Inside the Imam Ali Shrine

NAJAF, Iraq — There’s a storm brew­ing over the Imam Ali Shrine in the old city here, and it’s going to get ugly.

We made it into the shrine today after an early morn­ing dash to the city of Najaf from Bagh­dad. I had to hun­ker down in the back while trav­el­ing through Mah­moudiya and Lat­i­fiya, because those are the two hot spots where most journos seem to get them­selves kid­napped. We made it through with­out inci­dent, how­ever, mainly because we were going about 180 km/hour and we were there before any of the kid­nap­pers were awake. It was 6:30 a.m. when we blasted through the twin burgs.

We hit Najaf around 8:30 a.m. or so. After a quick check in at the Sea of Najaf hotel, which is about as crappy as it sounds, we sur­veyed the sur­round­ings. The hotel was crawl­ing with journos. Some old friend from Bagh­dad who had been on this story for a week longer. And tem­pers are short. If you’ve not been here for three weeks, the com­pletely fried old hands just hiss at you.

We headed out. Najaf is divided into the old city and the new city. The old city is a roughly cir­cu­lar area sur­round­ing the shrine while the new city sprawls out to the east and south. To the north is the Wadi al-Salaam, the Val­ley of Peace ceme­tery that some say is the largest in the world. It’s cur­rently occu­pied by the U.S. Marines and other Army units. The Mahdi Army has been pretty roundly chased out of there.

A huge fire burns on the other side of the front in Najaf. (Christopher Allbritton ® 2004)Any­way, we had to cross Med­ina Street to get into the Old City. We approached from the south. The place is crawl­ing with snipers from all sides — Amer­i­cans, Mahdi and Iraqi Secu­rity Forces. We hugged the walls of the close-to-collapsing build­ings and raised our hands to show we were unarmed as we crossed every inter­sec­tion. H, and I had hooked up with some Iraqi and Alger­ian pho­tog­ra­phers from AP, AFP and Reuters, and they seemed to know what they were doing — until the Reuters guy almost started cry­ing in one inter­sec­tion. It’s under­stand­able. It’s an incred­i­bly stress­ful thing to do, to walk out into the mid­dle of a free-fire zone with a bullet-proof vest, “TV” or “Press” taped to it, and hands raised in the air. Through­out this 2 hour long ordeal, we were con­stantly sur­rounded by the sharp bang-bang of small arms fire and the colos­sal booms of Bradleys and M1-A1 tanks fir­ing. Oh, and mor­tars being launched and land­ing about two blocks over. That was fun. At one point, a huge plume of black smoke rose up and a Bradley or an M1-A1 — I couldn’t tell from the dis­tance — was return­ing fire. It was about 500m away from us, but the smoke was too thick for me to shoot through.

As we rounded a cor­ner approach­ing Med­ina Street, which is the Red Line on the front, the sound of gun­fire opened up around us. We scram­bled to the lee of a build­ing and squat­ted. As the exchange died down, incred­i­bly, some guy came up and sold us all ice cream.

I asked him what he was doing.

I’m sup­port­ing the Mahdi Army,” he grinned. “They like ice cream and I have a lot of customers.”

It was good ice cream, I’ll admit. So while bul­lets whizzed around and over us, we crouched by the side of a wall that radi­ated heat from the mid-morning sun and snacked on a rain­bow swirl. Unreal.

Finally, the shoot­ing eased up and we backed up to another block fur­ther away to try another run toward the front. Mid-block, sev­eral men sat on the side­walk dis­cussing the state of the war.

I would not call this the worst,” mused Muham­mad Jasim, who seemed to know the pho­tog­ra­phers. “All of the days in Iraq are worse than the oth­ers, but these are dark days.” He instructed his son to fetch us water, mat­tresses and pil­lows. We all stretched out on the side­walk and napped. The incom­ing shells didn’t seem to be get­ting any closer and I found myself oddly unwor­ried about this improb­a­bly turn of events.

Jasim doesn’t think Moq­tada al-Sadr should be in the shrine. “If you attack the Amer­i­cans,” he shrugged, “then they will attack you.” He seemed to think that Moq­tada should go far away and fight the Amer­i­cans some­where else. “All thath I hope is to see peace in the city and the shrine,” he said. As we spoke, men wan­dered up and soon enough it was a salon of sorts, with about a dozen Iraqi men, three pho­tog­ra­phers, assorted fix­ers and trans­la­tors and me. We lounged on the side­walk. I dozed. FInally, after a cou­ple of hours we decided to make another run for it to cross the line.

