U.S. extends betrayal of Kurds to entire Iraqi people; no democracy.


Kur­dish men buy ice creams in the Mazi super­mar­ket in Dohuk. The super­mar­ket was opened two years ago and is seen as a tes­ti­ment to Iraqi Kurdistan’s inde­pen­dence. (Photo by Andrew Testa)

North­ern Iraq is get­ting a bit crowded. About 5,000 Iraqi oppo­si­tion troops, backed by Iran, have entered the PUK’s ter­ri­tory in Iraqi Kur­dis­tan osten­si­bly to secure the bor­der when war breaks across the region. Its real pur­pose, how­ever, may be to repel attacks by the People’s Mujahideen Orga­ni­za­tion (MKO), an anti-Iranian group based in Iraq and strongly backed by Sad­dam Hus­sein. The Iran­ian troops are part of Aya­tol­lah Sayed Mohammed Baqir Al-Hakim’s Badr brigade, which is made up of Shi’ites opposed to Sad­dam Hus­sein. Hakim is the head of the Supreme Coun­cil for Islamic Rev­o­lu­tion in Iraq (SCIRI), a mainly Shia Mus­lim group that fought in the failed 1991 upris­ing against Bagh­dad in south­ern Iraq. More recently, SCIRI has taken part in talks between the Iraqi oppo­si­tion and the U.S.. Accord­ing to the Web site for the SCIRI, “Hakim has an his­tor­i­cal and warm rela­tion with the Kur­dish Move­ments in Iraq since his father gave a reli­gious decree (Fatwa) which for­bade the Iraqi army from fight­ing against the Kurds in Iraq. A mutual agree­ment as been signed by SCIRI with the Patri­otic Union of Kur­dis­tan (PUK) headed by Jalal Tal­a­bani to work against Saddam’s regime. A sim­i­lar agree­ment was signed with the Kur­dish [sic] Demo­c­ra­tic Party (KDP) headed by Masood Barzani sev­eral years ago.“
This might be true, but one of the rea­sons the United States didn’t sup­port the 1991 Iraqi intifada that started in Basra was because it was mainly a Shi’ite move­ment with heavy back­ing by Iran. (The oppo­si­tion in the north was, of course, an effort led by the Kurds, who had been wait­ing for an oppor­tu­nity to rebel since the 1990 inva­sion of Kuwait.) Kuwait and Saudi Ara­bia, alarmed at the prospect of Iran­ian influ­ence expand­ing to their bor­ders and fig­ur­ing a weak­ened Sad­dam was prefer­able to the aya­tol­lahs, agreed with the United States that no sup­port to the mainly Shi’ite rebels would be given.
How the Badr brigade fits into the polit­i­cal and mil­i­tary intrigues of Iraqi Kur­dis­tan remains to be seen. Not only does the region play host to the PUK and the KDP, but also to var­i­ous Islamic par­ties, Ansar al-Islam, U.S. spe­cial forces, sev­eral thou­sand Turk­ish troops (with more soon to come) the MKO and now the Badr brigade. I hon­estly don’t know what’s going to hap­pen, but it can’t be good for U.S. plan­ning.
Or per­haps it doesn’t care. One of the biggest sto­ries yet to be car­ried by the main­stream Amer­i­can press is the appar­ent aban­don­ment of democ­racy in Iraq post-Saddam. Kanan Makiya, author of “Repub­lic of Fear: The Pol­i­tics of Mod­ern Iraq” and a lead­ing Iraqi dis­si­dent, penned a sav­age crit­i­cism of the Bush administration’s plans to replace Sad­dam and his cronies not with demo­c­ra­tic gov­ern­ment but with Amer­i­can gen­er­als and sol­diers where Ba’ath func­tionar­ies once sat. “The plan, as dic­tated to the Iraqi oppo­si­tion in Ankara last week by a United States-led del­e­ga­tion, fur­ther envis­ages the appoint­ment by the U.S. of an unknown num­ber of Iraqi quis­lings palat­able to the Arab coun­tries of the Gulf and Saudi Ara­bia as a coun­cil of advis­ers to this mil­i­tary gov­ern­ment.“
“We Iraqis hoped and said to our Arab and Mid­dle East­ern brethren, over and over again, that Amer­i­can mis­takes of the past did not have to be repeated in the future,” writes Makiya. “Were we wrong? Are the ene­mies of a demo­c­ra­tic Iraq, the ‘anti-imperialists’ and ‘anti-Zionists’ of the Arab world, the sup­port­ers of ‘armed strug­gle’, and the uphold­ers of the pol­i­tics of blam­ing every­thing on the U.S. who are dic­tat­ing the agenda of the anti-war move­ment in Europe and the U.S., are all of these peo­ple to be proved right?“
Most omi­nously:

