From Atatürk to Allah?

Tomor­row is elec­tion day in Turkey and it’s com­ing down to the home stretch! The Jus­tice and Devel­op­ment Party (AKP) is likely to win about 30 per­cent of the vote, which would make them the senior part­ner in any coali­tion gov­ern­ment, assum­ing they don’t win out­right. The Repub­li­can People’s Party (CHP), founded by Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, is polling at 15 to 20 per­cent. How­ever, Atatürk’s party is avowedly sec­u­lar, so it’s unlikely the two would part­ner up.
The sit­u­a­tion is mak­ing the mil­i­tary and other sec­u­lar Turks very, very ner­vous. In 1997, the AKP’s pre­de­ces­sor, the Wel­fare Party, was eased out by the mil­i­tary in what many have called a “soft coup.” But that option isn’t avail­able now. With the Euro­pean Union still dan­gling the car­rot of mem­ber­ship, the Turk­ish mil­i­tary can’t risk step­ping in and muck­ing about with elec­tions and democ­racy. But the pow­ers that be in Turkey also worry that a gov­ern­ment headed by an Islamist party wouldn’t be attrac­tive to Europe either, so Turkey is kind of caught in a bind.
Fur­ther com­pli­cat­ing the sit­u­a­tion, Mil­liyet reported last week that Turkey’s top state pros­e­cu­tor, Sabih Kanadoglu, has filed for the clo­sure of the AKP, cit­ing defi­ance by the party’s leader, for­mer Istan­bul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdo­gan, to give up his party post. Erdo­gan was banned from par­tic­i­pat­ing in pol­i­tics after he read a poem “incit­ing reli­gious hatred” in a mosque in 1997 and served four months in jail. Though the case won’t be decided for months, if the party even­tu­ally is shut down its sup­port­ers would see their votes wasted. All this legal maneu­ver­ing has been an attempt by the mil­i­tary and sec­u­lar lead­er­ship to depress the vote on AKP, and as I was told when I was in Ankara, “Turkey is the grave­yard of polit­i­cal par­ties.“
(For what it’s worth Sabah reported that U.S. State Depart­ment spokesman Richard Boucher said the United States is opposed to ban­ning polit­i­cal par­ties. “The US sup­ports democ­racy and broad polit­i­cal par­tic­i­pa­tion in Turkey and else­where,” he is quoted as say­ing. “We oppose the ban­ning of polit­i­cal par­ties that are express­ing their views in a peace­ful and demo­c­ra­tic man­ner.”)
Though Erdo­gan is banned by law from serv­ing in a gov­ern­men­tal post — such as, oh, prime min­is­ter for exam­ple — the sus­pi­cion is that he will work behind the scenes run­ning the coun­try, prob­a­bly through a weak prime min­is­ter. There is also con­cern that his com­mit­ment to mod­er­a­tion and democ­racy is only skin deep. He was elected mayor of Istan­bul in 1994 and promptly banned alco­hol in the city’s restau­rants. He has close ties with for­mer Wel­fare Party prime min­is­ter Erbakan, who dined with ter­ror­ists and talked of pulling out of NATO. Per­haps most omi­nously, “You can­not be sec­u­lar and a Mus­lim at the same time,” Erdo­gan said in 1995.
But he’s been crafty in how he has answered ques­tions on how he would lib­er­al­ize laws con­cern­ing the pub­lic expres­sion of reli­gion. For exam­ple, it is cur­rently ille­gal for women to wear head­scarves in uni­ver­si­ties, schools and gov­ern­ment build­ings or at gov­ern­ment func­tions. This is a highly emo­tional issue in Turkey, with head­scarves being a potent sym­bol of polit­i­cal Islam. Erdo­gan has been care­ful to not iden­tify the AKP with this kind of con­tro­versy. Would his wife, an obser­vant Mus­lim, wear a head­scarf at gov­ern­ment func­tions? “I wouldn’t bring her,” he has said, neatly not answer­ing the ques­tion or assuag­ing Turk­ish women’s fears.
So what are the sce­nar­ios? Near as I can tell, they are as follows:

  • The AKP wins deci­sively with enough seats in Par­lia­ment to form a gov­ern­ment with­out resort­ing to a part­ner. The mil­i­tary might inter­vene or it might not. If it doesn’t, look for the AKP to be kept on a short leash.
  • The AKP wins a major­ity, but can­not form a gov­ern­ment, in which case they will part­ner up with — pos­si­bly — Deniz Baykal’s Devlet Bahceli’s Nation­al­ist Action Party (MHP). I think a coali­tion between the nation­al­ists and Islamists could be one of the worst com­bi­na­tions. “The result will def­i­nitely be another coali­tion, an anom­aly of very con­tra­dic­tory views,” said Prof. Deniz Ilgaz of Bogazi�i Uni­ver­sity when I emailed her about all of this.
  • The myr­iad sec­u­lar par­ties in Par­lia­ment band together in a broad-based coali­tion together to keep the AKP out of power. The result­ing gov­ern­ment would be weak and inef­fec­tual, and would pretty much cement the sta­tus quo. None of the prob­lems of Turkey would be addressed, and the mil­i­tary would remain the de facto ruler of the country.

