Airstrikes … in Baghdad

BAGHDAD — So this is what all the booms were today (From a U.S. mil­i­tary press release):

WASHINGTON, Feb. 15, 2006 — In a joint effort, Coali­tion Forces con­ducted a pre­ci­sion air strike, using four U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles, against a known ter­ror­ist facil­ity at approx­i­mately 4:30 p.m. Feb. 15 in south­ern Bagh­dad.
Ter­ror­ists were using a for­mer Iraqi regime muni­tions stor­age bunker, located in a large, unin­hab­ited weapons-storage com­plex in the Babil province, to acquire and trans­port bomb-making muni­tions to be used in attacks against the Iraqi peo­ple and Coali­tion Forces.
Coali­tion Forces par­tic­i­pat­ing in the mis­sion took all avail­able pre­cau­tions to ensure no civil­ians were present dur­ing the strike. The air­craft con­ducted a clear­ing pass while Multi-National Divi­sion — Bagh­dad heli­copters scanned for any civil­ians in the area in a delib­er­ate effort to ensure no col­lat­eral dam­age.
The sor­ties made mul­ti­ple passes to ensure the com­plete and method­i­cal destruc­tion of the bunker.

The area they’re talk­ing about is prob­a­bly al-Saha, on the other side of the neigh­bor­hood of Dora, where a major refin­ery is located.
I’m not sure, but I don’t recall air strikes in or near Iraq’s cap­i­tal city for a long time. In fact, I can’t remem­ber any since I got here in May 2004, although these things tend to blend together after a while. But if the war’s going so well, and the Iraqis are tak­ing the fight to the ter­ror­ists, blah blah, why are the Amer­i­cans resort­ing to air strikes here? That’s, like, _so_ 2003.

Spain and Al Qaeda…

The Amer­i­can Prospect has a good inter­view with Jes­sica Stern, ter­ror­ism expert at Har­vard Uni­ver­sity and author of The Ulti­mate Ter­ror­ists and Ter­ror in the Name of God: Why Reli­gious Mil­i­tants Kill. In the inter­view, she spec­u­lates on pos­si­ble link­ages between ETA and al Qaeda. While all signs seem to point to al Qaeda, she brings up an inter­est­ing point that al Qaeda might be recruit­ing from within ETA.

Do you think that there is a rela­tion­ship between the two groups?
I have to won­der whether there’s coop­er­a­tion between ETA and Al Qaeda, and what this rela­tion­ship might con­sist of. Al Qaeda is prag­matic and likes to avail itself of local oper­a­tives, exper­tise, and lan­guages. They espe­cially like to recruit locals. Al Qaeda has a large pres­ence in Spain, so look­ing for part­ners like ETA would be at the top of their list.
We know that the major­ity of peo­ple in Spain oppose the war in Iraq, so it makes me won­der whether some mem­bers of ETA have been infil­trated by the Al Qaeda net­work. There’s also the chance that Al Qaeda might be recruit­ing within ETA.
I think the prag­ma­tism of ter­ror­ist groups is emerg­ing as they mature, as is a will­ing­ness to coop­er­ate with orga­ni­za­tions that would seem to be pro­mot­ing com­pletely dif­fer­ent agen­das. Also, some­times we see that as pos­si­ble ter­ror­ist orga­ni­za­tions get closer to achiev­ing their osten­si­ble objec­tive, zealots remain and carry out unprece­dented attacks (as hap­pened with the IRA). It’s not impos­si­ble to imag­ine that ETA could have done this even though it would be unprece­dented for them.
Reports have said that Al Qaeda has claimed respon­si­bil­ity for this bomb­ing. Are these reports cred­i­ble?
No. The group claim­ing to speak for Al Qaeda is noto­ri­ously unre­li­able — they even claimed respon­si­bil­ity for last summer’s black­out. Intel­li­gence offi­cials really don’t know any­thing about the group.

