are expected to vote “yes” in high per­cent­ages. That leaves Ninevah and Mosul as the swing votes that will decide this elec­tion, as it takes a two-thirds “no” vote in three provinces to veto the con­sti­tu­tion.
“I wrote about the vot­ing hanky-panky going on in Ninevah on Monday”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/2005/10/curious_numbers.php, and it seems like the IECI is tak­ing it seri­ously. I don’t know how it will go, but I sure hope that they can show the vote was fair.

Election Analysis in TIME

BAGHDAD — My lat­est take on the ref­er­en­dum is “avail­able at Time.com”:http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1119617,00.html now, and read­ers of B2I will notice that the blog informed a lot of the mag­a­zine copy. Plus, we got some more report­ing out of Mosul.

It wouldn’t sur­prise me if the elec­tion was rigged,” said a U.S. Army offi­cer in Mosul who requested anonymity and who worked on secu­rity arrange­ments for the poll with Iraqi secu­rity and elec­tion offi­cials. “I don’t even trust our elec­tion process.”

Sec­ondly, a primer by Elaine Shan­non and me on the Sad­dam trial “is also available”:http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1118387,00.html, and that’s tak­ing up a lot of my time today. Alas, I’m not in the first day’s pool but I’m in the sec­ond day — which means I won’t get to see Sad­dam until Jan­u­ary, prob­a­bly. His lawyer, Khalil Dulaimi is widely expected to ask for and receive some kind of delay, so the first day of the trial will likely be anti-climatic. A lit­tle charge-reading, a lit­tle delay motions and we’re done.
The secu­rity was very tight going in to the trial, accord­ing to pool reports. As the journos were bussed in, every­thing was taken from them — every­thing. Watches, wal­lets, even pens and note­books. (One U.S. sol­dier told the reporters that the CIA and the KGB have low-calibre pen-guns. Doesn’t he know the KGB was renamed years ago?) The reporters were given pen­cils and yel­low legal pads with which to take notes, although there is allegedly a sup­ply of back-up pens if peo­ple get too aggres­sive with the pen­cil lead.
So, in the absence of any­thing actu­ally hap­pen­ing at the trial right now, we’re reduced to a) writ­ing about writ­ing with pen­cils and b) report­ing from pool reports. Eh. It’s a liv­ing.