Now it got hairy.

Med­ina street is wide open, with a low divider in the mid­dle. We were sit­ting ducks. One of the pho­togs took off his white shirt and we waved that. We were clearly marked as jour­nal­ists, but friends had been telling me that the Amer­i­cans were shoot­ing at every­one. And the Iraqi Secu­rity Forces were even worse. The upside is that the ISF are bad shots and the Amer­i­cans are good enough to fire warn­ing shots above people’s heads and not hit them. It’s still dis­con­cert­ing to have a bul­let snarl past your ear by a few inches I’d imag­ine. I say “I’d imag­ine” because no one shot at us. We still were com­pletely freaked out by the idea of an instant death from an unknown enemy perched on a rooftop, but after a while, I started to breathe a lit­tle easier.

We crossed Med­ina street. Another street, who’s name I don’t know lay ahead, and it was guarded by tanks and other heavy armor. As we began to cross, I looked down to see a wire snaking across the alley­way we were prepar­ing to dart from. It led into a pile of debris, and the cas­ing of an unex­ploded shell was clearly vis­i­ble. Great. We were stand­ing on an IED. We decided it was time to move. This was when the Reuters pho­tog started crying.

When we got to the other side of the street, we began to relax a lit­tle. Until we saw another IED in the ground at our feet. We hopped it and entered the maze of the Old City.

We were met by the chil­dren of the Mahdi Army. They couldn’t have been more than 18 or so. And they were so small and frag­ile com­pared to the Amer­i­can troops who hulked over every­thing in this coun­try. They’re big guys. But our Mahdi Boys were friendly and searched us almost apolo­get­i­cally. We showed them our pass to the Shrine and they imme­di­ately guided us through a war­ren of twisty, cov­ered alley­ways that was straight out of the 11th Cen­tury, which is about when the Shrine was built, I believe. (Some­one check me on that one.)

The Imam Ali Shrine (Christopher Allbritton ® 2004)As we approached the Shrine, the gold dome gleamed in the mid-day sun. The twin minarets glit­tered. The whole thing is cov­ered with gold, pure gold, and the tile work is exquis­ite. I’ve never seen any­thing more ornate and beau­ti­ful. We dashed inside, avoid­ing more unseen marks­men, and beheld the Shrine itself.

Sur­rounded by high walls, the Shrine is the rest­ing place of Imam Ali, the third Imam and intensely holy to the world’s Shi’ites. This was their Vatican.

Inside, we were greeted warmly. The Mahdi know how to work the media, and they know the world press gen­er­ally likes the scrappy under­dog — espe­cially if they don’t actively try to kill you like the Sunni insur­gents do. And to give Moq­tada credit, he does try to dis­cour­age kid­nap­pings and he’s been help­ful in get­ting two of my friends released. There were no weapons in sight, and I don’t think — any­more — that there are any in the Shrine proper. But I did watch mor­tars being fired from just beneath and out­side the east­ern wall of the Shrine. The mor­tar teams were right up against the wall, allow­ing them quickly leave the mor­tar out­side and dash inside to become unarmed pil­grims again.

And this is piss­ing off a lot of the peo­ple who live around the Shrine. The Mahdi aren’t par­tic­u­larly accu­rate in their fir­ings, and they’re drop­ping live rounds in a densely pop­u­lated area. Houses and cars are being blown up. Peo­ple are dying, and the res­i­dents of Najaf are blam­ing Moqtada.

There is no food, no water,” said Akil Ramahi, 32, in the streets before we entered the old city. “Death is bet­ter than this.”

One man did all this,” he con­tin­ued. “If Sad­dam had been here, he would have got­ten rid of Moq­tada al-Sadr in one day. I accuse Moq­tada al-Sadr of destroy­ing the mar­ket — ” he was refer­ring to a bombed-out mar­ket — “Not the Americans.”

To be fair, more com­mon was the “pox on both houses” sen­ti­ment, but inter­est­ingly, the Mahdis are about as pop­u­lar as the Amer­i­cans, which is to say not very pop­u­lar at all. And one man had noth­ing good to say about the U.S. troops.

Are the Amer­i­cans here just to see how many Iraqis are dying?” asked Dakhel Sha’ban. “Or is there a point to this shooting?”

We spent the after­noon in the shrine, and a group of human shields — they said — told me that they were helped by Allah.