At any rate, I think it’s far more likely al Qaeda or at least an Islamist group is respon­si­ble. My ini­tial sus­pi­cions — that ETA and al Qaeda may have been in league — are feel­ing less sure now with more and more evi­dence point­ing to bin Laden’s net­work emerg­ing daily. Also, a Qaeda attack fits in with my hypoth­e­sis that a spring offen­sive from both sides in the ter­ror war is in the works. I wrote that al Qaeda would attempt to desta­bi­lize or over­throw the Saudi regime, desta­bi­lize Pak­istan and/or weaken U.S. resolve with mas­sive attacks within the coun­try, pos­si­bly with WMD. Well, now add a fourth option: crack away at the U.S. alliance by forc­ing its Euro­pean allies — Spain, Poland, Britain and Italy, for the most part — to with­draw from Iraq. Why is this impor­tant?
Two words: logis­tics and man­power.
The war on ter­ror and Iraq are linked, although not in the way that Pres­i­dent George W. Bush would like. They’re linked because much of the U.S. mil­i­tary is tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, Spain’s 1,300 troops cer­tainly weren’t adding much to the fire­power there, but they were of sig­nif­i­cant sym­bolic value. If Span­ish Prime Minister-elect Jose Luis Rodriguez Zap­a­tero makes good on his promise to pull Span­ish troops out by June 30, that will adversely affect the abil­ity of the U.S. to get other coun­tries to help out after the sov­er­eignty hand-over on June 30 — even with U.N. sup­port. That means the bulk of the secu­rity respon­si­bil­ity in Iraq will con­tinue to fall on the U.S. far into the fore­see­able future with a ham­per­ing of its oper­a­tional capac­ity else­where. The U.S. mil­i­tary, as pow­er­ful as it is, sim­ply can’t keep up with Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti and now North Africa. Al Qaeda is count­ing on this.
But back to Spain. I’m of two minds on this. One the one hand, I thor­oughly sup­port the demo­c­ra­tic process and there is no doubt that despite a hor­rific bomb­ing, the peo­ple of Spain had their voices heard loud and clear. The war in Iraq was immensely unpop­u­lar in Spain and it strikes me as stun­ningly arro­gant for a pur­port­edly demo­c­ra­tic gov­ern­ment to go against the wishes of so many of its cit­i­zens. On the other hand, I’m a full-blown sup­porter of the war against al Qaeda. I was at my desk work­ing at 8:46 a.m. when the first plane snarled low over my neigh­bor­hood and slammed into the north Tower. I watched those build­ings fall to the ground from my rooftop and saw my neigh­bor­hood turned into an armed camp for a week after­ward. I know mass ter­ror. I’m against any­thing that gives al Qaeda breath­ing room — which is why I opposed the Iraq war.
It was a hor­ri­ble, need­less dis­trac­tion. There were no sig­nif­i­cant ties between Saddam’s gov­ern­ment and al Qaeda. It was unlikely there were any Qaeda forces in Iraq prior to the fall of Bagh­dad — except for Ansar al-Islam in the area con­trolled by the Kurds out­side of Saddam’s con­trol. As far as being a threat to the United States, he was pre­vented from mov­ing into two-thirds of his coun­try, he was weak­ened by inter­na­tional sanc­tions and he had ene­mies on all sides: Turkey, Kur­dis­tan, U.S. forces in Saudi Ara­bia and Kuwait and Iran. He had no weapons of mass destruc­tion to give to al Qaeda even were he inclined to do so. Hell, even the ratio­nale that he was a very bad man — a fact not in dis­pute — is tak­ing a shel­lack­ing because all the mass graves seem to date from when he was either a U.S. pup­pet thug or imme­di­ately after the 1991 Gulf War in which the U.S. encour­aged the Shi’as and the Kurds to rise up, only to have the rug pulled out from under them. They ended up in mass graves, in no small part due to the United States’ reluc­tance to act on their behalf.
Iraq was a colos­sal blun­der that has costs thou­sands of lives and bil­lions of dol­lars. There is, as yet, no end in sight.
But the fact of the mat­ter is that the U.S. is now in Iraq and in need of allies if it hopes to pros­e­cute the war on ter­ror suc­cess­fully. Bill­mon has a typ­i­cally insight­ful take on this:.

