U.S. extends betrayal of Kurds to entire Iraqi people; no democracy.


Kur­dish men buy ice creams in the Mazi super­mar­ket in Dohuk. The super­mar­ket was opened two years ago and is seen as a tes­ti­ment to Iraqi Kurdistan’s inde­pen­dence. (Photo by Andrew Testa)

North­ern Iraq is get­ting a bit crowded. About 5,000 Iraqi oppo­si­tion troops, backed by Iran, have entered the PUK’s ter­ri­tory in Iraqi Kur­dis­tan osten­si­bly to secure the bor­der when war breaks across the region. Its real pur­pose, how­ever, may be to repel attacks by the People’s Mujahideen Orga­ni­za­tion (MKO), an anti-Iranian group based in Iraq and strongly backed by Sad­dam Hus­sein. The Iran­ian troops are part of Aya­tol­lah Sayed Mohammed Baqir Al-Hakim’s Badr brigade, which is made up of Shi’ites opposed to Sad­dam Hus­sein. Hakim is the head of the Supreme Coun­cil for Islamic Rev­o­lu­tion in Iraq (SCIRI), a mainly Shia Mus­lim group that fought in the failed 1991 upris­ing against Bagh­dad in south­ern Iraq. More recently, SCIRI has taken part in talks between the Iraqi oppo­si­tion and the U.S.. Accord­ing to the Web site for the SCIRI, “Hakim has an his­tor­i­cal and warm rela­tion with the Kur­dish Move­ments in Iraq since his father gave a reli­gious decree (Fatwa) which for­bade the Iraqi army from fight­ing against the Kurds in Iraq. A mutual agree­ment as been signed by SCIRI with the Patri­otic Union of Kur­dis­tan (PUK) headed by Jalal Tal­a­bani to work against Saddam’s regime. A sim­i­lar agree­ment was signed with the Kur­dish [sic] Demo­c­ra­tic Party (KDP) headed by Masood Barzani sev­eral years ago.“
This might be true, but one of the rea­sons the United States didn’t sup­port the 1991 Iraqi intifada that started in Basra was because it was mainly a Shi’ite move­ment with heavy back­ing by Iran. (The oppo­si­tion in the north was, of course, an effort led by the Kurds, who had been wait­ing for an oppor­tu­nity to rebel since the 1990 inva­sion of Kuwait.) Kuwait and Saudi Ara­bia, alarmed at the prospect of Iran­ian influ­ence expand­ing to their bor­ders and fig­ur­ing a weak­ened Sad­dam was prefer­able to the aya­tol­lahs, agreed with the United States that no sup­port to the mainly Shi’ite rebels would be given.
How the Badr brigade fits into the polit­i­cal and mil­i­tary intrigues of Iraqi Kur­dis­tan remains to be seen. Not only does the region play host to the PUK and the KDP, but also to var­i­ous Islamic par­ties, Ansar al-Islam, U.S. spe­cial forces, sev­eral thou­sand Turk­ish troops (with more soon to come) the MKO and now the Badr brigade. I hon­estly don’t know what’s going to hap­pen, but it can’t be good for U.S. plan­ning.
Or per­haps it doesn’t care. One of the biggest sto­ries yet to be car­ried by the main­stream Amer­i­can press is the appar­ent aban­don­ment of democ­racy in Iraq post-Saddam. Kanan Makiya, author of “Repub­lic of Fear: The Pol­i­tics of Mod­ern Iraq” and a lead­ing Iraqi dis­si­dent, penned a sav­age crit­i­cism of the Bush administration’s plans to replace Sad­dam and his cronies not with demo­c­ra­tic gov­ern­ment but with Amer­i­can gen­er­als and sol­diers where Ba’ath func­tionar­ies once sat. “The plan, as dic­tated to the Iraqi oppo­si­tion in Ankara last week by a United States-led del­e­ga­tion, fur­ther envis­ages the appoint­ment by the U.S. of an unknown num­ber of Iraqi quis­lings palat­able to the Arab coun­tries of the Gulf and Saudi Ara­bia as a coun­cil of advis­ers to this mil­i­tary gov­ern­ment.“
“We Iraqis hoped and said to our Arab and Mid­dle East­ern brethren, over and over again, that Amer­i­can mis­takes of the past did not have to be repeated in the future,” writes Makiya. “Were we wrong? Are the ene­mies of a demo­c­ra­tic Iraq, the ‘anti-imperialists’ and ‘anti-Zionists’ of the Arab world, the sup­port­ers of ‘armed strug­gle’, and the uphold­ers of the pol­i­tics of blam­ing every­thing on the U.S. who are dic­tat­ing the agenda of the anti-war move­ment in Europe and the U.S., are all of these peo­ple to be proved right?“
Most omi­nously:

We, the demo­c­ra­tic Iraqi oppo­si­tion, are the nat­ural friends and allies of the United States. We share its val­ues and long-term goals of peace, sta­bil­ity, free­dom and democ­racy for Iraq. We are here in Iraqi Kur­dis­tan 40 miles from Saddam’s troops and a few days away from a con­fer­ence to plan our next move, a con­fer­ence that some key admin­is­tra­tion offi­cials have done every­thing in their power to post­pone.
None the less, after weeks of effort in Tehran and north­ern Iraq, we have pre­vailed. The meet­ing will take place. It will dis­cuss a detailed plan for the cre­ation of an Iraqi lead­er­ship, one that is in a posi­tion to assume power at the appro­pri­ate time and in the appro­pri­ate place. We will be opposed no doubt by an Amer­i­can del­e­ga­tion if it chooses to attend. Whether or not they do join us in the com­ing few days in north­ern Iraq, we will fight their attempts to mar­gin­alise and shunt aside the men and women who have invested whole life­times, and suf­fered greatly, fight­ing Sad­dam Hus­sein. (Empha­sis added.)

But unless the oppo­si­tion can seize the oil­fields from the Amer­i­can gov­er­nors, they stand lit­tle chance of suc­cess in wrest­ing the des­tiny of their coun­try away from their new mas­ters because they’ll have no money. There is no bud­get in the State Depart­ment for the Iraqi oppo­si­tion groups next year.
“We don’t feel it’s nec­es­sary to fund it any longer,” said Christo­pher Burn­ham, assis­tant sec­re­tary for resource man­age­ment.
In fact, the war has not been bud­geted at all! No one seems to know very much at all about what the war will cost, what will come after Sad­dam and how to man­age the damn place after the shoot­ing dies down a bit.
“Con­querors always call them­selves lib­er­a­tors,” said Sami Abdul-Rahman, deputy prime min­is­ter of the Kur­dish admin­is­tra­tion, in a ref­er­ence to Mr. Bush’s speech last week in which he said U.S. troops were going to lib­er­ate Iraq.
Mr. Abdul-Rahman said the U.S. had reneged on ear­lier promises to pro­mote demo­c­ra­tic change in Iraq. “It is very dis­ap­point­ing,” he said. “In every Iraqi min­istry they are just going to remove one or two offi­cials and replace them with Amer­i­can mil­i­tary offi­cers.“
Last sum­mer, I inter­viewed Mr. Abdul-Rahman. He gave me the copies of the two Kur­dish con­sti­tu­tions the Kur­dis­tan regional gov­ern­ment had drafted. At the time, he could not have been more gra­cious and hope­ful, assur­ing me, the skep­ti­cal reporter, of America’s good inten­tions. The irony should be obvi­ous.
The cyn­i­cism should be as well. Tony Blair made what many felt was the clear­est moral case this week­end for remov­ing Sad­dam, for “lib­er­at­ing” the Iraqi peo­ple. In his State of the Union address in Jan­u­ary, Bush said, “I have a mes­sage for the brave and oppressed peo­ple of Iraq: Your enemy is not sur­round­ing your coun­try, your enemy is rul­ing your coun­try. And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be the day of your lib­er­a­tion.“
By not sup­port­ing a demo­c­ra­tic Iraq, by appoint­ing a con­tro­ver­sial fig­ure such as Ahmed Cha­l­abi as pro­vi­sional leader, by invit­ing Turks to occupy Iraqi Kur­dis­tan and pro­mot­ing some gauzy ill-thought-out vision of a demo­c­ra­tic Mid­dle East imposed by force of arms, the Big Idea ide­al­ism, which never rested com­fort­ably on the shoul­ders of a pres­i­dent who detests com­plex­ity, comes off as cal­low, cyn­i­cal and … what are the words? Oh, yes: “Absolute bull­shit.” The ideas and prin­ci­ples upon which the United States was founded — “lib­erty,” “free­dom,” “jus­tice for all” — and for which we allegedly fought and won two world wars and the Cold War, have become mere words, talk­ing points and awk­wardly mouthed slo­gans used to make a case for a war that no one except for a small junta in Wash­ing­ton wants.
Peo­ple in the pro-war camp often scoff at the “peaceniks” and “appeasers” of the ant-war crowd, call­ing them na�ve and say­ing they are con­sign­ing the Iraqis to oppres­sion if they are opposed the war. But who are really the na�ve ones, I won­der, if the hawks believe this is a war of lib­er­a­tion?
(By the way, read­ers can find a piece I wrote back in Novem­ber on the mixed sig­nals given by the United States regard­ing democ­racy in Iraq here.)