We, the demo­c­ra­tic Iraqi oppo­si­tion, are the nat­ural friends and allies of the United States. We share its val­ues and long-term goals of peace, sta­bil­ity, free­dom and democ­racy for Iraq. We are here in Iraqi Kur­dis­tan 40 miles from Saddam’s troops and a few days away from a con­fer­ence to plan our next move, a con­fer­ence that some key admin­is­tra­tion offi­cials have done every­thing in their power to post­pone.
None the less, after weeks of effort in Tehran and north­ern Iraq, we have pre­vailed. The meet­ing will take place. It will dis­cuss a detailed plan for the cre­ation of an Iraqi lead­er­ship, one that is in a posi­tion to assume power at the appro­pri­ate time and in the appro­pri­ate place. We will be opposed no doubt by an Amer­i­can del­e­ga­tion if it chooses to attend. Whether or not they do join us in the com­ing few days in north­ern Iraq, we will fight their attempts to mar­gin­alise and shunt aside the men and women who have invested whole life­times, and suf­fered greatly, fight­ing Sad­dam Hus­sein. (Empha­sis added.)

But unless the oppo­si­tion can seize the oil­fields from the Amer­i­can gov­er­nors, they stand lit­tle chance of suc­cess in wrest­ing the des­tiny of their coun­try away from their new mas­ters because they’ll have no money. There is no bud­get in the State Depart­ment for the Iraqi oppo­si­tion groups next year.
“We don’t feel it’s nec­es­sary to fund it any longer,” said Christo­pher Burn­ham, assis­tant sec­re­tary for resource man­age­ment.
In fact, the war has not been bud­geted at all! No one seems to know very much at all about what the war will cost, what will come after Sad­dam and how to man­age the damn place after the shoot­ing dies down a bit.
“Con­querors always call them­selves lib­er­a­tors,” said Sami Abdul-Rahman, deputy prime min­is­ter of the Kur­dish admin­is­tra­tion, in a ref­er­ence to Mr. Bush’s speech last week in which he said U.S. troops were going to lib­er­ate Iraq.
Mr. Abdul-Rahman said the U.S. had reneged on ear­lier promises to pro­mote demo­c­ra­tic change in Iraq. “It is very dis­ap­point­ing,” he said. “In every Iraqi min­istry they are just going to remove one or two offi­cials and replace them with Amer­i­can mil­i­tary offi­cers.“
Last sum­mer, I inter­viewed Mr. Abdul-Rahman. He gave me the copies of the two Kur­dish con­sti­tu­tions the Kur­dis­tan regional gov­ern­ment had drafted. At the time, he could not have been more gra­cious and hope­ful, assur­ing me, the skep­ti­cal reporter, of America’s good inten­tions. The irony should be obvi­ous.
The cyn­i­cism should be as well. Tony Blair made what many felt was the clear­est moral case this week­end for remov­ing Sad­dam, for “lib­er­at­ing” the Iraqi peo­ple. In his State of the Union address in Jan­u­ary, Bush said, “I have a mes­sage for the brave and oppressed peo­ple of Iraq: Your enemy is not sur­round­ing your coun­try, your enemy is rul­ing your coun­try. And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be the day of your lib­er­a­tion.“
By not sup­port­ing a demo­c­ra­tic Iraq, by appoint­ing a con­tro­ver­sial fig­ure such as Ahmed Cha­l­abi as pro­vi­sional leader, by invit­ing Turks to occupy Iraqi Kur­dis­tan and pro­mot­ing some gauzy ill-thought-out vision of a demo­c­ra­tic Mid­dle East imposed by force of arms, the Big Idea ide­al­ism, which never rested com­fort­ably on the shoul­ders of a pres­i­dent who detests com­plex­ity, comes off as cal­low, cyn­i­cal and … what are the words? Oh, yes: “Absolute bull­shit.” The ideas and prin­ci­ples upon which the United States was founded — “lib­erty,” “free­dom,” “jus­tice for all” — and for which we allegedly fought and won two world wars and the Cold War, have become mere words, talk­ing points and awk­wardly mouthed slo­gans used to make a case for a war that no one except for a small junta in Wash­ing­ton wants.
Peo­ple in the pro-war camp often scoff at the “peaceniks” and “appeasers” of the ant-war crowd, call­ing them na�ve and say­ing they are con­sign­ing the Iraqis to oppres­sion if they are opposed the war. But who are really the na�ve ones, I won­der, if the hawks believe this is a war of lib­er­a­tion?
(By the way, read­ers can find a piece I wrote back in Novem­ber on the mixed sig­nals given by the United States regard­ing democ­racy in Iraq here.)