The Army of the Imam Mahdi is get­ting its power from God,” said Ali Hus­sein, 41. “Our mor­tars are destroy­ing things the Amer­i­can mor­tars are not.” Like tanks and heli­copters, he said. “This is a heav­enly power.”

The sup­port­ers in the shrines are devoted men, ready to die for Moq­tada, they assured me. And they would die for the Shrine.

One of the most impor­tant things in our lives, as Mus­lims, is our Shrines, which are more impor­tant than our fam­i­lies, our chil­dren,” said Sha’ban. “We will die for them.”

One of the things I’m here for is a small story about the fabled trea­sures of Imam Ali sur­round­ing his sar­coph­a­gus. So I con­vinced Sheikh She­bani, Moqtada’s man in the mosque, to let me enter and take a few pic­tures of the shrine and the trea­sures of Ali. So now you see a lit­tle of what’s at stake here. (The green light is how they dis­play the sar­coph­a­gus and the trea­sures.) After see­ing the trea­sures, I was taken on a tour of the dam­age done to the shrine. It was calm affair, and I felt a bit like an insur­ance appraiser.

In both cases, Sheikh Mustafa Muham­madi told me calmly and with­out ran­cor that no Mus­lim could tol­er­ate it. He seemed to be tol­er­at­ing all right, how­ever, and I thought he would be the fire­brand! And this is some­thing I’ve noticed around Bagh­dad: The long-feared out­burst of Shi’a anger just isn’t hap­pen­ing. The ceme­tery has been bombed and occu­pied by infi­dels, the shrine has been dam­aged, and we keep hear­ing warn­ings of a loom­ing Shi’a upris­ing. But shouldn’t there have been some demon­stra­tions or expres­sions of con­cern? I hear rote expres­sions, said more with a feel­ing that it should be said rather than what they really feel. I don’t have any quotes or any­thing to back that up, and it’s really more the way they say it any­way. It’s just an impres­sion I’ve been struck by.

Finally, at 4 p.m., we high-tailed it out of there. The bom­bard­ments were get­ting closer and the Mahdi were return­ing fire more robustly. As we threaded our way out again, with hands raised at every inter­sec­tion, we ran into an Iraqi Army patrol. The lieu­tenant in charge said they were the Rapid Reac­tion Force, which has been one of the few units get­ting high marks from the Amer­i­can train­ers. They’re good, and I won­dered just what they were doing here, since Lt. Rafat Kad­him Mas­soun said they had come down from Bagh­dad just today. Are you going to storm the Shrine I asked him?

We hope that tonight or tomor­row this will be fin­ished because the time for them to quit is over,” he said. “The Shrine will be attacked; the Marines are get­ting closer. In two or three days, this will be over.”

I’m wait­ing to see what hap­pens next. He might have been just talk­ing out of turn, but tonight might be interesting.

Off to Najaf, inshallah…

I’m try­ing to orga­nize a trip to Najaf tomor­row, and hope­fully to get into the shrine. A cou­ple of friends of mine did it last week, but left after three days inside. They reported no weapons in the shrine proper, but instead they were stored around the shrine in the nearby build­ings. How­ever, other orga­ni­za­tions, includ­ing the AP, have pub­lished pic­tures of Mahdi fight­ers man­ning machine guns that the cut­line said was _in the shrine._ Also, an Iraqi reporter who helps TIME out has reported that peo­ple in Najaf are sick of the Mahdi fir­ing mor­tars from either within the shrine com­pound or from its minarets. So, I don’t know what to make of that.
And let’s not even get into the whole con­fu­sion of Moq­tada al-Sadr’s “will he or won’t he?” crab­walk on whether he’s vacat­ing the shrine or not. There have been so many con­flict­ing reports that I can’t begin to make sense of the state of play. Suf­fice it to say, con­fu­sion reigns at this point.
Thus, the expe­di­tion to Najaf. I’ll be tak­ing a BGan satel­lite receiver and my lap­top, so I should be able to file, if needed. But I may not be able to get into the shrine or even to Najaf; we’ve got to go through Kufa, where there have been reports of rel­a­tively heavy fight­ing.
So hope­fully we’ll be able to see a lit­tle bit of what’s going on. Wish me luck.