I under­stand, and emo­tion­ally sym­pa­thize with, the desire of many read­ers to see Sunday’s elec­tion as a vic­tory for the Span­ish peo­ple — or for the pro­gres­sive left, or for both. I, too, am glad the neo-Francoists of the Pop­u­lar Party got the boot.
But as much as I might like to, I can’t apply that par­tic­u­lar coat of sugar to the results, because I still think that some­thing sig­nif­i­cant (and omi­nous, from an Amer­i­can point of view) has hap­pened here: A well-timed ter­ror­ist attack has directly and dra­mat­i­cally influ­enced the results of a national elec­tion in a major coun­try allied with the United States. What’s more, it has caused, or at least con­tributed to, a deci­sive defeat for a rul­ing party that had aligned itself closely with the cur­rent U.S. strat­egy for fight­ing ter­ror­ism — which, like it or not (and of course I don’t like it at all) includes the occu­pa­tion and paci­fi­ca­tion of Iraq.

Word.
One the one hand, the Spaniards can argue that they have unyoked Iraq from the greater war on ter­ror, which is how it should have been all along. On the other, now that the world’s go-to guy on fight­ing Islamic fanati­cism is tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, is this really the time to pull up stakes and say you’re on your own? I wish I had a decent answer. But I feel the Span­ish, while remain­ing true to them­selves as a democ­racy, may have just embold­ened the real enemy.
PS: Back from Japan finally, but will, unfor­tu­nately, miss SXSW. My apologies.

An email received, questions asked

I received this email today:

Well, I was going to post a com­ment, but it just didn’t seem appro­pri­ate because I didn’t really have any­thing to add. I’m a mil­i­tary spouse, and this is the first time I’ve ever even heard of your web­site. My hus­band, who hap­pens to be a Marine sta­tioned at Camp Leje­une, was deployed last Sat­ur­day (who­ever picked that date should be shot, I swear! :)) back to Iraq. Since I can’t get a straight answer out of his com­mand, or the mil­i­tary in gen­eral, let alone any gov­ern­ment offi­cial (huge sur­prise there…). I was won­der­ing if you could offer some insight into exactly why we are send­ing thou­sands of troops back into Iraq this month. I under­stand that their pur­pose, osten­si­bly, is to relieve those that have been on the ground for a year now, but I thought that we would be receiv­ing some relief from other coun­tries’ troops, and that now that we were no longer offi­cially on a wartime foot­ing, the num­ber of our troops in Iraq would be decreased, not increased.
Any­way, call me crazy (or maybe I just mis­un­der­stand), but the entire sit­u­a­tion lacks any sort of sense that I can detect. A tran­si­tion of power is all well and good, but if it’s to be any­thing other than a pup­pet gov­ern­ment, shouldn’t the UN be direct­ing it, not GWB?
Any input would be appre­ci­ated…
Thanks,
Julia [Last name with­held by request]

Julia has agreed to allow me to post her email and my response. Here it is.
Julia–
First of all, I hope your hus­band will be OK. I’m so sorry he shipped out on Sat­ur­day (Valentine’s Day), and it seems that the mil­i­tary has the mother of all bad tim­ings. My best friend in the world has also been mobi­lized (He’s Army Reserve) and he’s due over there in early March. He has two daugh­ters (5 and 3) and a lovely wife. They mobi­lized him a week or so before Christ­mas, and gave him five days to get his affairs in order.
Any­way, on to your ques­tion: Yeah, it’s the largest troop rota­tion since WWII, and it’s to spell the guys who have been there for a year. But your ques­tion is more about why isn’t any­one help­ing us out. Well, there are sev­eral reasons:

  1. Bush alien­ated so many allies in the run-up to the war that they’re dis­in­clined to sup­port us now, espe­cially if, like France and Ger­many, they have mas­sive majori­ties in their pop­u­la­tions opposed to the war. Even if France and Ger­many wanted to help out (and there are grow­ing signs that they do) it will be very dif­fi­cult for them to do so with­out spark­ing mas­sive protests in the streets of Paris and Berlin. They’re democ­ra­cies, after all, and they do have to lis­ten to the vot­ers on occasion.
  2. Rums­feld blew it and put in too few men when the Amer­i­cans first went in. That ini­tial mis­take is a root cause of the main prob­lem: a lack of secu­rity. Many for­eign gov­ern­ments don’t want to send their sol­diers to fight a war — again one that their peo­ple prob­a­bly opposed. Peace­keep­ing is one thing, fight­ing a war is another.
  3. The Bush Admin­is­tra­tion has not evi­denced a will­ing­ness to trust the U.N. — not with­out rea­son. The U.N. prob­a­bly isn’t in step with Amer­i­can goals in Iraq, which were not WMD or free­ing the Iraqi peo­ple, but far more about main­tain­ing a strate­gic base of oper­a­tions in the heart of the Mid­dle East from which to pres­sure Syria, Iran and Saudi Ara­bia. Check out Why Iraq? as to my the­o­ries on this.

As to why there’s an increase in the num­ber of troops, it’s got to do with over­lap­ping and train­ing the new guys. But there are also some thoughts that the 200,000+ that will be in Iraq dur­ing the rota­tion will be for a spring offen­sive against the insur­gents. We’ll see what hap­pens.
Best wishes, and give my respect and regards to your hus­band, please.
thank you,
Christo­pher.
By pub­lish­ing Julia’s let­ter, I’m hop­ing to spark a dia­logue among the read­ers, so she might gain a deeper insight.

Military Strapped, General Angry

Shame­ful. Because Pres­i­dent Bush’s 2005 bud­get didn’t include any spend­ing for mil­i­tary oper­a­tions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. mil­i­tary will run out of fund­ing at the end of Sep­tem­ber unless Bush requests a sup­ple­men­tal appro­pri­a­tion.
Now, this is an impor­tant story, and shows the depths of dis­hon­esty to which this admin­is­tra­tion will sink when it comes to cook­ing the books. Or maybe it’s just incom­pe­tence. Con­gress approved two admin­is­tra­tion requests last year totalling nearly $166 bil­lion for Iraq and Afghanistan, which were _not_ pop­u­lar — espe­cially that $87 bil­lion Bush asked for. The pres­i­dent is going to have to come back and ask for more money, and if he waits until the end of Sep­tem­ber that won’t go down well with the vot­ers. Joshua Bolten, the White House bud­get direc­tor, said a sup­ple­men­tal bill could be as much as $50 bil­lion.
Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker tes­ti­fied before the Sen­ate Armed Ser­vices Com­mit­tee on Tues­day that the Army is spend­ing $3.7 bil­lion a month in Iraq and $900 mil­lion a month in Afghanistan.
But the most inter­est­ing part of the story came when com­mit­tee chair­man Sen. John Warner, R-Va., asked the joint chiefs if they had any doubts about the intel­li­gence they had before the war. The story says, “Three said they still sup­port the deci­sion to go to war, in spite of ques­tions being raised about whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruc­tion at the time U.S. troops invaded.“
Marine Corps Com­man­dant Gen. Michael W. Hagee, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John P. Jumper and Adm. Vern Clark, chief of naval oper­a­tions, all said they sup­ported going to war despite doubts about the intel­li­gence regard­ing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruc­tion. Gen. Schoomaker didn’t “address the issue,” the story says.
That’s inter­est­ing. The gen­eral in charge of the branch that’s tak­ing it on the chin in Iraq declines to state he sup­ports his commander-in-chief’s deci­sion to go to war? He wasn’t on active duty at the time, yes, but if he sup­ports the deci­sion, he wouldn’t be crit­i­cized for say­ing, “I wasn’t on active duty when we went to war, but I sup­port the deci­sion now that I’m in charge of the Army.” No one in the White House would fault him for that. But he can’t crit­i­cize his commander-in-chief, even implic­itly; it’s not allowed under Title 10, Sec­tion 888, Arti­cle 88 of the U.S. Code.

Any com­mis­sioned offi­cer who uses con­temp­tu­ous words against the Pres­i­dent, the Vice Pres­i­dent, Con­gress, the Sec­re­tary of Defense, the Sec­re­tary of a mil­i­tary depart­ment, the Sec­re­tary of Trans­porta­tion, or the Gov­er­nor or leg­is­la­ture of any State, Ter­ri­tory, Com­mon­wealth, or pos­ses­sion in which he is on duty or present shall be pun­ished as a court-martial may direct.

