Much news and catching up… (LONG POST)

Hi all. Sorry for the delay in post­ing. Not only have we seemed to enter a “phony war” period regard­ing impend­ing hos­til­i­ties with Iraq with­out any­thing def­i­nite hap­pen­ing, but I also needed to take a lit­tle break.
Be that as it may, there have been some inter­est­ing sto­ries show up in the last few days. First off, United Nations weapons inspec­tors have gone … back to Iraq. (Sorry, I couldn’t resist.) Hans Blix, the chief of the inspec­tors, holds the fate of Iraq in his hands and he has said he will asses the intent of any delays on the part of the Iraqis as to whether foot-dragging is obfus­ca­tion or sim­ple foul-ups. Con­sid­er­ing that much of my time in Iraq was char­ac­ter­ized by hur­ry­ing up and wait­ing — and I was in friendly territory! — I won­der if the, ah, “flex­i­ble” con­cept of time in soci­eties other than north­ern Euro­pean ones will be taken into account. Blix is Swedish after all; I hear they frown on tar­di­ness. At any rate, Iraq has until Dec. 8 to present UNMOVIC with a full account­ing of its weapons of mass destruc­tion pro­grams or it will be in “mate­r­ial breach” of UNSCR 1441. We’ll see what hap­pens. (P.S. When the Iraqis fire on Allied air­craft patrolling the no-fly zones in the south and the north, does that con­sti­tute a “mate­r­ial breach”? Some in the Bush admin­is­tra­tion want it to be so. Please note, Oper­a­tions North­ern Watch and South­ern Watch have never been sanc­tioned by the UN and Iraq has never accepted them.)