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Curious numbers in Ninevah

BAGHDAD — Ninevah province, home to the mixed city of Mosul and the besieged city of Tal ‘Afar, is see­ing some _very_ strange num­bers. I’ve done back of the Excel enve­lope cal­cu­la­tions and have found this:
* In the Jan­u­ary elec­tion, which was boy­cotted by Sun­nis, there were 165,934 votes cast, accord­ing to the “Inde­pen­dent Elec­toral Com­mis­sion of Iraq”:http://ieciraq.org/English/Home.htm.
* In Octo­ber, accord­ing to “AP’s pre­lim­i­nary results”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051017/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_vote_results, there were 419,804 votes cast in Ninevah, an increase of 253,870 votes, or +152.99 per­cent.
* The num­ber of peo­ple vot­ing *for* the con­sti­tu­tion in Ninevah, accord­ing to the AP, was 326,774 (78 per­cent), with 90,065 vot­ing *against* it (21 per­cent). Less than 1 per­cent, or 2,965 votes, was dis­qual­i­fied.
By way of com­par­i­son, Tamim province, home to the dis­puted city of Kirkuk, saw 542,000 votes cast — an increase of 35.2 per­cent over Jan­u­ary — with 341,611 vot­ing “yes” (63 per­cent) and 195,725 vot­ing “no” (36 per­cent). You mean we’re sup­posed to believe that in Tamim, which is also a mixed province but which has had a steady stream of Kurds mov­ing in for the last two-and-a-half years, had *more than twice as many no votes as Ninevah?* And with the Kurds already pretty much own­ing Kirkuk? Color me skep­ti­cal.
What’s truly eyebrow-raising is that the num­ber of con­sti­tu­tional “yes” votes — 326,774 — is more than the total increase in votes over January’s turnout. That sug­gests that not only did all of the Sun­nis in Ninevah province, who largely boy­cotted the Jan­u­ary elec­tions turn out, but that they _all voted for the constitution._ That’s a very strange idea to me, as I’ve not met a sin­gle Sunni who voted for it here in Bagh­dad.
Ninevah is home to Mosul, a mixed city of about 2 mil­lion Arabs, Turko­mans and Kurds, as well as Tal’Afar, the mostly Turko­man city of 500,000 that U.S. and Iraqi forces stormed last month. Anec­do­tal reports are that a) Sunni Arabs have come out in droves, mainly to vote down the con­sti­tu­tion, and b) the con­sti­tu­tion was very unpop­u­lar in Tal’Afar because of mil­i­tary actions there.
Now, sev­eral pos­si­bil­i­ties spring to mind: Sunni Arabs in the north really _love_ the idea of the new national char­ter, but I find this unlikely, to say the least. In fact, I only sug­gest it for the gig­gle fac­tor. Another pos­si­bil­ity is that the vote was bla­tantly fixed. A third pos­si­bil­ity is that the Kurds moved thou­sands of peo­ple into Mosul to skew the vote. Oddly enough, I heard Sun­nis mak­ing just this charge in the run-up to the Saturday’s ref­er­en­dum. A third pos­si­bil­ity is a com­bi­na­tion of the last two. The vote was rigged _and_ the Kurds moved peo­ple in.
Now, con­trast­ing points that prove I don’t know what I’m talk­ing about, sug­gested by col­leagues:
# Mosul is an Iraqi Islamic Party strong­hold. The IIP called on its sup­port­ers to vote “yes” after a deal last week to open up the con­sti­tu­tion to early amend­ments. This split the Sunni oppo­si­tion to the char­ter.
# The Sun­nis sim­ply don’t make up 20 per­cent of Iraq. There hasn’t been a reli­able cen­sus in years and not only do the Sun­nis not make up 42 per­cent of Iraq as Saleh Mut­laq, a mem­ber of the National Dia­logue Coun­cil, claims, but they’re much fewer than the 20 per­cent most peo­ple assume.
# Ninevah and Mosul aren’t Sunni strong­holds. It’s con­ven­tional wis­dom, but maybe that’s wrong.
# Mosul was a lot more vio­lent in Jan­u­ary, keep­ing the vote there down. Per­haps now, with less vio­lence, more Kurds — per­haps half of the total increase — were able to come out and vote.
# The Turko­mans aren’t a fac­tor. Money quote from cyn­i­cal col­league: “There are more Turko­man par­ties than there are Turko­mans.“
# The AP num­bers are so pre­lim­i­nary, they’re flat-out wrong.
The pos­si­bil­ity exists that all of these pos­si­bil­i­ties have played into the dynamic in Ninevah, lead­ing to wild num­bers, and I’ve not been able to reach a stringer in Mosul yet to get more infor­ma­tion. But if these num­bers hold, there’s some­thing very, very rot­ten in the north.
(Hat tip to var­i­ous com­menters who alerted me to the num­bers here.)

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Quiet Election Day; Sunnis Show Up

Woman voter

A woman exits the Ayoon al-Maha Nurs­ery School, in the Jadhriyah neigh­bor­hood, a mostly Shi’ite area in Bagh­dad. Copy­right 2005 Yas­sar al-Ali