So rather than risk court-martial or a demand for his res­ig­na­tion, he shuts up, begs off. I think with the lack of finan­cial sup­port from the White House, and the less than full-throated defense of the president’s poli­cies from one of his joint chiefs, Bush has made some ene­mies in the ser­vices.
Hardly sur­pris­ing. To date, one U.S. sol­dier is miss­ing and 535 are dead in Iraq. Exactly 100 have died in Afghanistan. More than 2,600 sol­diers have been wounded, and that num­ber is likely much higher. Most of those casu­al­ties have been U.S. Army, and now the Bush White House forces the Armed ser­vices to dip into their main­te­nance and mod­ern­iz­ing funds to fight two hot wars? That main­te­nance and mod­ern­iz­ing money is used to replace old weapons with new ones. It’s to replace tires, boots, dam­aged bullet-proof vests and pay for ammu­ni­tion. It’s not money for sexy, new, expen­sive weapons sys­tem — it’s money that keeps Amer­i­can sol­diers alive. Schoomaker knows this, and his silence speaks volumes.

U.S. vs. al Qaeda: Spring offensives planned

The United States is plan­ning a spring offen­sive against al Qaeda and Tal­iban posi­tions in Afghanistan, and a spokesman for the U.S. mil­i­tary said America’s armed forces are “sure” they can catch Osama bin Laden and Tal­iban leader Mul­lah Omar “later this year.” Unfor­tu­nately, al Qaeda likely has a spring offen­sive of its own in the plans.
But first, con­fir­ma­tion of the Amer­i­can plans from Strat­for:

For­mer Pak­istani Inter-Service Intel­li­gence Chief Lt. Gen. Hameed Gul (Ret.) has told the daily _Nawa-I-Waqt_ that reports of a planned U.S. offen­sive against al Qaeda in the spring were true. Gul said CENTCOM com­man­der Gen. John Abizaid had asked coun­tries bor­der­ing Afghanistan for per­mis­sion to carry out oper­a­tions within their bor­ders. Gul implied that Pak­istan had not granted its con­sent. In fur­ther com­ments, he said Wash­ing­ton would post­pone elec­tions in Afghanistan in order to con­duct this oper­a­tion and had been pres­sur­ing Islam­abad regard­ing its nuclear pro­gram to coerce its cooperation.