U.S. hangs Kurds out to dry — again; allows occupation of Iraqi Kurdistan by Turkey

Hameda Farag, 46.JPG
Hameda Farag, 46, a vic­tim of 1988 Hal­abja attack, pho­tographed in Halabja’s sin­gle hos­pi­tal. It was near sun­set when she smelled some­thing odd. “I didn’t know it was a chem­i­cal attack until I fled to Iran,” she said. She was preg­nant at the time and lost the child. Since then, she has had three mis­car­riages and now can no longer have chil­dren. At the time, the world didn’t care. The United States still doesn’t. ®2002, Christo­pher Allbritton

1975. 1988. 1991. 1995. And now 2003.
Those dates will be burned in the col­lec­tive mem­ory of Iraq’s Kur­dish pop­u­la­tion, which, for the past 12 years, has built a nascent democ­racy in the very face of Saddam’s tyranny. But now, it seems, that the exper­i­ment will be stran­gled in the crib because the United States is nego­ti­at­ing with Turkey to occupy the Kur­dish area in north­ern Iraq.

The plan, which is being nego­ti­ated in closed-door meet­ings in Ankara, the Turk­ish cap­i­tal, is being bit­terly resisted by at least some lead­ers of Iraq’s Kur­dish groups, who fear that Turkey’s lead­ers may be try­ing to real­ize a his­toric desire to dom­i­nate the region in a post-Saddam Hus­sein Iraq. The Kur­dish offi­cials say they fear a mil­i­tary inter­ven­tion by the Turks could also prompt Iran to cross the bor­der and try to seize sec­tions of east­ern Iraq.
Amer­i­can diplo­mats and senior mil­i­tary com­man­ders, led by Pres­i­dent Bush’s spe­cial envoy, Zal­may Khalilzad, are said to be encour­ag­ing the Kur­dish lead­ers to accept the Turk­ish pro­posal. While Wash­ing­ton has strongly sup­ported the autonomous Kur­dish region in Iraq over the past 12 years, it is eager to secure the per­mis­sion of Turkey’s lead­ers to use Turkey’s bases for a pos­si­ble attack on Iraq. (Empha­sis added.)