Con­tinue read­ing

Can’t keep a bad man down

Whoa! Who would have thought that Osama Bin Laden was really alive and hid­ing out for all this time? Appar­ently not the U.S. intel­li­gence com­mu­nity which has fer­vently hoped that bin Ladin was toasted in the bomb­ing of Tora Bora. That seems increas­ingly to be wish­ful think­ing on the part of the United States. Aston­ish­ingly, the tape that has come to light, in which some­one who sounds an awful lot like the Napoleon of Ter­ror praises recent attacks and threat­ens more vio­lence against the West if Iraq is attacked, was met with resound­ing indif­fer­ence by the White House and the Pen­ta­gon. Sec. of Defense (and in-house funny man) Don­ald Rums­feld quipped that Bin Laden was “alive or dead” when asked about the ter­ror leader’s con­di­tion. Appar­ently, Schrödinger’s ter­ror­ist is a para­dox they know well at the Defense Depart­ment.
But seri­ously folks, shouldn’t the news of bin Ladin’s sur­vival be taken a lit­tle more, well, seri­ously? Sen­ate Major­ity leader (for the moment) Tom Daschle, D-S.D., thinks so and valiantly ques­tioned whether the U.S. is win­ning the war on ter­ror yes­ter­day, ask­ing, in effect, if we didn’t declare vic­tory in Afghanistan a wee bit early.
So if bin Ladin is alive, as is likely, and al Qa’ida is prepar­ing to strike again, as is likely, the obvi­ous course of action is to focus on … Sad­dam Hus­sein!
Argh. I tear my hair out over this. I’m con­vinced that the rea­son given by the left for the U.S.‘s drive to top­ple Sad­dam — mainly con­trol of Iraq’s oil fields — is much too sim­plis­tic to give the whole pic­ture. And I don’t trust the Bush Admin­is­tra­tion that Iraq poses a clear and present dan­ger, with Sad­dam being this­close to field­ing nukes on magic unmanned drones that could take out Amer­i­can cities. And the Butcher of Bagh­dad isn’t sostu­pid that he would give weapons of mass destruc­tion to an ele­ment that he couldn’t con­trol, such as al Qa’ida. So what gives? Why the push on Iraq when al Qa’ida poses a clear and present threat and Pak­istan has been help­ing North Korea with its nuke pro­gram. (The impli­ca­tion is that if Pak­istan has ele­ments that would help the North Kore­ans, there are likely ele­ments in the gov­ern­ment that would help al Qa’ida in a sim­i­lar man­ner.)
This report from the Insti­tute for National Strate­gic Stud­ies’ National Defense Uni­ver­sity might offer some clues. The main thrust of the report is that Amer­ica has long real­ized the strate­gic value of the Per­sian Gulf, and fully intends to keep a mil­i­tary pres­ence there regard­less of any out­come in Iraq. “The United States will need to diver­sify its depen­dence on regional bas­ing and for­ward pres­ence, as well as reduce the vis­i­bil­ity and pre­dictabil­ity of its forward-deployed forces,” reads the report.
Why is this nec­es­sary? Because way back in 1990, the the Bush White House, part first, announced a defense pos­ture that called for “adult super­vi­sion” of the world. And the most recent iter­a­tion of the National Secu­rity Strat­egy of the United States calls for the globe’s sole super­power to suf­fer no rivals mil­i­tar­ily or eco­nom­i­cally, impos­ing a pax amer­i­cana. So the United States is in the Gulf to guar­an­tee the sup­ply of oil not for itself, but for Europe and Japan, which get most of their oil from the Mid­dle East. (Sur­pris­ingly, the United States gets most of its oil from Canada, Venezuela and Mex­ico; Per­sian Gulf sources sup­plied only 11 per­cent of America’s oil in 2000, accord­ing to the Depart­ment of Energy.) The United States Marines safe­guard the Per­sian Gulf because Europe and Japan might re-arm and secure the oil sources for them­selves if we didn’t. And as I said, the United States does not intend to suf­fer rivals gladly.
So we are going to be in the Gulf for a long time. As the INSS report says, “There is no escap­ing the U.S. role as a guar­an­tor of Gulf sta­bil­ity. Thus, the United States needs a viable con­cept for its future for­ward pres­ence that can be sus­tained over the long haul.” Saudi Ara­bia is not the secure base that we need for such a pres­ence, as the pres­ence of infi­del troops so close to the holy sites of Mecca and Med­ina directly under­mines the legit­i­macy of the House of Saud, which came to power in the 1920s as the fam­ily that would pro­tect Islam’s holi­est shrines. The pres­ence of the troops inflames the faith­ful, such as bin Ladin, and leads the Saudi royal fam­ily to pay off the rad­i­cal cler­ics that wield much influ­ence in the king­dom. In essence this is the rea­son rad­i­cal Islamists with pos­si­ble access to nukes are “funded” by Saudi Ara­bia — the Saudis are buy­ing them off and point­ing a loaded gun away from their own head and toward some­one else’s. If the House of Saud falls, which it could do at any time, a big rea­son will be resent­ment over its invi­ta­tion of Amer­i­can GIs.
The solu­tion is to get the 5,000 or so Amer­i­can off the Ara­bian penin­sula. But the United States can’t pull out with Sad­dam in power; the troops are there to con­tain Sad­dam. So the solu­tion to the solu­tion is to remove Sad­dam from power, in the process diver­si­fy­ing the dis­tri­b­u­tion of Amer­i­can troops in the region and remov­ing a provo­ca­tion to rad­i­cals. (Once they get over being pissed at the sub­ju­ga­tion of Iraq, that is.)
Some would argue that this will just pre­serve Saudi legit­i­macy. Oth­ers may argue that a friendly regime in Iraq would under­cut the Saudis and bring oil prices down as the two coun­tries (which con­trol the largest and second-largest known reserves of oil on the planet) com­pete for mar­kets. There is evi­dence that the Saudis are hew­ing to the sec­ond view, doing every­thing in their power to impede the United States’ war plan­ning, includ­ing a mas­sive loan to Rus­sia — inter­est free! — if the Bear had only vetoed UNSCR 1441. Alas for the Saudis, this didn’t hap­pen, and they are caught between Iraq and a hard place.
So the goal of the United States is to main­tain a pres­ence in the Per­sian Gulf so that Europe and Japan don’t re-arm. In order to main­tain a pres­ence and decrease depen­dency on an unre­li­able ally, Saudi Ara­bia, Wash­ing­ton has to lighten the mil­i­tary foot­print in the region by remov­ing the cause for the heavy foot­print — Sad­dam Hus­sein. Once that is accom­plished, the for­ward forces can be dis­trib­uted out of Saudi Ara­bia and a friendly Iraq can help pres­sure the Saudis to keep oil prices low. As a bonus, Wash­ing­ton would no longer have to easy on the Saudis in its war against al Qa’ida since Iraq would be the bul­wark in the Gulf.
Could this be the strat­egy after all, part an elab­o­rate chess game played on sev­eral boards at once? Win­ning such a game demands cool heads, clear minds and accu­rate intel­li­gence — espe­cially in a shoot­ing war. The fact that bin Ladin has prob­a­bly reëmerged right now means that the lat­ter — since well before Sept. 11, 2001 — has been woe­fully lacking.

