Escape from Iraq

A story I wrote appeared Mon­day in the Newark Star-Ledger, a great smaller paper that cares about for­eign news. The story dealt with the plight of the Iraqi refugees in Jordan.

Lives sus­pended by war
AMMAN, Jor­dan — Rana crosses her legs on the thread­bare car­pet in her liv­ing room in this poor Pales­tin­ian sec­tion of town and watches as her three chil­dren light a can­dle. The kids are hav­ing a pre­tend birth­day party with­out a cake or presents, but their faces are painted a mag­nif­i­cent shade of gold by the candlelight.

Across town, Hasa and his fam­ily sit in their richly-appointed apart­ment, with all the mod­ern con­ve­niences and bed­rooms for every­one. The kitchen is espe­cially bright and clean.

Rana and Hasa live in sep­a­rate worlds, but have much in common.

Both fam­i­lies are Iraqi refugees fac­ing an uncer­tain future in a for­eign coun­try. Both want to return to their shat­tered coun­try. And both agreed to be inter­viewed and pho­tographed for this story only if their real names would not be used because they fear depor­ta­tion from Jor­dan and ret­ri­bu­tion in Iraq.
Dri­ven from their homes by vio­lence and threats of death, Rana and Hasa also pro­vide rare por­traits of the refugee life fac­ing many Iraqis. The two fam­i­lies are among the 750,000 Iraqi refugees esti­mated to be liv­ing in Jor­dan, a coun­try about the size of Penn­syl­va­nia and chok­ing on the stag­ger­ing bur­den of its new pop­u­la­tion. (The Iraqis account for about 15 per­cent of the peo­ple liv­ing in Jordan.)

Rana’s fam­ily is strug­gling to fit in and faces dis­crim­i­na­tion from other Iraqis, Jor­da­ni­ans and Pales­tini­ans. Jor­da­ni­ans, Rana says, com­plain to her that “you’re not wear­ing a hijab, you’re wear­ing tight jeans, you’re leav­ing the house.” Pales­tini­ans, mean­while, say, “You killed Sad­dam.”
Hasa’s fam­ily, while well off, faces dif­fi­cult cir­cum­stances as well. From their plush perch over­look­ing the local mosque, they made a com­fort­able life here after arriv­ing in 2003.

Things have changed, though.

Hasa now com­plains gov­ern­ment reg­u­la­tions make it impos­si­ble for him to run his busi­nesses here or in Iraq, and his life sav­ings is being bled dry.
At the same time, he rages at the U.S. government.

We are in such a state that we who wel­comed Amer­ica now hate it, and hate the peo­ple as much as we hate the pol­i­tics,” he says. “This isn’t the free­dom we expected. This isn’t what we wanted.”

Two fam­i­lies in a coun­try where they don’t want to be.

Two fam­i­lies in a coun­try that really doesn’t want them.

Please read the whole thing”:http://www.nj.com/starledger/stories/index.ssf?/base/news-11/1180932323248120.xml&coll=1. It should be noted that two days after the story appeared, the UNHCR raised the num­ber of Iraqis who are dis­placed or refugees to 4.4 mil­lion — almost twice the num­bers that were avail­able to me at the time of my report­ing. That’s 16 per­cent of the entire Iraqi pop­u­la­tion, mak­ing it the largest human cat­a­stro­phe to hit the Mid­dle East in recorded his­tory. It dwarfs the Pales­tin­ian dis­place­ments in 1948 and 1967. If some­thing isn’t done about this, it will fur­ther desta­bi­lize an already volatile region.

By the way, can some­one rec­om­mend a good server host? Yahoo! is ter­ri­ble and I keep get­ting 500 Server Errors pre­vent­ing me from get­ting into the blog, rebuild­ing it, etc.

Lebanese Army on the Move

BEIRUT — The Lebanese army is on the move toward Nahr el-Bared. For the last three hours, the army has been pound­ing Fatah al-Islam posi­tions with artillery, tanks and mor­tars. Some believe this is a soft­en­ing up of posi­tion before a full-scale assault on the camp, which would break a 37-year-old prece­dent keep­ing Lebanese troops out of the Pales­tin­ian camps.
Or it might be another one of the exchanges of fire that have pep­pered the almost two week stand-off. Although this one looks pretty big.