This is a betrayal on the level of the Algiers Accord in 1975, when Sec­re­tary of State Henry Kis­sen­ger pulled the rug out from the under the Kurds who were fight­ing Sad­dam with the help of the Shah of Iran. On the level of Hal­abja, when Sad­dam gassed that Kur­dish vil­lage (among oth­ers in his bru­tal al Anfal cam­paign) and killed 5,000 men, women and chil­dren in less than 20 min­utes and the United States (and the rest of the world) stood by.
Turkey has been dri­ving a hard bar­gain to allow the United States to use its bases for this inva­sion. Back in Decem­ber, it even asked for 10 per­cent of Iraqi oil annu­ally. And back in Octo­ber, I wrote about the Kur­dish plans for auton­omy within a post-Saddam Iraq here and here. (If you’d like to see a copy of the pro­posed Kur­dish con­sti­tu­tions given to me by Dept. Prime Min­is­ter Sami Abdul Rah­man, click here and here.) The offi­cial word is that the Turks’ role will be extremely lim­ited, with a few thou­sand troops con­fined to the north­ern regions near the Iraqi-Turkish bor­der. They would be under Amer­i­can com­mand and lim­ited to human­i­tar­ian duties.
How­ever, the Times story quotes a Turk­ish offi­cial — it doesn’t say if the offi­cial is with the mil­i­tary or the civil­ian gov­ern­ment — as say­ing the deploy­ment would far exceed the num­bers talked about with the Amer­i­cans. And Turk­ish prime min­is­ter, Abdul­lah Gul, sug­gested that the Turk­ish Army’s role would go beyond human­i­tar­ian con­cerns to pro­tect­ing Turk­ish inter­ests in the region.
“Turkey is going to posi­tion her­self in that region in order to pre­vent any pos­si­ble mas­sacres, or the estab­lish­ment of a new state,” Gul told Turk­ish reporters.
This isn’t fair. I met sev­eral of the men and women work­ing to cre­ate a democ­racy, flawed as it is, in Iraqi Kur­dis­tan, and I can’t even imag­ine the dis­ap­point­ment that this news must have gen­er­ated. Adding insult to injury, the Amer­i­cans intend to seize the oil-rich cities of Kirkuk and Mosul for them­selves, to pre­vent the Iraqis from sab­o­tag­ing the oil pro­duc­tion facil­i­ties there and the Kurds from seiz­ing them for them­selves. (Kirkuk is the pro­posed cap­i­tal of an envi­sioned Kur­dish autonomous region.) Turkey has long cov­eted both Kirkuk and Mosul, hav­ing lost them to the young King­dom of Iraq in 1926.
I wor­ried about just this devel­op­ment back in Octo­ber, and said Amer­ica was send­ing mixed sig­nals to the peo­ples of the region. As I wrote back then,

Kurds cer­tainly think a democ­racy is in the cards, what with their pro­posed con­sti­tu­tion and all. Fowzi Hariri, the smooth, British-educated deputy head of the KDP Bureau of Inter­na­tional Rela­tions, told me in July that “We want Bagh­dad.” I didn’t know what he meant by that, but he went on to explain that the Kurds want the chance to hold the office of chief exec­u­tive in a Fed­eral Repub­lic of Iraq. “We want a direct say in gov­ern­ment,” he con­tin­ued. “When­ever we have relied on other sys­tems or peo­ple, we have ended up with a dic­ta­tor­ship.“
That was a thinly veiled barb at the on-again, off-again sup­port from the United States. My sus­pi­cion is that we’re at it again, telling the Kurds they will have a place at the table in order to lure them into com­mit­ting to a fight against Sad­dam while we tell the Kuwaitis, Turks and Syr­i­ans that a messy, unpre­dictable demo­c­ra­tic Iraq is “not in the cards,” as the Kuwaiti said to Kristof. And when the ham­mer hits the anvil, I think we’ll hang the Kurds out to dry.

Some­times it sucks to be right.