Moqtada redux

It’s time to set some­thing straight that I should have done a while back. In a “pre­vi­ous post”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/000803.php that pissed a lot of peo­ple off, I said, “Mobs are ter­ri­fy­ing, but they’re rel­a­tively easy to deal with if you’re will­ing to kill a lot of peo­ple and say the hell with world opin­ion.” I would have _thought_ most peo­ple would have real­ized that I was _not_ advo­cat­ing killing a bunch of peo­ple; I was say­ing armed mobs like Sadr’s are fiendishly dif­fi­cult to deal with — unless you’re will­ing to say to hell with what other peo­ple think.
Amer­ica and Allawi have shown that, by and large, they don’t care what other peo­ple think. But I didn’t choose words care­fully in the next sen­tence: “The lat­ter is unlikely to be a prob­lem for Allawi and the Amer­i­cans, how­ever; world opin­ion is basi­cally against Moq­tada.” I should have instead said “world opin­ion is not for Moq­tada.” That’s a dif­fer­ent idea that I wrote and that was my mis­take.
What I meant is this: Lib­eral democ­ra­cies, mostly what we call “The West,” are usu­ally pretty uncom­fort­able with things like mass killings and raz­ing holy places. That’s a good way to get peo­ple riled up and why deal­ing with mobs in a jack-booted way is tricky and dif­fi­cult. But what works in the U.S. and Allawi’s favor is the gen­eral unsa­vori­ness of the Mehdi Army. As Juan Cole says, “Arab news­pa­pers don’t usu­ally say so, but the other side of the story is that Muqtada’s mili­ti­a­men are narrow-minded, thug-like puri­tans who impose their power on civil­ians by coer­cion.” He’s absolutely right. As one fighter is quoted by a Salon story, “We will do any­thing to stop the Amer­i­cans. They have sex and drink­ing and other things, and we don’t want this.“
Now, I’m _not_ going to make the argu­ment that they should be killed because they don’t like Brit­ney Spears. I am also not going to say that they don’t have a right to life or to their beliefs. I am going to ask the ques­tion why the West­ern world should be wring­ing its hands about deal­ing deci­sively with a heav­ily armed group of these guys, who are also the chief sus­pects behind a wave of liquor store and CD shop bomb­ings in Bagh­dad and other cities. In any other sit­u­a­tion, they would be con­sid­ered crim­i­nal thugs and most peo­ple would beg­ging the National Guard to come in and restore order. But in the case of Moq­tada, you’d think I’d maligned La Resis­tance of World War II. How _dare_ I call the brave mujahdeen ass­holes and thugs?
Which brings me back to my point. Where is the out­rage and the sym­pa­thy for Moq­tada? I mean, I under­stand the desire to avoid killing peo­ple in mass quan­ti­ties; it’s really for the best that that doesn’t hap­pen. I am against mass killings, period. But where are the crowds and the marches for U.S. out of Najaf or for Moqtada’s brave resis­tance such as those that pre­ceded the war in the West? Where are the denun­ci­a­tions in the U.N. from peo­ple with cred­i­bil­ity on human rights and vio­lence like Ger­many or Canada? I’m not hear­ing them. Or at least, I’m not hear­ing of reports of them.
And here in Iraq, I’d guess that most peo­ple would “sym­pa­thize” with al-Sadr stand­ing up to the hated Amer­i­cans. But do they sup­port al-Sadr him­self? Over­whelm­ingly, *no.* In a sur­vey (.doc file) done in June by the Iraq Cen­ter for Research and Strate­gic Stud­ies, an Iraqi think tank run by Dr. Sadoun al-Dulame, he found that the per­son Iraqis would most vote for in a pres­i­den­tial race was … Ibrahim al-Jafari, the head of the Islamic Dawa Party (A Shi’a group.) The next most pop­u­lar was “don’t know.” The Shi’a leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Coun­cil for Islamic Rev­o­lu­tion in Iraq, received 2.1 per­cent of the vote. What did Moq­tada get? 1.1 per­cent. Hell, _Saddam Hussein_ out­polled al-Sadr, with 1.7 per­cent of respon­dents choos­ing him as their favorite pres­i­den­tial can­di­date.