BAGHDAD — Well, well… The Sun­nis might sur­prise us all on this one.
If you’re a reg­u­lar reader of this blog, both of you, that means you know (“from other sources”:http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1118269,00.html) there was a ref­er­en­dum yes­ter­day. With none of the gid­di­ness of Jan­u­ary, but all the secu­rity, Iraqis voted for the sec­ond time this year, this time on the pro­posed per­ma­nent Iraqi con­sti­tu­tion. It’s a doc­u­ment sup­port­ers say will secure the country’s future and unite the coun­try while oppo­nents say it will lead to dis­so­lu­tion and civil war.
Con­sid­er­ing the sec­tar­ian divi­sions on dis­play between Iraq’s Shi’ites and Sun­nis, it’s unsur­pris­ing issues of reli­gion and national iden­tity are what decides people’s vote. What is sur­pris­ing is the num­bers that Sun­nis showed up.
Shi’ites over­whelm­ingly sup­port the doc­u­ment, in part because of the instruc­tions from the pow­er­ful Shi’ite cler­i­cal body, the _merjariya_, led by the ven­er­ated Grand Aya­tol­lah Ali al-Sistani. He called for a “yes” vote on the doc­u­ment. Most Sun­nis, how­ever, say it’s a ter­ri­ble con­sti­tu­tion and bad for Iraq.
“We are fol­low­ing our supreme _merja_, Sis­tani,” said Jafar al-Khazali, a 29-year-old day laborer as his daugh­ter, Sou’ad, clung to his leg. “I will not lose my rights again like before.“
“This is bad for the Iraqis,” coun­ters Saleh Mut­laq, an influ­en­tial mem­ber of the National Dia­logue Coun­cil, a Sunni group which includes many for­mer Ba’athists. “This con­sti­tu­tion will break up this coun­try.“
Under the for­mer regime of Sad­dam Hus­sein, Shi’ites were often dis­crim­i­nated against and oppressed while Sis­tani was under vir­tual house arrest. The con­sti­tu­tion, writ­ten largely by Shi’ites installed in power by the United States, would secur­ing their place as the country’s new rulers. With 60 per­cent of the pop­u­la­tion, demo­graph­ics trans­late into polit­i­cal des­tiny.
Fur­ther cement­ing their power, the document’s fed­er­al­ism pro­vi­sions, bit­terly opposed by most Sunni politi­cians, would allow the for­ma­tion of pow­er­ful regions — mini-states, in effect — with con­trol of Iraq’s future oil wealth and the abil­ity to ignore the cen­tral gov­ern­ment in Bagh­dad. Sun­nis say this will lead to the breakup of Iraq, with oil-rich regions in the Kur­dish north and Shi’ite south and a bar­ren desert for Sun­nis in the mid­dle.
But back to yes­ter­day. The giddy enthu­si­asm of the Jan­u­ary elec­tions, in which Iraqis voted in rel­a­tively free elec­tions for the first time in their his­tory, was absent, and instead an air of res­ig­na­tion was felt. Rather than hang around the polling places gos­sip­ing, as they did nine months ago, Iraqis came, voted and left quickly. There were fewer chil­dren out with par­ents, too, indi­cat­ing a height­ened sense of the dan­gers present on the empty streets.
Bagh­dad was rel­a­tively calm, despite vio­lence in the last 19 days that killed more than 450 Iraqi civil­ians. Saturday’s quiet could indi­cate that the dra­con­ian secu­rity mea­sures that banned almost all vehic­u­lar traf­fic, inter­na­tional travel and move­ment between provinces were effec­tive in curb­ing insur­gents’ attacks. Or it might mean the insur­gents just decided to keep their pow­der dry until a more polit­i­cally oppor­tune time. The night before the vote, insur­gents sab­o­taged an elec­tri­cal tower, plung­ing the city and north­ern towns into dark­ness, and there were reports of gun bat­tles between insur­gents and com­bined U.S. and Iraqi troops in Ramadi. In Abu Ghraib, police sources said insur­gents had attacked a polling place, killed the super­vi­sor and made off with five bal­lot boxes. Despite all that, the vio­lence was much less intense than on Jan. 30, which saw more than 100 attacks, includ­ing sui­cide bomb­ings, killing at least 40 peo­ple.
Because of the secu­rity restrictions,I was unable to visit Sunni neigh­bor­hoods where atti­tudes toward the con­sti­tu­tion dif­fered. Res­i­dents of these areas, reached by phone said there were many peo­ple in the streets all ready to vote against the con­sti­tu­tion, but this could not be inde­pen­dently con­firmed. I was able to walk to nearby polling areas with no prob­lem, but they’re all Shi’ite neigh­bor­hoods, and the response is pretty much what you’d expect: They love the con­sti­tu­tion, love Sis­tani and believe all Iraqis are broth­ers and love one another.
Excuse me while I sing “Kum­baya” with my Iraqi hip­pie broth­ers.
The Sun­nis I reached, how­ever, say — again — exactly what you’d expect them to: This is ter­ri­ble and bad for Iraq. Oh, and by the way, screw the Ira­ni­ans, er, Shi’ites. Broth­ers, our col­lec­tive asses.
Thafir Aga, 38, a taxi dri­ver and Sunni in the Sadiya neigh­bor­hood, said he voted against the con­sti­tu­tion because “This con­sti­tu­tion is divid­ing Iraq,” he said. “The gov­ern­ment is only Kur­dish and Iran­ian, it is not a Sunni or Shi’ite gov­ern­ment.” Many Sun­nis, who ben­e­fited under Saddam’s reign, regard the Shi’ites in gov­ern­ment as pawns of Iran because politi­cians such as Prime Min­is­ter Ibrahim al-Jaafari spent the war in exile there.