Turkey claims Iraqi oil

soldiers300.jpg
Turk­ish sol­diers on parade

The Turk­ish daily Sabah reported that Turkey is demand­ing 10 per­cent of Iraqi oil annu­ally after the war, bring­ing in $5.5 bil­lion dol­lars a year if Wash­ing­ton agrees.
This is not a new claim. Turkey is rely­ing on the 1923 Lau­sanne treaty, which offi­cially marked the bound­aries of the Repub­lic of Turkey with all par­ties except Britain. The agree­ment between the two pow­ers was to be a “friendly arrange­ment to be con­cluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months.” Unfor­tu­nately, the two par­ties could not come to an agree­ment, with Turkey con­tin­u­ing to lay claim to the province of Mosul in present-day Iraq, and the mat­ter was referred to the League of Nations.
Turkey’s reluc­tance to part with Mosul was based on sev­eral fac­tors: Mosul wanted to remain in the Turk­ish fold, it had many Turkish-speaking cit­i­zens, its trade routes and of course, its oil reserves. Also, on Oct. 30, 1918, when the armistice end­ing World War I was signed, British troops were still sev­eral miles out­side the city, mak­ing the British claim on the area less than con­vinc­ing.
But in 1926, Turkey finally accepted the “Brus­sels line,” giv­ing Iraq (a British pro­tec­torate) the oil-rich province of Mosul, along with its 600,000 or so inhab­i­tants. In com­pen­sa­tion, Turkey was to receive a por­tion of the oil rev­enues — includ­ing those from trans­porta­tion and other petro­leum prod­ucts — out of Mosul for 25 years, but instead Turkey agreed to a £500,000 buy­out.
This con­flict has flared up over the years, with the most recent being in 1995 when dur­ing Oper­a­tion Steel, Turkey moved approx­i­mately 35,000 troops into north­ern Iraq to hunt PKK mem­bers. As the troops were leav­ing, Turk­ish pres­i­dent Süley­man Demirel said to the press:

The bor­der is wrong. The Mosul Province was within the Ottoman Empire’s ter­ri­tory. Had that place been a part of Turkey, none of the prob­lems we are con­fronted with at the present time would have existed.

Iraq, of course, fiercely resisted the idea of redraw­ing bor­ders (even though Saddam’s regime had lost con­trol of the north­ern provinces) and even the Iraqi oppo­si­tion found com­mon ground with the dic­ta­tor in denounc­ing Demirel’s com­ments. In the face of such oppo­si­tion from every­one in the region, includ­ing Syria, Iran and even Egypt, Demirel backed down, say­ing that the issue of bor­ders had indeed been set­tled in 1926. “Turkey has no pol­icy about any new bor­der arrange­ments and has no plans to recon­sider such mat­ters,” he told an Ara­bic news­pa­per.
(Thanks to Daniel Pipes for the back­ground on this.)
So this is just more of the same from the Turks. They have never for­got­ten the loss of Mosul and Kirkuk, and I’ve writ­ten about this sev­eral times here and here (at the bot­tom.) What’s new is the drop­ping of the demand of the return of the ter­ri­to­ries, but set­tling for a por­tion of oil rev­enues.
This says to me that Russia’s and France’s oil con­tracts in Iraq have a shelf-life of about two months now. After the war, The Shells, Exxon-Mobiles and other Amer­i­can oil com­pa­nies will take over the Iraqi oil indus­try and begin ladel­ing out spoils to friends, a cat­e­gory which almost cer­tainly doesn’t include Rus­sia or France. Turkey, how­ever, although it has been luke­warm to a war in pub­lic, has nonethe­less come onboard.
The claim of 10 per­cent of the oil sub­mit­ted to Wash­ing­ton is either ballsy in the extreme, or the Turks believe they have done some­thing right to expect that kind of rev­enue. Most likely, they have given up ter­ri­to­r­ial claims and backed down on their sabre-rattling against the Kurds, who will also be mol­li­fied by this, since it will keep Turk­ish troops out of their ter­ri­tory and they will still get some oil rev­enue from Kirkuk and Mosul. (Also remem­ber the Turk­ish econ­omy — espe­cially in the south­east around Diyarbakir — has been pistol-whipped by the U.N. sanc­tions. That $5.5 bil­lion extra a year would sure help out in a $42.5 bil­lion annual bud­get.) The United States wins because it keeps the sit­u­a­tion in the north sta­ble, with­out hav­ing to play ref­eree between Turk­ish forces and PUK and KDP pesh­mer­gas.
This all sounds great, except that Turkey is rely­ing on a 76-year-old agree­ment to lay claim to oil that doesn’t belong to it. Whether the United States will point out this ele­phant in the liv­ing room remains to be seen.