Would more peo­ple vote for al-Sadr now? Very pos­si­bly. Would it be more than 2 – 3 per­cent? I seri­ously doubt it. Will it change in the future? Undoubt­edly, but to what degree I have no idea.
Al-Sadr’s move­ment gar­ners sym­pa­thy because he’s point­ing his fin­ger at the biggest devil of them all in Iraq — the United States. But that doesn’t nec­es­sar­ily trans­late into sup­port for the man him­self. His cause — dri­ving out the U.S. — may be pop­u­lar, but the man and his poli­cies, such as they are, are widely dis­par­aged. Putting down an armed (and mostly unpop­u­lar) rebel­lion isn’t putting the brakes on democ­racy, it’s remov­ing a bar­rier to it.
What the Iraqis do after that is their busi­ness, hope­fully. I’ve been at the national con­fer­ence for the past two days, and it’s a mess, but I hope not an entirely hope­less one. The big par­ties — the PUK, KDP, Islamic Dawa Party, SCIRI and Iraqi National Accord have set up the selec­tion process so that it — surprise! — favors them­selves. And the two biggest par­ties, Dawa and SCIRI are mak­ing a real power play to dom­i­nate the com­ing coun­cil. The reac­tion among the 1,300 del­e­gates to the Islamic putsch? Dis­may and alarm. Most Iraqis from all walks of life really don’t want to live under an Islamic state envi­sioned by the Islamists, among which Moq­tada would proudly place him­self.)
Any­way, the peo­ple who do argue most stren­u­ously are the “hard-core anti-imperialists,” as I rather slop­pily termed them. My apolo­gies. These are — gen­er­ally — the folks who opposed the war, as I did, but who think that pulling out com­pletely is the answer, as I do not. I don’t think they’re really argu­ing in favor of Moq­tada so much as against the U.S. Some­one in one of the com­ments said they favored “self-determination.” Based on anec­do­tal evi­dence — and the poll results above — self-determination would involve _someone_ rid­ing Moqtada’s ass out of Najaf on a rail and dis­arm­ing his mili­tia. It would also involve get­ting the U.S. out of Iraq and not dam­ag­ing the shrine.
As I said, if Moq­tada and his fol­low­ers get slaugh­tered, I’m con­fi­dent most of the world will make the stan­dard dis­ap­prov­ing noises, but not too much of a fuss. If the shrine is undam­aged (or maybe only a lit­tle bit), it’s a big win for Allawi. If, how­ever, the Imam Ali shrine is dam­aged or worse, that’s an entirely dif­fer­ent story. And a much scarier one. That _would_ inflame mid­dle class and poor alike, unit­ing behind a hatred for the U.S. that could trans­late from resent­ful grum­bling into real action. That’s why al-Sadr is weak with­out the shrine and pow­er­ful inside it. And that’s why this is tricky.
Al-Sadr isn’t that pop­u­lar, except where he exploits the fears and resent­ment of the poor, his vision of Iraq is not that pop­u­lar, he’s been given numer­ous oppor­tu­ni­ties to take part in a polit­i­cal sys­tem that is, while flawed, the only game in town, and he refuses and takes over the holi­est shrine in Islam. An Iraqi reporter in Najaf is telling me the peo­ple of Najaf are fed up with him and want him out because the Mehdi’s are ter­ror­iz­ing them and shoot­ing mor­tars from the top of the mosque. Tell me again why he shouldn’t be dealt with strongly and force­fully if he con­tin­ues to refuse all over­tures of giv­ing him a slice of the polit­i­cal pie? What is the alter­na­tive? Just pulling up stakes and leav­ing?
That’s not such a good idea either.
Say­ing the war should have never hap­pened and feel­ing vir­tu­ous because you were right it is all well and good, but it’s not really a road map to what to do regard­ing Iraq. Because, Iraq is the U.S.‘s prob­lem — and it’s a big one. It is _the_ for­eign pol­icy chal­lenge for the U.S. — and the rest of the world — for the fore­see­able future. If this was Viet­nam you could, from a realpoli­tik point of view, let it mud­dle along under a regime of benign neglect. But not here. It’s chaos sit­ting on the second-largest oil reserves in the world. And they don’t even have to be tapped for it to affect you per­son­ally.