Going in?

BEIRUT — In my pre­vi­ous post, I men­tioned that Maj. Gen Ashraf Rifi, the head of the Inter­nal Secu­rity Forces told me, he “thinks the army will have to go in” to Nahr el-Bared to uproot the mil­i­tants of Fatah al-Islam.
“They are very dan­ger­ous,” he told me in his plush office. “We have no choice, we have to com­bat them.“
Per­haps I under­played his com­ments, because if he’s right, “going in” would be a huge devel­op­ment. The Pales­tini­ans have run their own secu­rity in the 12 camps under a 1969 agree­ment bro­kered by the Arab League. Now, that agree­ment was allegedly revoked in 1987 by the Lebanese Par­lia­ment, but there’s still at least a tacit agree­ment that the Pales­tini­ans mind their own store.
That’s not really a viable secu­rity option any­more, as we can see just north of Tripoli.
Now, what was Rifi try­ing to say? Was he merely repeat­ing the phrase of my ques­tion — “Will the army have to go in?” — because his eng­lish isn’t so good, as he protested a cou­ple of times? (He spoke well enough to con­duct an inter­view, mind you.) Was he try­ing to empha­size the point that there are ele­ments in the gov­ern­ment that are rarin’ to go get those Fatah al-Islam guys while oth­ers, per­haps Prime Min­is­ter Fuad Sin­iora, are will­ing to take a slower approach?
Or was he try­ing, in his own locu­tion, to empha­size the impor­tance for Lebanon of win­ning this bat­tle? Because this is make or break time for Lebanon as a sov­er­eign state.
If the army fails at this task of defeat­ing Fatah al-Islam — and I’m not talk­ing about some mealy-mouthed “arrange­ment” where a few of the mil­i­tants are hauled in — it will under­mine the legit­i­macy of the army as a state insti­tu­tion. And that will very much play right into Hezbollah’s hands.
See, Hezbol­lah has often said it is needed as an armed resis­tance because the army is too weak to stand up to Israel. (True.) But the Shi’ite group won’t put itself under the com­mand of the army because to do so would mean that any attack it launched on Israel such as, say, cap­tur­ing and killing Israeli troops, would mean _Lebanon_ was the aggres­sor and as such would bring down the wrath of the Israeli mil­i­tary on _Lebanon._
Of course, this is exactly what hap­pened last sum­mer, but let’s not quib­ble. In Lebanese pol­i­tics, there are appar­ently no lim­its on hypocrisy.
If the army fails and is seen as weak or ille­git­i­mate, Hezbol­lah has a strong argu­ment for say­ing it must keep its arms for the defense of Lebanon. Now, one of the def­i­n­i­tions of sov­er­eignty is the “monop­oly on the legit­i­mate use of phys­i­cal force”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monopoly_on_the_legitimate_use_of_physical_force, or vio­lence. Since Lebanon’s gov­ern­ment and weak army would be unable to claim that fol­low­ing a loss at the hands of Fatah al-Islam, there would be no real sov­er­eignty here. Hezbol­lah 1, Lebanon 0.
One can argue whether a sov­er­eign Lebanon is a good or bad thing in the grand scheme of things, an argu­ment I can’t address on this hum­ble blog, although I favor the for­mer. But it’s vitally impor­tant to the Lebanese gov­ern­ment.
It’s so impor­tant that some ele­ments of the gov­ern­ment, includ­ing Rifi’s for­mer boss, cab­i­net mem­ber Ahmad Fat­fat, “are call­ing for storm­ing the gates of Nahr el-Bared.”:http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20070526.LEBANON26/TPStory/International
There is some buzz that this will be resolved in 48 hours. That may be true, or it might not be. A lot can hap­pen in this small coun­try in that time.
By the way, the dona­tions are work­ing again, and cov­er­ing this place ain’t cheap. Fix­ers, rented cars, hotel rooms, etc. all cost money and free­lanc­ing for news­pa­pers only cov­ers part of it. If you’d like me to keep blog­ging the devel­op­ments in Lebanon’s lat­est cri­sis, please con­sider drop­ping some coin in the donate link below and to the right. Thanks.