U.S. on ground in Iraqi Kurdistan

Reuters is report­ing that the United States has qui­etly moved forces into Iraqi Kur­dis­tan to train up to 5,000 Kurds in prepar­tion for an inva­sion. Reg­u­lar read­ers might remem­ber that I posted about this back in Octo­ber.
There are two things inter­est­ing about this. One, Jalal Tal­a­bani, the leader of the Patri­otic Union of Kur­dis­tan, which con­trols the south­ern and east­ern part of Kur­dish coun­try, said that the Kurds had finally received secu­rity guar­an­tees from the United States in case of an attack by Saddam’s forces. This is a good thing. One of my major objec­tions to this adven­ture has been America’s reluc­tance to stand by the Kurds, which it has failed sev­eral times in the past (1970s, 1980s and twice in 1991 and 1995.) The Kurds are work­ing at build­ing a nascent democ­racy in their ter­ri­tory, and while it’s hardly per­fect and prone to the Great Man the­ory of gov­ern­ment that so plagues the region, they’re try­ing. And the United States should sup­port that effort. The secu­rity guar­an­tee is a good first step. Next, the United States should sign on to the pro­posed con­sti­tu­tion for a Fed­eral Repub­lic of Iraq. It’s cer­tainly not a per­fect doc­u­ment, but again, they’re try­ing.
Sec­ondly, if the United States is actively train­ing Kurds, that obvi­ously means the Kurds have signed on to an inva­sion, which they had not when I was there. Deputy Prime Min­is­ter (KDP) Sami Abdul Rah­man told me that the Kurds would not — could not — stand in the way of Amer­i­can forces should an inva­sion come, but there would be no active help with­out the secu­rity guar­an­tees. With the train­ing and the guar­an­tees, the Kurds have secured for them­selves a place at the table when it comes time to gov­ern Iraq, apres Sad­dam
Aside: The Kur­dish spe­cial forces, of which it seemed the KDP had the most, are trained by Iraqi gen­er­als who defected to Kur­dish coun­try. They brought with them their train­ing from the Iraqi army, which inher­ited British SAS train­ing. Also, there were a num­ber of Kur­dish pesh­mer­gas who wore Amer­i­can GI uni­forms. When I asked where they came from, they just smiled and said, “smug­glers and traders.” I’ll bet.

News from the region…

Wow. Lots of stuff today already. In the first instance, Ara​bic​News​.com (and oth­ers) reports that Sad­dam Hus­sein has shown a new will­ing­ness to work with the United Nations and thanked Saudi Ara­bia for its lack of coop­er­a­tion with the Amer­i­cans. The Kuwaitis on the other hand, in a show of Gulf War I grat­i­tude, said it was OK with them for the United States to bivouc on Kuwaiti bases. (This may end up prov­ing more trou­ble than its worth, per­haps, since the Kuwaiti daily al-Rai al Aam is report­ing that a soli­dier for the emi­rate was caught try­ing to sneak into the al-Doha base there for the pur­pose of attack­ing Amer­i­cans. With Kuwaiti army troops and other peo­ple attempt­ing may­hem against the United States on a semi-regular basis, Kuwait may prove a shaky ally.)
At the same time, the Wash­ing­ton Post reports that the United States is pre­pared to ten­der its final Iraq res­o­lu­tion to the Secu­rity Coun­cil, pos­si­bly as soon as tomor­row, and that it wants a vote by the end of the week. It’s the third such res­o­lu­tion and is aimed at allay­ing the con­cerns of Rus­sia and France, since Britain is on board and China has indi­cated it won’t sign on to such a pro­posal, but it won’t veto it either. Mex­ico, which has many of the same con­cerns as France and Rus­sia, said it was “opti­mistic” a solu­tion would be found soon, indi­cat­ing the Amer­i­cans are get­ting closer to a deal.
Also, Sad­dam gives his first inter­view in 12 years, accord­ing to the Egypt­ian oppo­si­tion weekly, Al Usbou’. It’s full of juicy lit­tle tid­bits, includ­ing the novel the­ory that the United States will carve up all Arab lands into coun­tries the size of Yemen (or Israel) so they may be gov­erned bet­ter by an Amer­i­can viceroy­alty. A high­light of the inter­view:

Nas­sar: “Mr. Pres­i­dent, I want to ask you some­thing that I already know, but would like your con­fir­ma­tion. Do you have Kuwaiti pris­on­ers that you did not release as yet, know­ing that Kuwait is demand­ing their release as a con­di­tion for rec­on­cil­i­a­tion?“
Sad­dam: “You know, and every­one else knows, that I issued a deci­sion to release all pris­on­ers, polit­i­cal and crim­i­nal, Arab and Iraqis. Except for the spies who worked for Israel and the U.S. We released even mur­der­ers, on con­di­tion that an agree­ment was reached between the fam­i­lies of the mur­der­ers and the fam­i­lies of the vic­tims, and that the amnesty was the will of both sides. The jails in Iraq became the only jails in the world, and in his­tory, with­out occu­pants.“
Nas­sar: “…And the war­dens have a prob­lem, Mr. Pres­i­dent, they have to look for a job since the jails are empty…“
Sad­dam: “We shall turn the jails into shel­ters for orphans, the vic­tims of Amer­i­can daily mis­sile attacks on the country’s south and north, and on Baghdad’s neigh­bor­hoods, while the world con­science remains indif­fer­ent.” (Ed. — Emphasis added. Orphans!)

Prime min­is­ter Ariel Sharon backed up Saddam’s state­ment that the United States was try­ing to make the Mid­dle East safe for Israel by say­ing in an inter­view with The Times that Britain and Amer­ica should attack Iran after they’ve fin­ished con­quer­ing Iraq. British for­eign min­is­ter Jack Straw soundly rejected that idea, thank good­ness. (You can read the entire inter­view here. Also, Sharon has agreed to Beyamin Netanyahu’s demands for early elec­tions on Feb. 4, 2003, but grum­bled that Israel doesn’t need elec­tions right now. Pales­tin­ian offi­cials urged Israelis to vote for “a lead­er­ship capa­ble of mak­ing peace,” while Islamic Jihad said elec­tions would make no difference.)