Yes, you per­son­ally. Let’s say Moq­tada sur­vives and his move­ment suc­ceeds in dis­cred­it­ing the Allawi gov­ern­ment to such an extent that he resigns or, in des­per­a­tion, asks the United States to leave and invites Moq­tada into some form of power-sharing arrange­ment. He’s a fun­da­men­tal­ist Shi’a who wants to impose an Islamic state on a pop­u­la­tion that would over­whelm­ingly oppose it, as I’ve men­tioned. Or hell, let’s say he dies and his mar­tyr­dom leads to a pop­u­lar rev­o­lu­tion — again, some­thing I think is improb­a­ble, but bear with me for the sake of argu­ment. Call this new Islamic Repub­lic of Iraq Iran-lite.
What would hap­pen next? Well, for one, the best and the bright­est of Iraq’s intel­lec­tu­als and mid­dle class would flee. So you’re mak­ing an already poor pop­u­la­tion poorer. Good for Moq­tada, the poor are his base, appeal­ing as he does to a kind of Islamic pop­ulism. What hap­pens when you make a coun­try impov­er­ished? Right, you cre­ate a breed­ing ground for _jihadist_ ter­ror­ism. It’s already hap­pen­ing among the Sunni extrem­ists of the Anbar province. A very few for­eign fig­ures such as Zar­qawi are inspir­ing native-born Iraqi _jihadis._ Fal­lu­jah is crawl­ing with them.
Next, the Kurds would prob­a­bly fight a civil war to get out of such a state. That’s one of the rea­sons they’re so adamant about the veto clause in the TAL — and why the Shia groups were so adamant to have it in. An inde­pen­dent Kur­dis­tan would almost surely ignite a regional war involv­ing Turkey and Iran. It would also deny the uni­fied Islamic Repub­lic of Iraq a lot of oil rev­enues from the Kirkuk region. The Mul­lahs of Bagh­dad would not let region go peace­fully.
So now you have a fun­da­men­tal­ist state that may not be offi­cially ter­ror­is­tic, but has cre­ated the con­di­tions for ter­ror­ism to grow, and there’s a regional war being fought right on top of much of the world’s oil sup­ply. Can you say $60 a bar­rel? Maybe higher? $100?
Now, bemoan Amer­i­can depen­dence on Mid­dle East oil all you want — I cer­tainly do — but for the medium term, we need it. As does Europe and Japan — even more than the United States does. Oil prices at $45 a bar­rel are already pro­duc­ing a drag on the United States econ­omy; even higher rates would send the world econ­omy into a tail spin. And what hap­pens when China can’t afford Mid­dle East oil? Well, those Sprat­ley Islands look mighty invit­ing.
So now the U.S. is faced with _two_ bla­tantly hos­tile regimes strad­dling the Gulf and the sub­ver­sive Saudi regime, all con­trol­ling 20 – 25 per­cent of the world’s oil sup­ply. Your heat­ing bills will go through the roof, for one. Like­wise, your elec­tric­ity bill. For­get about dri­ving that car every­where, and hell, you prob­a­bly won’t have a job to drive to, since the energy costs are caus­ing com­pa­nies to cut costs every­where. Trans­porta­tion costs are higher, so the goods you need to buy and the food you eat will cost a lot more — which is prob­lem since you lost your job. Etc., etc. You get the point.
So there is a domino the­ory at work here, as I think I’ve pointed out — just not the one the neo­cons envi­sioned. I’m not say­ing it’s right to ignore the masses or urban poor, only that it hap­pens. I’m not say­ing it’s right to kill a lot of peo­ple whether they’re poor or rich, but some­times it’s nec­es­sary. It’s tragic that the poor are too often the vic­tims, how­ever.
I’m say­ing that defeat­ing al-Sadr’s aims to impose an Islamic state either through diplo­macy or through mil­i­tary action, which would be highly dis­taste­ful and prob­a­bly a pyrrhic vic­tory, is really the only option left to Allawi and the Amer­i­cans. And the fact that that’s not really a choice at all is a tragedy too.