Of course, you know, this means war

bombs
Photo cour­tesy of the BBC

First off, my apolo­gies for the delay in updat­ing the site. This past week, I got snowed under by a com­bi­na­tion of out­side assign­ments and a mater­nal visit. I’m not a slacker. Really. Also, to who­ever just donated $5, thanks very much! You pushed me over the $100 mark for dona­tions.
Oddly enough, it’s been a bit of a quiet week on the Iraqi front, with any news mostly pushed to the side by Trent Lott wink­ing at the seg­re­ga­tion­ists and then say­ing, in effect, “I wasn’t wink­ing, I had some­thing in my eye.” As they say in the movies, “It’s quiet … too quiet.“
But the war machine moves on, although per­haps with more hes­i­ta­tion than many peo­ple think. Chief of the Army, Gen. Eric Shin­seki, and the com­man­dant of the Marine Corps, Gen. James L. Jones, worry that the cur­rent war plans are too risky. The plans, as reported by the Wash­ing­ton Post call for “a fast-moving ground attack with­out an over­whelm­ing num­ber of rein­force­ments on hand.” Instead, the war would get off to a “rolling start” with more troops being flown in. Also, the armored units, instead of trav­el­ing a pre­de­ter­mined dis­tance and paus­ing to allow slower units to catch up, would charge across the desert until they run into oppo­si­tion. They would then blow things up real good.
That’s the cur­rent plan, any­way, and it’s giv­ing Shin­seki and Jones, who sit on the Joint Chiefs, the heebie-jeebies. They argue that Paul Wolfowitz’s rosy “house of cards” the­ory of the life span of Saddam’s reign is overly opti­mistic. The gen­er­als argue that worst-case plan­ning is nec­es­sary, espe­cially in the case of a “Fortress Bagh­dad” sce­nario that involves heavy street fight­ing with the Iraqis using chem­i­cal and bio­log­i­cal agents. (Hm. Have Shin­seki and Jones been read­ing this entry in which the Ba’ath party has a con­tin­gency plan to ring Bagh­dad with the Repub­li­can Guard? The details of the Iraqi defense plan, first reported in the London-based Ara­bic daily paper, Al-Quds Al-Arabi are thus:

First, deploy­ment of the Repub­li­can Guard forces at the periph­ery of the cities, pri­mar­ily Bagh­dad, to resist any Amer­i­can ground offen­sive that seeks to take them. The mis­sion of the Repub­li­can [Guard] forces will also be to resist any attempt at inter­nal Iraqi rebel­lion, such as the one that fol­lowed the Amer­i­can offen­sive in Jan­u­ary 1991 in the South and the North.“
“Sec­ond, deploy­ment of spe­cial forces that will include the ‘elite of the elite’ – in his words – inside the cap­i­tal Bagh­dad, so that they can par­tic­i­pate in street com­bat if the Amer­i­can forces or their allies enter. Then, will begin fierce resis­tance oper­a­tions, such as those car­ried out in occu­pied Pales­tine.“
“Third, deploy­ment of groups of ‘Saddam’s Feday­een’ within the cap­i­tal and in other cities, to con­trol the inter­nal sit­u­a­tion and par­tic­i­pate in the resis­tance oper­a­tions.” (Trans­la­tion pro­vided cour­tesy of MEMRI)