Aga also had lit­tle faith in a fair vote and said the gov­ern­ment would fix the elec­tion in its favor. “They just want to let the peo­ple feel they are prac­tic­ing democ­racy,” he said. “Peo­ple in the gov­ern­ment are just instru­ments for Amer­ica and Israel. If I accept this con­sti­tu­tion, then I will be like them.” He added that the con­sti­tu­tion was un-Islamic and against Iraq tra­di­tions because it was cre­ated under for­eign occu­pa­tion.
A neigh­bor, Mustafa Hamdi, a 35-year-old bar­ber also rejected he doc­u­ment. “They imported this con­sti­tu­tion from abroad,” he said. “This is only for Kurds and other par­ties,” mean­ing Iran.
How­ever, the Sun­nis seem to have come out in droves in sev­eral swing provinces, such as Nin­eveh, and there’s a real chance this might go down to the wire. Anbar and Sala­hadin provinces — con­tain­ing the cities of Fal­lu­jah and Tikrit, Saddam’s home­town, respec­tively — will almost cer­tainly vote against the doc­u­ment. But Ninevah is home to Mosul, a mixed city of about 2 mil­lion Sunni Arabs and Kurds. If the Kurds stayed home out of com­pla­cency — and I’m hear­ing that Kur­dish and Shi’ite par­tic­i­pa­tion was lower than expected — the Sun­nis might just pull off a huge upset.
That will change every­thing. The Sis­tani coali­tion, made up of mainly of reli­gious Shi’ite par­ties, will be crack apart. The sec­u­lar par­ties involved, includ­ing Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Con­gress, will split off. One pos­si­bil­ity is to see them ally with for­mer Prime Min­is­ter Iyad Allawi and the National Dia­logue Coun­cil, who are seek­ing an alliance to run for elec­tions in Decem­ber. The reli­gious par­ties will be unable to go to the vot­ers with a sin­gle accom­plish­ment. They haven’t deliv­ered power, water or secu­rity. The econ­omy is still in sham­bles and unem­ploy­ment is high. If the con­sti­tu­tion passes, at least they’ll be able to say to their con­stituents, “At least we secured our seat of power and put the Sun­nis in their place.” If it doesn’t, what can they offer?
On the Sun­nis side, you’ll see newly resur­gent polit­i­cal groups — and the end of the Iraqi Islamic Party, which sup­ported a “last-minute deal”:http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1116781,00.html to amend the con­sti­tu­tion after the elec­tion of a per­ma­nent Assem­bly in Decem­ber. For­merly united with the National Dia­logue Coun­cil and the Asso­ci­a­tion of Mus­lim Schol­ars opposed it, the IIP switched last week with the announce­ment of the deal and called for its peo­ple to sup­port it. If the con­sti­tu­tion fails because of Sunni “no” votes, that will show the IIP to be tooth­less and it will lose sup­port. The Asso­ci­a­tion of Mus­lim Schol­ars, at the same time, will be shown to have the real juice among the Sun­nis, as it has been a long-time oppo­nent of the inva­sion, the occu­pa­tion, the Iraqi gov­ern­ment and the con­sti­tu­tion. The National Dia­logue Coun­cil is fairly new, and will also ben­e­fit, but from what I’m hear­ing it was the Sunni mosques, not the sec­u­lar­ists of the NDC, that got the vote out.
As for the Amer­i­cans, they’ll have a a new polit­i­cal real­ity to deal with. The AMS has deep ties to the insur­gency, and a no vote and infu­sion of polit­i­cal cap­i­tal will, iron­i­cally, allow the Amer­i­cans to start deal­ing seri­ously with the Asso­ci­a­tion — and thus, the insur­gency. That could actu­ally be the start of peace talks.
If the con­sti­tu­tion wins deci­sively, how­ever, the Sun­nis will grum­ble but likely work within the sys­tem. Sunni mem­bers of the con­sti­tu­tional com­mit­tee, from Fal­lu­jah no less, have said as such. They promised to run a slate of can­di­dates that can actively shape the con­sti­tu­tion when it’s up for amend­ments in April.
The absolute worst-case sce­nario is if the Sun­nis come close to defeat­ing the con­sti­tu­tion, but fail. There will be accu­sa­tions of vote-rigging and any polit­i­cal momen­tum the Sun­nis felt was mov­ing their way will be spent. The Shi’ites will have con­sol­i­dated their power and those Sun­nis on the fence might be moved into active oppo­si­tion. The insur­gency might even worsen, if such things are pos­si­ble, or a close vote might be the trig­ger for “open civil war”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/2005/09/civil_war_is_he.php.
So, it will def­i­nitely be inter­est­ing to watch the results come in. So far, we’re hear­ing noth­ing but rumors. They range from the intrigu­ing — I heard that the polling sta­tions in the Green Zone, the seat the Iraqi Gov­ern­ment, went over­whelm­ingly against the con­sti­tu­tion; make of that what you will — to the absurd: Al-Firat, an Iran­ian chan­nel, is report­ing that instead of vot­ing “no,” Sala­hadin province, con­tain­ing Tikrit, voted 75 per­cent in favor of the con­sti­tu­tion. If that result turns out to be true, there will be no doubt the vote was fixed, and in a stu­pidly clumsy man­ner.
I do think that defeat­ing the con­sti­tu­tion might be best in the long run. It will embolden the Sun­nis and give them a polit­i­cal win, moti­vat­ing them to fur­ther involve them­selves in the polit­i­cal process. This will force the Shi’ites and Kurds to deal with real elected rep­re­sen­ta­tives instead of appointed ones. Will this spell and end to vio­lence? Of course not, but any­thing that allows the Sun­nis to claim vic­tory instead of forc­ing them to eat polit­i­cal table scraps is a big step in end­ing the Sunni-led insurgency.