More on Moqtada

I’ve been a bit busy here in Bagh­dad, what with run­ning around try­ing to get a han­dle on the Sunni insur­gency while also deal­ing with demands for sto­ries on al-Sadr. Also, for the last three days I’ve been hold­ing down the fort for the TIME bureau while a new bureau chief comes in, so I’ve not been get­ting out as much as I’d like dur­ing that time.
But it’s hard to escape the story of the moment, which is the loom­ing show­down with Moq­tada al-Sadr. I go back and forth on how seri­ous the al-Sadr inflam­ma­tion really is. On the one hand, if Moq­tada al-Sadr is killed there will be a blood­bath. If the shrine of Imam Ali is stormed, Shi’as all over the world will take to the streets. And yet, I sus­pect any vio­lence from that would be short-lived. There is no real No. 2 guy in the Sadr move­ment; he’s the remain­ing scion of the al-Sadr fam­ily. And that’s the basis of his power, in a nut­shell. Yes, he would be a mar­tyr, but peo­ple fol­low him because he’s got a heavy fam­ily name and is the son of a gen­uine patriot who stood up to Sad­dam Hus­sein and paid for it with his life. In the event of his death, his fol­low­ers would be up for grabs to the likes of the Supreme Coun­cil for Islamic Rev­o­lu­tion in Iraq and other smaller, reli­gious par­ties. His move­ment would frag­ment.
[UPDATE 12-AUG 0907 +0400 GMT: Allawi’s office issued a press state­ment this morn­ing deny­ing his gov­ern­ment had given approval to Amer­i­can forces to storm the holy shrines in Najaf. This con­tra­dicts ear­lier press reports from the New York Times and the Wash­ing­ton Post, which quote a “mil­i­tary spokesman” and even Allawi spokesman Georges Sada as con­firm­ing approval had been given.]
But what about the pas­sion of the Sadr City street? Moq­tada has been able to rouse the pas­sions of a lot of angry young men who are furi­ous at being — in this order — poor, ignored, occu­pied and lack­ing elec­tric­ity, but it’s not clear he can lead them any­where but into an abyss. His fight­ers can take to the street, but the amount of dam­age they’re doing to the MNF and the Iraqi gov­ern­ment is quite minor, actu­ally. Mil­i­tar­ily, they’re a pain in the ass more than a threat to the gov­ern­ment. They do seem to have a tal­ent for get­ting gov­ern­ment employ­ees to stay home, how­ever; the Mehdi Army — in a deli­cious bit of polit­i­cal the­atre — faxed a press release to Prime Min­is­ter Iyad Allawi’s office warn­ing of an indef­i­nite 1 p.m. cur­few and telling all state work­ers to stay home or be shelled. A lot of them did today.
Any­way, back to the “street.” An insight I’ve gained since I’ve been here is this: No one cares what the street thinks. Well, no one in power, I mean. For all the talk of the Arab street, there has never been a pop­u­lar rev­o­lu­tion in an Arab coun­try based on the pas­sion of the masses. They’re eas­ily manip­u­lated and utterly dis­or­ga­nized. The one excep­tion would be Iran — which is not an Arab coun­try. Why were the Per­sians dif­fer­ent? I’m not sure yet, but I sus­pect it has some­thing to do with a depth of polit­i­cal cul­ture and a thriv­ing mid­dle class that joined with the masses to oust the Shah in 1979. With no petit bour­geoisie to lend polit­i­cal oomph to the street demon­stra­tions, Iran would be … well, a lot like Iraq is today: a thin, rich strata sep­a­rated by the poor, angry but inchoate and dis­or­ga­nized masses by a few hardy middle-class souls who really just want to get the hell out of the coun­try.
Mobs are ter­ri­fy­ing, but they’re rel­a­tively easy to deal with if you’re will­ing to kill a lot of peo­ple and say the hell with world opin­ion. The lat­ter is unlikely to be a prob­lem for Allawi and the Amer­i­cans, how­ever; world opin­ion is basi­cally against Moq­tada. Oh, sure, you’ll always have hard-core anti-imperialists who sup­port any­one who stands up to the United States’ pres­ence in Iraq. They will make their calls for real democ­racy in Iraq with­out under­stand­ing that Moq­tada and his fol­low­ers don’t want democ­racy; they want an Islamic state with Moq­tada at the head. And that’s some­thing that vast major­ity of Iraqis emphat­i­cally don’t want. If he and his rad­i­cal fol­low­ers get slaugh­tered, I think the world will believe they brought it on them­selves. The West’s brow will remain largely unfur­rowed and its con­science untrou­bled.
Al-Sadr may yet pro­duce his own pri­vate Göt­ter­dammerung, but whether it remains a rip­ple or turns into a tsunami remains to be seen.

Sistani is ill

While the Shi’a south seems to be on the verge of con­fla­gra­tion, Bagh­dad and else­where is rife with rumors that Grand Aya­tol­lah Ali al-Sistani is dying of a heart prob­lem. He has been flown to Beirut and will con­tinue on to Lon­don for treat­ment. From his office in Los Ange­les:

Due to many calls, inquir­ing about the health of our grand scholar, Aya­tol­lah Seyyid Seestani [sic], please be informed that he is sick with a heart prob­lem and is under the super­vi­sion of sev­eral med­ical spe­cial­ists. We hope that they send us a report about his well being as soon as pos­si­ble.
As we thank all of those who are ask­ing about his health, we urge all the Mo’mens to raise their hands in sup­pli­ca­tion to the Almighty Allah swt to bestow upon him health and shade him with total pro­tec­tion as soon as pos­si­ble.
It should also be known that the Ummah of Islam, par­tic­u­larly the Shi’a, are in dire need for his pres­ence in this sen­si­tive era, the time that requires brave stands and hon­or­able decrees.
Peace and bless­ings be upon you all.