The “good” news, I guess, is that if it does come down to hor­ri­ble fight­ing, block by city block, and Sad­dam strikes back with chem­i­cal or bio­log­i­cal weapons, a major­ity of Amer­i­cas are fully pre­pared to nuke him.
Six in 10 Amer­i­cans would sup­port a nuclear response, accord­ing to the Wash­ing­ton Post-ABC News poll. Yipes! More encour­ag­ingly, how­ever, 58 per­cent of respon­dents said Pres­i­dent George W. Bush had not pre­sented enough evi­dence to war­rant attack­ing Iraq, up from 50 per­cent in Sep­tem­ber. There seems to be some con­cern over Bush’s motives for attack­ing Iraq and the pub­lic wor­ries he’s mov­ing too quickly for their taste. Fifty-eight per­cent also want to see the United Nations as a sup­port­ing cast mem­ber. Per­haps in the Gulf War II movie, it will be cred­ited as “sec­ond inter­na­tional orga­ni­za­tion on the left.“
(As an aside, U.S. Sec­re­tary of State Colin Pow­ell told Al-Quds Al-Arabi that the United States had no plans to remove Sad­dam from power. “If he coop­er­ates, then the basis of changed-regime pol­icy has shifted because his regime has, in fact, changed its pol­icy to one of coop­er­a­tion,” Pow­ell said. Note it’s no longer “regime change” but “changed regime” as the goal. Orwell must be proud.)
Oh, and in case any­one thought a war might be averted, the United States will give Iraq’s dossier it turned in last week­end an “F.” With the news that the United States would not be accept­ing Iraq’s excuse that the dog ate its chem­i­cal weapons, the price of gold rose and the dol­lar fell, indi­cat­ing that mar­kets feel war is now inevitable. I’ve been say­ing it since July: It’s not a mat­ter of will the United States go to war, but when. And it’s still look­ing like Feb­ru­ary or March. Strat­for agrees, say­ing that Aus­tralia has been advised to be ready to gear up in March. The British mil­i­tary has also begun leak­ing to the press say­ing the sum­mer heat would not be a “cru­cial fac­tor” in an attack on Iraq.
In other news, the Asso­ci­ated Press is now report­ing that Turkey is prepar­ing to deploy 65,000 to 75,000 troops in north­ern Iraq in the event of a U.S. inva­sion. I reported on this back in Octo­ber. Radio Aus­tralia is report­ing that Turkey has already put 10,000 to 15,000 troops on the Turkish-Iraqi bor­der in order to counter Kur­dish rebels oper­at­ing cross bor­der. The goal of the Turks is to pre­vent the Kurds from form­ing a state in the fog of war result­ing from a dust-up to the south. The Turks would also be in a posi­tion to seize the oil fields of Kirkuk and Mosul, some­thing they’ve wanted to do since 1923 when they were denied to Ataturk. Ankara is not going to miss out on the spoils of this war, espe­cially since the first one and the decade of sanc­tions demol­ished Turkey’s econ­omy. It’s pay­back time.

Kurdish rebels armed on Turkish-Iraq border

Jane’s Defense Weekly reported (sorry, no link) last month that the Kur­dis­tan Free­dom and Democ­racy Con­gress (KADEK), the suc­ces­sor to the Kur­dish Work­ers’ Party (PKK), has armed itself with man-portable surface-to-air (SAM) mis­siles along the Turkish-Iraqi bor­der. The news, leaked by the Turk­ish mil­i­tary to the national press, under­scores the Kur­dish rebels’ con­cerns that Turkey may be plan­ning an inva­sion of Iraqi Kur­dis­tan in con­junc­tion with a U.S.-Iraq war.
Accord­ing to the report, KADEK has acquired 70 to 80 Strela-2 mis­siles, and is look­ing to pro­cure more. (These are labeled by NATO as the SA-7 “Grail”.) The arms are posi­tioned in the Harkuk and Kandil moun­tains in north­ern Iraq, and the group is look­ing to fur­ther deploy the mis­siles in the Haf­tanin and Garadag moun­tains. KADEK is also report­edly seek­ing mines and other ordi­nance to be deployed along the bor­der with Turkey’s Sir­nak province. Fight­ers have been repo­si­tioned to the evac­u­ated vil­lages of Haf­tanin, Metine, Zap, Avasin-Basyan and Harkuk in North­ern Iraq. These weapons would pose a seri­ous threat to Turk­ish armed forces oper­at­ing in the region.
The weapons, worth about $200,000, have been acquired from Arme­nia, Iran and Iraq in the last cou­ple of months. Most of the arms are Russ­ian made.