Pak­istan has already appar­ently taken the lead on this offen­sive. On Jan. 13, accord­ing to the _Pakistan Daily Times_, about 250 com­man­dos from the Pak­istani military’s elite Spe­cial Ser­vices Group (SSG) along with reg­u­lar infantry troops were shifted from North Waziris­tan to the Wana area in South Waziris­tan in the Fed­er­ally Admin­is­tered Tribal Areas, notes Strat­for.
The goal of both Amer­ica and Pak­istan will be to root out al Qaeda’s entrenched posi­tions in the law­less North­west Ter­ri­to­ries. Ide­ally, Pak­istani troops will be used for the bulk of the fight­ing, and this is the rea­son for Gul’s denial to the United States.
How­ever, Pakistan’s refusal should be seen as a net gain for both coun­tries. The United States has appar­ently been plan­ning this offen­sive for some time, and with the Bush administration’s his­tory of uni­lat­eral action at the expense of other coun­tries’ sov­er­eignty pretty well known, Pak­istani Pres­i­dent Per­vez Mushar­raf has some cover for going into a region hos­tile to out­side con­trol. He can’t be seen by his peo­ple as acqui­esc­ing to the Amer­i­cans’ wishes, so he denies them access and moves his own troops into the region as a show of strength and sov­er­eignty. He knows full well that the United States will move into Pak­istani ter­ri­tory any­way, and his think­ing is that there’s not a lot the Pak­ista­nis can do to stop Wash­ing­ton. At the same time, because Pak­istan is mak­ing an effort to to root out bin Laden and his jihadists, the White House can’t accuse Musharraf’s gov­ern­ment of not step­ping up to the plate. And — bonus! — any pres­sure on Pakistan’s nuclear pro­gram from Wash­ing­ton will prob­a­bly ease a lit­tle bit. The upshot? Wash­ing­ton gets to act against its real ene­mies with­out desta­bi­liz­ing Mushar­raf, and he doesn’t look like a patsy to his own peo­ple. Also, Islam­abad gets to keep the Bomb, a source of great national pride in Pak­istan.
With this strat­egy, the goal is to have the war against al Qaeda wrapped up some time in 2005.
But back to bin Laden. What will be al Qaeda’s response? Three things: It will to 1) desta­bi­lize or over­throw the Saudi Ara­bian royal fam­ily (a long-held goal), 2) desta­bi­lize Pak­istan or 3) weaken U.S. resolve by mas­sive attacks inside the United States, pos­si­bly with WMD. These strate­gies could be — and likely will be — used together.
In Saudi Ara­bia, al Qaeda could build on its string of bomb­ings and attacks to such a degree that the sur­vival of the cur­rent regime in Riyadh is in doubt. The U.S. would be forced to inter­vene, using the mil­i­tary hard­ware it has and will have in Iraq once the March rota­tion is in motion. (Riyadh is already on high alert for ter­ror attacks dur­ing the hajj.) If al Qaeda can bog down the United States by caus­ing it to stretch its already thin forces in Iraq into Saudi Ara­bia, it will strengthen its hand in Pak­istan, too.
By desta­bi­liz­ing Pak­istan — the two recent assas­si­na­tion attempts against Mushar­raf are prob­a­bly just the first of many to come — al Qaeda makes the United States’ war infi­nitely more dif­fi­cult. With Mushar­raf in con­trol, the U.S. can cut back­room deals that allow it to oper­ate in Pak­istan to attack al Qaeda posi­tions with rel­a­tive free­dom, as dis­cussed above. With a mil­i­tant Islamist _junta_ rul­ing from Islam­abad — a nuclear-armed _junta_, mind you — that’s no longer an option. Can the United States occupy Afghanistan, Iraq _and_ Pak­istan? No.
Finally, al Qaeda may attempt another mas­sive attack on the scale of 9/11. Would mas­sive Amer­i­can casu­al­ties sap the will of the United States? Pos­si­bly. Or maybe not; Sept. 11 didn’t cause the United States to cut and run. Instead, the attacks on the World Trade Cen­ter and the Pen­ta­gon pro­pelled the United States into a war with mil­i­tant Islamists and the fall­out — Iraq, most notably — has divided the West inter­nally and pit­ted the United States against the Mus­lim world. This may have been bin Laden’s main goal all along. What would be the result of another mas­sive attack? The answer depends on how much sym­pa­thy the U.S. could gar­ner from a world that may have exhausted its sup­ply of good­will toward Amer­ica. Instead of a replay of 2001’s sea­son of sol­i­dar­ity, would the United States be seen as reap­ing what it has sown? The Axis of Evil 8-Ball on this one says, “Sources cloudy; ask again later.” If its any con­so­la­tion, bin Laden prob­a­bly doesn’t know either. What is known is that _nothing_ would stop an enraged and wounded Amer­ica from hell­ish retal­i­a­tion.
So for the moment, that’s where all the play­ers stand. Al Qaeda has to demon­strate its effec­tive­ness before the United States starts its offen­sive this year to pre­emp­tively stall any momen­tum Wash­ing­ton may gather. It also has to show its mem­bers and sup­port­ers that it still has the capa­bil­ity to lead the jihad against the West. I pre­dict intense attacks in Pak­istan and Saudi Ara­bia. Oth­er­wise, the United States will attack in Pak­istan and al Qaeda likely will be dealt a death blow and bin Laden cap­tured or killed. That would be a stun­ning set­back for mil­i­tant Islam, what with its spokesman and folk hero felled by the infi­del.
That won’t spell the end of mil­i­tant Islam of course, nor will it mean the end of the ter­ror threat against the United States and the West. Al Qaedaism is more than just the group and it’s more than bin Laden. Smaller groups will con­tinue to exist, oper­ate and net­work. But with­out the charisma of bin Laden — and his web of financ­ing — ter­ror groups affil­i­ated with al Qaeda can be reduced to a chronic, but man­age­able, problem.