Is It Civil War Yet?

BAGHDAD — That pink-o, lib­eral work­ers’ rag Defense­News (thanks to Robert for the link!), also known as a trade pub­li­ca­tion for defense con­trac­tors, “pub­lished a depress­ing piece”:http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/message/60549 on Iraq call­ing the sit­u­a­tion here an “unde­clared civil war.” I think it’s time we jour­nal­ists faced up that this is, indeed the case.
I remem­ber many dis­cus­sions over the past few months with col­leagues as to whether this place is in civil war yet or not, but I think this arti­cle lays out the argu­ment for it pretty well:

‘Things Are Get­ting Worse By the Day’
Unde­clared Iraq Civil War Sig­nals Worse to Come
5 Sept 05
By Riad Kah­waji, Dubai
Iraq’s long-feared civil war is esca­lat­ing and will engulf the entire coun­try unless eth­nic lead­ers take dras­tic steps, accord­ing to offi­cials and ana­lysts.
“The cur­rent sec­tar­ian and eth­nic killings in Iraq are actu­ally the begin­ning of a civil war,” said Georges Sada, an adviser to Iraqi Prime Min­is­ter Ibrahim al-Jaafari and the exec­u­tive sec­re­tary of the Iraq Insti­tute for Peace. “Sec­tar­ian divi­sions in Iraq have started back in the ‘90s, which pre­pared the ground for the civil war spread­ing today.”

Kah­waji notes that the Amer­i­cans have down­played deep cul­tural dif­fer­ences between Sun­nis, Shi’ites and Kurds despite the increase in sec­tar­ian and eth­nic killings since April 2003. And while Amb. Zal­may Khalilzad and mil­i­tary com­man­ders now acknowl­edge the pos­si­bil­ity of civil war, none of them will label the vio­lence going on right now as such.
Hun­dreds have been killed for being Sunni, Shi’ite or, less often, Kur­dish. Entire neigh­bor­hoods of Bagh­dad are being “cleansed”:http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1096488,00.html (paid link, sorry. c’mon, guys!). Sunni lead­ers accuse the gov­ern­ment of Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a Shi’ite from the Dawa Party, of allow­ing the Badr mili­tia to set­tle scores and elim­i­nate ene­mies by using the secu­rity appa­ra­tus of the state. (Badr con­trols the Inte­rior Min­istry and its dreaded com­mando units.)
And yet, I’ve been reluc­tant to call it a civil war because I just haven’t been able to. I felt unsure and per­haps a lit­tle unwill­ing to see that it’s gone as far as it has. And oth­ers say “the exis­tence of a polit­i­cal process means it’s not yet a civil war”:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4249172.stm. I now think that’s sim­plis­tic. After watch­ing this place for two years, I’m now pre­pared to call this thing a civil war, align­ing myself squarely with the America-haters at DefenseNews.