Chirac infected by Bush’s madness

chirac_bush1.jpg
Not speak­ing the same lan­guage: Rela­tions between the United States and Euro­pean “allies” such as France have become increas­ingly bit­ter — and personal.

France lashed out at EU-applicants for sid­ing with the United States over Iraq, indi­cat­ing that a dis­pute over national inter­ests and secu­rity has become per­sonal and is edg­ing into the realm of a slapfest in a play­ground sand­box between the the class bully (Bush) and the trans­fer stu­dent (Chirac.)

Mr Chirac, whose sup­port for enlarge­ment is, as French offi­cials admit, as shal­low as his empa­thy for Chan­cel­lor Ger­hard Schröder of Ger­many, called the can­di­date coun­tries “child­ish” after they had signed two dec­la­ra­tions that sup­ported US pol­icy over Iraq.
It was also “dan­ger­ous, reck­less, not very well-behaved”. The can­di­date coun­tries, he said, “had missed a great oppor­tu­nity to shut up”. He warned their entry to the EU depended on mem­ber states rat­i­fy­ing the acces­sion treaties.

Wlodz­imierz Cimoszewicz, the Pol­ish for­eign min­is­ter, expressed his government’s posi­tion: “We respect the right by France to present its opin­ion. We expect the same for our side.“
The appli­cant coun­tries, which include nations such as Poland, Czech Repub­lic, Bul­garia and Roma­nia, are in a bit of a tight spot because they also want to join NATO as well as the EU and, as the arti­cle points out, they need U.S. Con­gres­sional approval to do so. With U.S. rep­re­sen­ta­tives call­ing for a boy­cott of French prod­ucts and the Pen­ta­gon pulling out troops to pun­ish Ger­man ‘treach­ery,’ it would seem they know where their bread is but­tered, and the bread is not a crois­sant.
Cor­rect me if I’m wrong here, but I thought one of the key points of the EU was to for­mu­late a com­mon for­eign pol­icy to go along with a com­mon agri­cul­tural pol­icy, mon­e­tary pol­icy, etc. If Poland, Czech Repub­lic and other appli­cant nations are pur­su­ing their own for­eign pol­icy with the idea of pro­tect­ing their unique national inter­ests — not that there’s any­thing wrong with that — doesn’t that kind of, you know, under­mine the whole idea of the EU as a sin­gle polit­i­cal unit? Many Ger­mans I know would roll their eyes at the naïvité of this ques­tion. Prob­a­bly a lot of French peo­ple would to. Any­way, this whole row just shows you how un-united “Europe” still is.
And another thing, why does it seem we’re already at war with Europe as a pre­lude to war with Iraq? Was this part of the plan? A friend of mine offered this unique the­ory, tongue planted firmly in cheek: “We always knew the Repub­li­cans hated the U.N., so it’s no sur­prise they want to trash it. But do they hate NATO, too, because Bill Clin­ton used it in Kosovo so well? It’s almost like they want to pick up the china sets that Clin­ton ate off and smash them, just because Clin­ton used them.“
Of course, I don’t believe that, but hell, it makes as much sense as any­thing else as to why Team Bush has allowed this sit­u­a­tion to spin so madly, stu­pidly out of control.