So what will hap­pen and how might this affect the United States’ deter­mi­na­tion to open up some pre­ci­sion guided whoop-ass on Iraq, a fel­low Mus­lim coun­try and for­merly a major trad­ing part­ner to Turkey? We’ll have the out­lines in a day. But one thing is cer­tain is that the polit­i­cal land­scape is about to change in unpre­dictable ways.

Happy birthday, Turkey

Happy 79th birth­day, Turkey! You look weeks younger!
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded by the mod­ern Turk­ish state Oct. 29, 79 years ago. For all of Turkey’s prob­lems today, no one should under­es­ti­mate the deter­mi­na­tion and accom­plish­ment of Atatürk. In the face of hos­tile ene­mies, a skep­ti­cal world and a col­lec­tion of peo­ples with no rea­son to band together, he forged a mod­ern and Western-facing nation out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Regard­less of how peo­ple view the mod­ern Turkey, it’s a damn sight bet­ter than what might have been had he failed. And for that I tip my hat to Father Turk.
I also think that were he alive today, he would have brought the same energy, deter­mi­na­tion (and, frankly, author­i­tar­i­an­ism) to the prob­lems of the Repub­lic. But he’s not, and Turkey needs to step out of the great man’s shadow and move on. Atatürk was able to accom­plish what he did because he didn’t worry about the demo­c­ra­tic process. And his approach was exactly right for what was needed at the time. But today, Turkey must embrace a full democ­racy and remove the mil­i­tary from the deci­sion mak­ing process. The slo­gan that adorns the steps lead­ing up to Atatürk’s mau­soleum in Ankara should be amended. Instead of “Sov­er­eignty rests with the Nation,” it should instead derive from the peo­ple — all of them, Turks and Kurds alike. His admo­ni­tion to the army to pro­tect the nation from all ene­mies for­eign and domes­tic should come with the appen­dix the peo­ple are not the enemy; they are cit­i­zens.
I’d like to think that Atatürk would rec­og­nize this. Turkey no longer needs a Great Man. It needs a great people.

Turkey preparing to invade Kurdistan?

Turkey has been mak­ing noises that the Iraqi Kurds should not get too hope­ful about estab­lish­ing a quasi-independent entity in the three gov­er­nates they con­trol in north­ern Iraq. Now, it looks like Turkey is ready to back up their words with force. (At least they’re con­sis­tent.) How­ever, there is an elec­tion com­ing up in Turkey, so the pos­si­bil­ity that this is all fod­der for domes­tic con­stituen­cies can­not be ruled out.
On the they-really-mean-it side of the equa­tion, Ara​bic​News​.com is report­ing that Turk­ish deputy prime min­is­ter Doulat Bah­jali said that his coun­try must recon­sider its stance regard­ing north­ern Iraq. Since 1991 when it got dragged into Oper­a­tion Pro­vide Com­fort (the allied estab­lish­ment of the north­ern no-fly zone to pro­tect Kur­dish refugees from the 1990 – 91 Gulf War,) Turky has gone back and forth in its rela­tions with the PUK and KDP. At times the rela­tion­ship was warm enough that Barzani and Tal­a­bani, the lead­ers of the respec­tive par­ties, trav­eled under Turk­ish diplo­matic pass­ports.
That has appar­ently ended with final­ity after the Kur­dis­tan Regional Gov­ern­ment con­vened its par­lia­ment in Octo­ber and intro­duced a pro­posal for a fed­eral repub­lic of Iraq with a Kur­dish entity in the north and with Kirkuk as its cap­i­tal. Kirkuk, rich in oil and his­tory is home to Kurds, Arabs, Assyr­i­ans and Turkomen, to whose defense Bah­jali is leap­ing.
“The pres­sures which are imposed on the Turkomen under Sad­dam Hus­sein were great and that they are at the mean­time exposed to a new threat by the two Kur­dish lead­ers Masoud al-Barazani and Jalal al-Talabani tar­get­ing their cities of Mosul, Kirkuk and Arbil,” Ara​bic​News​.com says. (Ed. I changed some spellings of towns in this quote.)
This backs up the it’s-all-politics argu­ment, since the Turkomen are a nat­ural ally of Bahjali’s National Move­ment Party, and bash­ing the Kurds is always a sure­fire way to rally the nation­al­ist faith­ful. How­ever, Turk­ish defense min­is­ter Sbah Eddin Oglo said Oct. 14 that Turkey intends to estab­lish ‘a secu­rity belt’ in north­ern Iraq and that intel­li­gence agen­cies have reported that Turkey has increased its troop strength in Iraqi Kur­dis­tan from 4,000 to 10,000 troops.
All of this must be dri­ving the United States crazy. The last thing it needs is a Kurdish-Turkish dis­pute in north­ern Iraq just when it’s try­ing to get its ducks in a row should shoot­ing start. And this is exactly the kind of chaos var­i­ous pun­dits have pre­dicted would hap­pen if Sad­dam is removed and regional rival­ries are allowed to flare. But wasn’t that sup­posed to hap­pen after a war?
Keep watch­ing the Turks. They hold the key to all of this.