For over a year now, there has not been a day in which Iraq did not wit­ness sec­tar­ian killings where the vic­tims were either Shi­ite, Sunni or Kurds,” said Ghas­san Attiyah, chair­man of the Baghdad-based Iraq Foun­da­tion for Devel­op­ment and Democ­racy. “I’m not talk­ing here about ran­dom shoot­ing. I am talk­ing about tar­get­ing peo­ple indi­vid­u­ally on the roads and killing them for being from one group or another.”

In the arti­cle, Qassem Jaa­far, a Doha, Qatar-based Mid­dle East secu­rity ana­lyst, listed the symp­toms of a civil war:
* A weak cen­tral gov­ern­ment with incom­pe­tent secu­rity appa­ra­tus.
* Spread of sec­tar­ian and eth­nic killings.
* Exis­tence of armed sec­tar­ian and eth­nic mili­tias.
* High threat per­cep­tion among the sec­tar­ian and eth­nic groups of the coun­try.
* Insis­tence of each group on its demands.
* For­eign inter­fer­ence and sup­port to feud­ing groups.
All of these ele­ments are present now in Iraq, and the con­sti­tu­tion process didn’t help mat­ters.
Trum­peted by Khalilzad as a “national com­pact,” the con­sti­tu­tion is instead a greater source of divi­sion, and pri­vately the Amer­i­cans are barely stom­ach­ing it. The prob­lem is not so much the con­tent as is the process. It’s not a _bad_ doc­u­ment, as writ­ten, and the con­tra­dic­tions within — with the excep­tion of fed­er­al­ism — can prob­a­bly all be finessed. But the process of draft­ing it, which largely excluded the Sun­nis, deep­ened dis­trust among the var­i­ous groups. The Sun­nis, who didn’t par­tic­i­pate in Jan­u­ary elec­tions and who have them­selves to blame for not hav­ing legit­i­mately elected lead­ers to sit on the panel, dis­trust the Shi’ites and Kurds as mak­ing a power grab. The Shi’ites and Kurds, how­ever, never trusted the Sun­nis who _did_ show up to help draft the char­ter, say­ing they weren’t elected so who knows who they rep­re­sent. (Both fair enough points, I sup­pose, but not very help­ful ones for bridg­ing divides.)

If the con­sti­tu­tion is not amended to meet Sunni demands and goes as-is to the ref­er­en­dum, then mod­er­ate Sunni fig­ures would lose ground to the rad­i­cal forces and an all-out civil war will spread to each cor­ner of the coun­try,” Attiyah said.
[UPDATE: It was amended slightly, but whether it will be enough to assuage Sun­nis remains to be seen. The hard core rejec­tion­ists obvi­ously will never vote for it.]
Jaa­far agreed. “The U.S. is fac­ing a seri­ous dilemma in Iraq, where its Shi­ite and Kur­dish allies have gone out on their own push­ing for their own agen­das that do not seem to meet with Washington’s vision of a future Iraq,” he said.
“The Shi­ites, for exam­ple, have been push­ing for an Iranian-style Islamic repub­lic, which would not suit U.S. inter­ests,” while “the Kur­dish seces­sion­ist drive is grow­ing stronger every day, which is get­ting Turkey and other neigh­bor­ing states more worried.”

The ques­tion is what is Wash­ing­ton going to do? They’re in a no-win sit­u­a­tion, Jaa­far says, nei­ther able to with­draw nor able to main­tain Iraq’s unity and estab­lish a demo­c­ra­tic Iraq as a model for neigh­bor­ing coun­tries. Attiyah believes the U.S. might choose to sac­ri­fice Iraq’s unity for its own goals.

I believe some U.S. offi­cials have started enter­tain­ing the idea of divid­ing Iraq on eth­nic and sec­tar­ian lines to ensure sta­bil­ity and facil­i­tate their exit after estab­lish­ing some mil­i­tary bases in the oil-rich Kurdish-controlled north­ern Iraq,” Attiyah said. “In this case, Wash­ing­ton would blame the Sun­nis and other neigh­bor­ing states like Iran and Syria for the breakup of the country.”

A dis­mem­bered Iraq with var­i­ous mili­tias fight­ing over the corpse on top of 20 per­cent of the world’s oil. It’s a night­mare sce­nario that looks more more likely by the day, and the cur­rent civil war is just a smol­der com­pared to the inferno to come.

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