Bush to protesters: “Who cares what you think?”

Big sur­prise here. Pres­i­dent Bush “respect­fully” told the mil­lions of anti-war pro­test­ers to take a hike and that he would not be deterred by anti-war slo­gans, marchers or any other speed bump on the road to Bagh­dad.
Well, I guess this proves one thing: Deter­rence really doesn’t work to stop mad­men.
Bush took a moment to out of his busy sched­ule to con­de­scend to the pro­test­ers who turned out by the mil­lions on Sat­ur­day and who could, con­ceiv­ably, cost Tony Blair his pre­mier­ship.
“Democ­racy is a beau­ti­ful thing, and that peo­ple are allowed to express their opin­ion,” Bush said. I just don’t have to lis­ten, he thought to him­self.
I’d like to think that Bush et al. will pay a price for this come 2004, but I worry that the mem­ory of the Amer­i­can voter is short, too short, and eas­ily erased, like an etch-a-sketch shaken hard, by smart bomb footage and gauzy CNN films of GIs receiv­ing flow­ers from Iraqi chil­dren.
If things go wrong, as they very well could, the fall­out could be dev­as­tat­ing for Amer­ica. If that’s the case, Bush’s polit­i­cal career deserves to be “col­lat­eral damage.”

Why Iraq?

A few days ago, I men­tioned I would pub­lish my thoughts on the real rea­sons for the Bush administration’s drive to attack Iraq. My apolo­gies for the delay. I’m a one-man oper­a­tion here and some­times I have to do other stuff, like sleep.
There are sev­eral the­o­ries float­ing around about the need to attack Iraq, some com­ing from the White House and oth­ers com­ing from var­i­ous sources. The most com­mon argu­ment for attack­ing Iraq, that given by the admin­is­tra­tion, is a mish-mash of wor­ries about weapons of mass destruc­tion, dis­re­gard for U.N. Secu­rity Coun­cil res­o­lu­tions, ties to al Qa’ida and Saddam’s wicked­ness. Of these rea­sons, the WMD ratio­nale seems to have gained the most trac­tion in the minds of many Amer­i­cans. This is hardly sur­pris­ing, as the White House has been relent­lessly on mes­sage regard­ing Saddam’s weapons pro­grams until recently, when Osama bin Laden (remem­ber him?) con­ve­niently popped up to exhort Mus­lims to defend their Iraqi broth­ers through mar­ty­dom oper­a­tions against West­ern inter­ests world­wide if the United States assaults Bagh­dad.
Despite bin Laden’s sneer­ing ref­er­ences to Sad­dam as a “social­ist” and an “apos­tate,” the White House lept upon the tape as proof that Sad­dam and bin Laden were play­ing foot­sie when the West wasn’t look­ing. White House spokesman Ari Fleis­cher said bin Laden’s ref­er­ence to “our mujahideen broth­ers” inside Iraq and his appeal to Mus­lims to pre­pare for jihad sug­gested a “strong state­ment of alliance” between Iraq and al Qa’ida.

Con­tinue read­ing

On the road to Baghdad

I’ve heard from an undis­closed source that Bagh­dad is “Phase-1 Hous­ton” in U.S. mil­i­tary par­lance and that it will be get­ting a visit from the air “very soon.” This is all I know, except that it jibes with a March 1 (or slightly later) start to the cam­paign to oust Sad­dam.
This is start­ing to get tricky. I’m start­ing to get infor­ma­tion spe­cific to war plans and which, if pub­lished, could con­ceiv­ably endan­ger United States forces. Just to be clear: I will not be pub­lish­ing any infor­ma­tion that could get peo­ple killed. If I have advanced infor­ma­tion of troop move­ments, you won’t see it here. I may oppose the war, but I won’t do any­thing to harm peo­ple in the field. I have friends in the mil­i­tary, and they have a tough job. Most them don’t want this war any more than peace activists do and they don’t have the oppor­tu­nity to march in the streets say­ing “no.” How­ever, they do make it pos­si­ble for every­one else to march by nature of their ser­vice to their coun­try.
There­fore, what fol­lows is spec­u­la­tion. I have no data that the fol­low­ing is accu­rate, but I think it makes sense.
The mas­sive buildup in Kuwait and in other Gulf coun­tries such as Qatar is a Calais-style feint. Just as in the first Gulf War, when Marines prac­ticed an amphibi­ous inva­sion that turned out to be a ruse only to mount a mas­sive “left hook” by armored divi­sions, the United States is hop­ing to con­vince Iraq that the major­ity of its attack will be from the south. How­ever, two other fronts could be open with­out the Amer­i­can media being informed.