Pre­dictably, a rep­re­sen­ta­tive for Sis­tani in Bagh­dad, Sheikh Jalal­adin al-Sagheer, claimed to know noth­ing about any­thing, but would get back to me.
Despite al-Sagheer’s stud­ied clue­less­ness, Sistani’s flight out of the coun­try indi­cates his health con­di­tion is indeed very seri­ous, because he hasn’t left his home in Najaf in years. His reclu­sive­ness is, in part, a source of his author­ity, lend­ing him an orac­u­lar air.
This news of his health prob­lems first broke yes­ter­day, but the con­tin­ued fight­ing in Najaf, where the aya­tol­lah lives, has made get­ting med­ical atten­tion to him dif­fi­cult. He’s in crit­i­cal con­di­tion, my Shi’a friends say, pos­si­bly on his death bed. Dijla Radio, a local sta­tion here, is report­ing that he’s suf­fered a severe heart attack. But so far, no one in Bagh­dad really seems to know the full sit­u­a­tion. All any­one is sure of is that if Sis­tani dies, the fight­ing in the south could get a lot worse as Moq­tada al-Sadr and other lead­ers in the Shi’a com­mu­nity jockey for power.
Juan Cole, who knows a lot more about this than I do, says this:

It is not clear that the other three grand aya­tol­lahs have Sistani’s high opin­ion of par­lia­men­tary democ­racy rooted in pop­u­lar sov­er­eignty. He would prob­a­bly be suc­ceeded by Muham­mad Said al-Hakim, an Iraqi and dis­tant cousin of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Coun­cil for Islamic Rev­o­lu­tion in Iraq (SCIRI). SCIRI cer­tainly does not have a long-term com­mit­ment to democ­racy, though Muham­mad Said al-Hakim has never iden­ti­fied with that party him­self. The other two pos­si­ble suc­ces­sors are Bashir Najafi, a Pak­istani, and Muham­mad Fayad, an Afghan. Bashir Najafi is more vehe­mently anti-American than Sis­tani. Another con­tender is Sayyid Kad­him al-Haeri, some­times called the “fifth grand aya­tol­lah”, who is still in exile in Qom. He is a fol­lower of Iran’s Khome­ini and a rad­i­cal reac­tionary on social issues. He had been Muq­tada al-Sadr’s men­tor but has bro­ken with him.

While Moqtada’s Mahdi Army can be fairly well relied upon to attack Coali­tion forces, al-Hakim’s Badr Brigade (the mil­i­tary arm of SCIRI) might be per­suaded to help set­tle the inter-Shi’a rival­ries by tak­ing on Moqtada’s boys. The Badr Brigade is the largest mili­tia in Iraq after the Kur­dish pesh merga, num­ber­ing around 10,000 men.
Mean­while, I’m hear­ing reports from my fix­ers of fight­ing in Basra, Amarra, Najaf, Kar­bala, Nasariyah, Sadr City and the al-Shu’lah and al-Sha’ab ‘hoods in Bagh­dad.
A., my old friend, tells me four British troops have been killed in Basra and that Amarra is com­pletely con­trolled by the Mahdi Army. He went to Kar­bala yes­ter­day to visit friends of his and saw three mosques filled with “thou­sands” of weapons, includ­ing Katyusha rock­ets, Strella SAMs and more Kalash­nikovs than he could count. Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army has appar­ently used the two-month cease fire to regroup, train and pur­chase more weapons from Iran, and it’s likely that a lot more mosques than those three in Kar­bala have been turned into arms depots.
Things in Iraq have taken a rad­i­cally bad turn, in my opin­ion, and the post­pone­ment of the national con­fer­ence seems a bit of a storm in a teacup in com­par­i­son. The Amer­i­cans and the Iraqi Interim gov­ern­ment have big­ger prob­lems — e.g., another two-front insur­gency — than whether a veneer of legit­i­macy will be slathered on by the seat­ing of an Interim National Council.