HADEP Deputy Chairman: “This is democracy in Turkey”

While in Ankara, Aykut and I spent a day try­ing to find the local offices of var­i­ous Iraqi and Kur­dish oppo­si­tion groups includ­ing the KDP and PUK. We were look­ing for var­i­ous offi­cials who might be able to help me when I went to Diyarbakir in the south­east and on to Iraq, but we weren’t hav­ing much luck, and kept dri­ving through twisty neigh­bor­hoods hop­ing the cops weren’t fol­low­ing us.

At one point, the com­edy descended into farce, as we drove into a mil­i­tary res­i­dence area look­ing for the embassies. We found the embassies, but the PUK still eluded us. We drove past the Jor­dan­ian, Syr­ian and Saudi Embassies, but finally stopped out­side the the United Arab Emi­rates while Aykut jumped out of the car and asked a bored-looking secu­rity guard for directions.

Excuse me, where are the offices for the Patri­otic Union of Kur­dis­tan?” Akyut asked while I shrunk into my seat and tried to look invisible.

The guard, a Turk and appar­ently no friend of Iraqi Kurds, looked him up and down, looked me up and down, and then motioned off down the road.

Aykut dropped his bulk into the dri­vers’ seat and smiled at me.

Don’t do that again,” I said.

He apol­o­gized, but at least the guard’s direc­tions were good. We finally found the rather sad look­ing house that was the office for the PUK. No one was around except for a plain­clothes guy who watched us closely and smoked a cig­a­rette like a fugi­tive. He made me ner­vous, so we left to go meet A. Turan Demir, the deputy chair­man of HADEP, the Kur­dish party in Turkey. The tran­script — from Aykut’s translation — follows:

Con­tinue read­ing

Ecevit: Kurds dragging Turkey into war

Wow. I posted the pro­posed Kur­dish and Iraqi con­sti­tu­tions last night—and my thoughts that the Kurds are ask­ing for trouble—and wouldn’t you know it? Today, the Guardian runs this. It’s more of that growl­ing that I men­tioned in my pre­vi­ous post, but what’s most alarm­ing about this is Turkey’s charges that the United States is direct­ing the Kurds: “It is beyond encour­age­ment, (Wash­ing­ton) is direct­ing them,” Prime Min­is­ter Bulent Ece­vit told the Turk­ish paper Mil­liyet. “We will talk to the United States.“
If the United States is direct­ing the PUK and the KDP, that would amount to a stun­ning rever­sal against Turkey, one of our most loyal allies in the region. I don’t think that we are, frankly, and these com­ments are likely play­ing to Ecevit’s nation­al­ist base of sup­port, which often views the U.S. with sus­pi­cion. (They still har­bor resent­ments over Cyprus form 1964 and 1974.)
The United States needs Turkey more than it needs the Kurds, sadly, as the Kurds have only about 80,000 lightly armed pesh­mer­gas while the Turks have tanks and F-16s (bought from the United States, of course.) They’re also a NATO ally and Incir­lik is a nec­es­sary base for run­ning sor­ties in the north­ern no-fly zone.
But beyond that Turkey is valu­able to the United States in that it pro­vides a “good exam­ple” of democ­racy and Islam, serv­ing as an effec­tive ide­o­log­i­cal coun­ter­weight to Iran. It also has close ties to the Turkish-speaking peo­ples of cen­tral Asia and their energy reserves.
This is why the United States has been such a pro­po­nent of Turkey’s ascen­sion to the Euro­pean Union. America’s sup­port is a com­plex web of self-interest (keep­ing a strong, demo­c­ra­tic Mus­lim nation tied to the West) and pay-back (see mil­i­tary alliance above.) It’s also why the Kurds of south­east Turkey both admire and resent the United States. They admire it for its stance on the Turkey-EU issue, and they see mem­ber­ship as the key to eco­nomic recov­ery in that depressed region. They resent Amer­ica because it was very very sup­port­ive of Turkey’s war against the PKK’s ter­ror cam­paign (which Turkey remem­bered when Sept. 11, 2001 hap­pened.)
So, again, I’m not sure what would hap­pen if Iraq’s Kurds attain some form of inde­pen­dence. That would almost cer­tainly drive the Turks to war in Iraqi Kur­dis­tan, and what then would the Amer­i­cans do? This may turn out to be a big­ger ques­tion than who rules the day after Saddam…