Turkey and Iraqi Kur­dis­tan: Much has been said about the reluc­tance of Turkey to allow U.S. forces to open up a north­ern front in order to tie down Iraqi forces from rac­ing to defend Bagh­dad. Recent arti­cle have men­tioned fur­ther foot-dragging on the part of the Turk­ish Par­lia­ment. This is likely a ruse. I think it’s prob­a­ble there is already a mod­est build-up of Amer­i­can forces larger than pre­vi­ously admit­ted but smaller than what the United States is pub­licly ask­ing for. The sit­u­a­tion is prob­a­bly even more sta­bi­lized in Iraqi Kur­dis­tan. The Wash­ing­ton Post reported on Jan. 30 that “small num­bers” of Amer­i­can mil­i­tary forces are oper­at­ing in Iraqi Kur­dis­tan. Jalal Tal­a­bani, chair­man of the Patri­otic Union of Kur­dis­tan made a laugh­able dis­tinc­tion between the“personnel“and“troops.” My the­ory is that the num­bers are much greater in Iraqi Kur­dis­tan than any­one is admit­ting. The north­ern front, despite its pub­lic dis­ar­ray is prob­a­bly in pretty good shape.
Iraqi armored vehicleJor­dan and Saudi Ara­bia: There have been con­sis­tent rumors of Amer­i­can troops “train­ing” in Jor­dan. It’s not unrea­son­able for the one Arab coun­try with a free-trade agree­ment with the United States and a peace treaty with Israel to have allowed a mod­est build-up in the east­ern desert ready to launch into Iraq’s vast west­ern provinces to seize SCUD sites and advance on Bagh­dad. There are already troops in Saudi Ara­bia and the desert kingdom’s pub­lic protests, reluc­tance to allow the use of its bases and dec­la­ra­tions that the Amer­i­cans will be expelled after the war could very well be a head-fake on Sad­dam. The government-controlled media could be eas­ily brought to heel, as evi­denced by protests that rocked the coun­try months ago and which were never reported in the newspapers.

in each region I’ve men­tioned, the media are either tightly con­trolled or can quickly be cen­sored. My spec­u­la­tion mir­rors a war plan that was leaked to the New York Times in July 2002 but which was quickly dis­owned by the Amer­i­cans and the regional pow­ers. Turkey and Jor­dan, espe­cially, said quickly that their ter­ri­to­ries would not be used. I’m skep­ti­cal of these claims, espe­cially con­sid­er­ing the lever­age the United States has on Ankara and Amman.
Again, this is spec­u­la­tion, but con­sid­er­ing the his­tory of the United States using mas­sive build-ups to dis­tract ene­mies only to hit them hard from another direc­tion, it makes sense. There are also signs that Iraq may be wise to this tac­tic. Along an Iraqi army post about 100 yards from the Kuwaiti bor­der, “there is no sign here that Iraq is doing much to pre­pare itself mil­i­tar­ily against an inva­sion. A stray tank or two can be seen far­ther north, off the road from Basra to Bagh­dad, but oth­er­wise there is lit­tle evi­dence of any real mil­i­tary pres­ence near the zone.“
In two weeks or so, we’ll see how close I was in my pre­dic­tions. Any tak­ers?
[UPDATE: I swear I didn’t read this arti­cle in the Boston Globe before I wrote this entry. But the two pieces seem to jibe pretty closely, eh?]