About that showdown…

BEIRUT — Lebanon is truly a strange — yet tasty — place. Two hours ago, I had Lebanese sol­diers point­ing guns at me over a traf­fic snafu (my dri­ving or theirs, I’m not sure which and I’ll bet nei­ther do they) and now I’m at Julia’s enjoy­ing a right­eous grilled chicken salad with a sub­tle basil vinai­grette.
But I won­der if “my pre­dic­tions of a loom­ing showdown”:http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/2007/05/showdown_looming.php were pre­ma­ture. It’s true that hun­dreds of Lebanese troops are ring­ing the Pales­tin­ian camp of Nahr el-Bared, where “hun­dreds” of Fatah al-Islam fight­ers are holed up — along with about 18,000 Pales­tin­ian civil­ians. And also it’s true that the U.S. and other Arab coun­tries have sped up the deliv­ery of mil­i­tary aid to Lebanon: more ammo, night vision gog­gles and the like. And it’s true that Defense Min­is­ter Elias Murr has said that death or sur­ren­der are the only options for the fight­ers. Fur­ther­more, the chief of the Inter­nal Secu­rity Forces, Maj. Gen. Ashraf Rifi told me not 30 min­utes ago that he thought the army would have to go in.
But that ras­cally sheikh Has­san Nas­ral­lah has thrown a span­ner in the works, it seems. Yes­ter­day was Lib­er­a­tion Day, a national hol­i­day com­mem­o­rat­ing the retreat of the Israelis from south­ern Lebanon in 2000. Nas­ral­lah took the oppor­tu­nity to warn against going into the camps, say­ing an assault by the army was “a red line” and that the oppo­si­tion wanted no part of it.
“The Nahr al-Bared camp and Pales­tin­ian civil­ians are a red line,” Nas­ral­lah said, accord­ing to Al-Nahar. “We will not accept or pro­vide cover or be part­ners in this.“
“Does it con­cern us that we start a con­flict with Al Qaeda in Lebanon and con­se­quently attract mem­bers and fight­ers of Al Qaeda from all over the world to Lebanon to con­duct their bat­tle with the Lebanese army and the rest of the Lebanese?” he added.
Fair enough, I guess. But more to the point, his address and his oppo­si­tion to a mil­i­tary solu­tion will rever­ber­ate through­out the army, about half of which is Shi’a. A sharp pro­ducer I know up north painted an alter­nate sce­nario than the _al-Götterdämmerung_ sce­nario presently being awaited.
Nasrallah’s address stopped the state in its tracks, said the pro­ducer, because of his influ­ence among Shi’a. Going into the camp now, with half the army Shi’a, risks split­ting the army while at the same time risk­ing a gen­eral upris­ing among the 350,000 to 400,000 Pales­tini­ans in Lebanon. With­out a uni­fied army, there can be no uni­fied Lebanon. The rem­nants of the mil­i­tary would col­lapse into mili­tias. And that’s the end of the ball game. Civil War 2.0. Talk about an ‘80s revival! (Only with­out the music, hair or Molly Ring­wald.)
What’s more likely, he said, is that in the com­ing days or, more likely, weeks, a num­ber of Fatah al-Islam mem­bers will be “caught” try­ing to “escape” the camp. The Army will announce it has caught the “crim­i­nals” who started this whole thing with their attack on army posi­tions last week­end. Shaker al-Abssi, the leader of Fatah al-Islam, will evade cap­ture.
And the rest? Well, it will turn out that Fatah al-Islam wasn’t quite as big an orga­ni­za­tion as peo­ple thought it was.
The army would look like it accom­plished some­thing, mas­sive blood­shed would be avoided (a good thing) and, like most issues in Lebanon, this whole ugly episode would be sus­pended but not resolved.
Does it solve the prob­lem? No, but look­ing the other way and see­ing what they want to is a Lebanese tra­di­tion.
Time will tell if the pro­ducer or the doom­say­ers are right.
By the way, the dona­tions are work­ing again, and cov­er­ing this place ain’t cheap. Fix­ers, rented cars, hotel rooms, etc. all cost money and free­lanc­ing for news­pa­pers only cov­ers part of it. If you’d like me to keep blog­ging the devel­op­ments in Lebanon’s lat­est cri­sis, please con­sider drop­ping some coin in the donate link below and to the right. Thanks.